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This is a study of nationalism and its visual representation in Taiwan’s 
architecture. Although nationalism studies have achieved significant theoretic 
breakthroughs in sociology, politics and history over the past decades, its close 
relationship with architecture has not received enough attention. In recent related 
architectural literature, too much emphasis is placed on stylistic analysis concerning 
‘national style’, and less on those wider social, cultural and political factors which 
also play an important role in shaping nationalistic architecture during 
nation-formation. In order to bridge the gap, this thesis attempts to carry out a 
cross-disciplinary study, engaging architecture with the notion of nationalism and 
other relative perspectives in a quest for better understanding. In doing so, Taiwan’s 
nationalistic architecture is divided into four different building types: the martyrs’ 
shrine, the museum, the parliament building and the memorial hall. By examining 
these types and cases, this thesis argues that nationalistic architecture is a particular 
type of building created by specialised architects who were encouraged to select 
certain visible and cultural markers, establishing a symbolic link connecting the 
current nation with its previous ethnic roots in the service of politics during the age 
of nation-building. As a part of a growing body of research on nationalism and its 
architectural representations, this thesis aims to advance our understanding of the 
important issue regarding the relationship between nationalism and architecture in 
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In March 2007, in the Asia section of the Economist, there was an article with the 
title Taiwan Cultural Revolution: the Fight over a Dictator’s Legacy. It discussed the 
most controversial political issue in Taiwan; how to deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
cultural and political legacy, especially the grand Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in 
Taipei city centre. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the ruling party at that 
time, intended to intensify a campaign against Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) (1887-1975) 
and his political heirs when the island marked the 60
th
 anniversary of the 228 Incident. 
According to a new official report, Research Report on Responsibility for the 228 
Massacre (二二八事件責任歸屬研究報告) (2006), Chiang Kai-shek was accused as the 
executive who should bear the full responsibility for the Incident, which caused 
18,000 to 28,000 deaths during the violent military suppression of local uprisings 




Blaming the massacre on Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party 
(Koumingtang or KMT), former President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁 ) (1950- ) 
announced a plan to rename the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as the ‘Taiwan 
Democracy Memorial Hall’ and to tear down the perimeter wall of the Memorial 
Hall.
2
 In that speech, Chen also called Chiang Kai-shek the ‘true murderer’ who 
caused a terrible tragedy for Taiwanese people under his dictatorship. Chen made an 
apology to the victims and their families for the incident and expressed his discontent 
about ‘imperial treatment;’ that the perpetrators and their families still enjoyed 
privilege, shielding themselves from being brought to justice. The existence of the 
                                                 
1
 Zhang Yan-xian張炎憲 二二八事件責任歸屬研究報告 (Research Report on Responsibility for the 
228 Massacre), (Taipei: Wu Press, 2006). This is the second official report on the 228 Incident and 
the first issued by the DDP government. 
2
 ‘Chen Blasts Chiang over 228 Role,’ Taipei Times, 27 February 2007.   
 2 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was proof that showed that the ‘murderer’ was still 
treated with the highest respect in Taiwan. Chen described the Memorial Hall as ‘a 
building with a strong tinge of one-party rule’ and ‘the product of a feudal time which 
does not conform to democratic trend’. Chen vowed that he would begin to seriously 
tackle the totalitarian legacy left by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in the last year of 




Indeed, it seemed like good timing for Chen Shui-bian to deal with Chiang’s 
totalitarian legacy after the KMT had fallen from power in 2000.
4
 The DPP is the 
biggest pro-independence party in Taiwan, and its political stance and national 
ideology are completely different to that of the KMT. When the DPP won the 
Presidency and elections in local administrations, it planned to eliminate the cult of 
Chiang Kai-shek and its references in the Taiwanese landscape step by step.
5
 The 
prominent target of the campaign was the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. In aiming 
for this target, the campaign used this iconic piece of architecture to symbolise the 
victory of the pro-independence groups.   
 
Following President Chen’s announcement, the Premier of the Executive Yuan 
Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) (1947- ) conceived a project aimed at demolishing the 
perimeter walls of the Memorial Hall.
6
 Later, however, this project was forced to be 
suspended due to strong objections. Thousands of people gathered together in the 
                                                 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Some scholars believe that the reason that Chen launched this anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign was 
that in the six years of ruling, the DPP unfortunately had no significant achievement in political and 
economic reforms to persuade their supporters to vote for them. A major newspaper’s post-election 
poll also showed that only 21% of population was satisfied with Chen’s ruling. See Zhou Yang-shan 
周陽山 , ‘三合一大選選舉結果的整體分析  (Three-in-one Elections in Taiwan: A General 
Analysis),’ 台灣民主季刊 (Taiwan Democracy Quarterly) 2, no. 4 (December 2005): 130.    
5
 More details about the DPP’s anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign please see Jeremy E. Taylor, 
‘QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Reign on Taiwan,’ 
Journal of Contemporary History 45, no. 1 (January 2010). 
6
 ‘CKS memorial hall the latest to be rechristened,’ Taipei Times, 03 March 2007.  
 3 
square of the Memorial Hall to demonstrate in protest at this project.
7
 Not only did 
the KMT and many pro-reunion groups oppose Su’s idea, but some members of the 
DPP showed deep concern about the manner and timing of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek 




These political brawls over the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall provoked a 
series of questions which needed to be answered: why had the Memorial Hall become 
the main focus of Taiwan’s political struggles and historical debates? Why it is the 
Memorial Hall, but not other buildings connected to certain national and political 
ideology? In other words, the main concern of the current thesis is how are particular 
types of buildings constructed and interpreted as metaphors of the nation in Taiwan? 
What is the social and political condition that helps to produce these buildings? What 
kind of architectural aesthetics on which these buildings are based are to be utilised as 
visual cultural markers to express a strong sense of national identity and community?  
 
Fundamental to these questions are the close relationships between nationalism 
and its visual representations in Taiwan. These questions are concerned more with the 
ways in which certain public buildings are used to serve politics in order to manifest 
the glory of national traditions. In asking this type of question, this thesis attempts to 
search for a better understanding of nationalistic architecture through the exploration 
of theories and methodologies from other disciplines. Therefore, the intersection 
between architecture and national identity in the age of nation-formation in Taiwan 
will be presented in this study. Without uncovering the reason why certain 
architecture is used as a political tool in the service of national ideology, and the role 
                                                 
7
 ‘萬人連署 反對中正紀念堂拆圍牆 (More than 10,000 people signed the petition against the 
project of demolishing the perimeter walls of the Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall),’ 聯合報 (United 
Daily News), 07 March 2007. 
8
 Taylor, ‘QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Reign on 
Taiwan,’ 182. 
 4 
that particular politicians and architects play in the construction of these buildings, a 
satisfactory explanation cannot be found.   
 
In recent years, a growing number of studies have explored the notions of nations 
and nationalism. The works of three leading scholars, Ernest Gellner, Benedict 
Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, who is also known as the founder of the modernist 
approach, have paved the way for many relative studies on nations and nationalism.
9
 
They share the belief that it is the transformation of modern society, not the root of 
ethnicity as primordialists have suggested, that is the key factor forming national 
consciousness in the modern era. Although they use slightly different terms to 
describe nationalism in their research, the fundamental assumption is the same, 
namely nationalism is a modern phenomenon; it is not possible to have a greater 
understanding of nations and nationalism without locating them in a modern context.  
 
Although this modernist perspective marks out a significant departure in 
nationalism studies, their arguments still attract a great deal of criticism. Post-colonial 
theorists Bhikhu Parekh and Partha Chatterjee criticise the modernist approach as a 
type of Euro-centralism. It oversimplifies the processes of nation-building in 
non-European countries and views them as passive consumers of the European model 
but without their own translations, re-interpretations and colonial resistance.
10
 Umut 
Ö zkirimli, Steven Grosby and John Hutchison also point out that the modernist 
approach is based on an assumption of cultural and social homogeneity within a 
nation. It largely ignores that most countries in the world are comprised of varying 
                                                 
9
 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); 
Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).  
10
 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse,’ Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1  
(March 1995); Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).  
 5 
degrees of cultural and ethnic differences, which may generate different imaginations 
of a nation. During nation-formation, these differences may encounter violent 




Among these critics, Anthony D. Smith is one of the most influential scholars. 
He argues that nations and nationalism are rarely ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ as most 
modernists have claimed. There must have been something ‘real’ inside the nation for 
these nationalists to create. Smith does not deny that modernism plays an important 
role in the formation of national consciousness, but without the pre-existence of 
traditions and ethnic ties, such as the symbols of constitutive political myths and 
ethnic cultural roots, nationalist builders could not build a solid foundation for a 
nation in modern times.
12
 Therefore Smith developed the ethno-symbolist approach 
to offer cultural and historical perspectives to nationalism studies.  
 
Inspired by Smith’s studies, this thesis will apply ethno-symbolism to the 
examination of Chinese nationalism and its cultural representations in architecture in 
Taiwan. Due to the distinctive developments of Chinese nationalism in China and 
Taiwan, Smith’s theory provides a better explanatory framework to the studies of 
cultural and historical factors in nationalism. In addition, his theory also emphasises 
the importance of visual representations, especially in architecture, in the formation of 
the nation.
13 
Thus ethno-symbolism offers a profound insight to the relationship 
between nationalism and architecture.  
 
In this thesis, nationalism refers to a term used to describe an ideological 
                                                 
11
  Umut Özkirimli and Steven Grosby, ‘Nationalism Theory Debate: The Antiquity of Nations?’ 
Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 3 (July 2007); John Hutchinson, ‘Ethnicity and Modern Nations,’ 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 4 (July 2000).  
12
  Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ Journal of International 
Studies 20, no. 3 (March 1991).  
13
 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998).  
 6 
movement on behalf of a population attaining their common political goal on 
autonomy, unity and identity in certain area.
14
 National identity is an emotional bond 
ties the nation with its members through an act that constantly reproduces and 
reinterprets values, memories, myths, symbols, and traditions of a nation.
15
 
Nationality is an external expression of national identity in a variety of ways to show 
one’s distinctive national characters used to indicate the racial differences between 
one group and others. Nationalisation is a social and cultural movement directed by 
political elites with an aim to monopolise the identity in an established nation.
16
 The 
concept of these terms in nationalism studies is crucial for understanding nationalism 
and its relation to cultural and art expressions.    
 
In this thesis, ‘Nationalistic Architecture’ is a term used to describe a type of 
building created by architects who were encouraged to adopt a ‘national style’ from 
the past to satisfy the needs of politics. Architecture would become the ‘metaphors of 
the nation’, because nationalists tended to carefully select particular visible cultural 
markers, establishing a symbolic link connecting the current nation with its previous 
ethnic roots during nation-formation. Therefore, the study of nationalistic architecture 
should take wider political, historical and cultural factors into consideration.  
 
This thesis is an attempt to explore this topic. It is an interdisciplinary study 
aimed at advancing our understanding of the important issue concerning the 
relationship between nationalism and architecture in Taiwan. It will also put 
architecture into a particular social, cultural and political focus for further 
examination, but will limit stylistic analysis to cataloguing these buildings. It does not 
                                                 
14
 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (London: Routledge, 
2009), chapter 4.  
15
 Ibid., 15-6. Also see Anthony D. Smith, The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western 
Europe 1600-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.  
16
 Benedict Anderson has a clear introduction to nationalisation in the chapter 6 of his famous book 
Imagined Communities. Please see Anderson, Imagines Communities, 83-111.  
 7 
mean that a traditional formalist manner is not important to the topic, but the true 
meaning of these buildings would not be identified if a cross-disciplinary explanation 
was not considered.  
 
It should be noted that although Smith offer a path-breaking contribution to the 
study of nationalism in cultural and historical aspects, he is still skeptical about 
political accounts of nationalism.
17
 He pays less attention to the impact of political 
factors which also play an important role in nationhood.
18
  The development of 
Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, for example, was largely a top-down model 
manipulated by certain politicians and elites who would like apply their idea of the 
Chines nation to the new occupied island. If the political factors had not been fully 
explored, the discussion on Chinese nationalism in Taiwan would not be complete. 
Therefore, this study will emphasise on the top-down model of politics to explain how 
leading political figures made use of national myths and symbols in China and in 
Taiwan to sustain the legitimacy of ruling power. 
 
In recent years, Smith shifts his focus of nationalism study from historical, social 
and cultural subjects to visual art. In his new book The Nation Made Real: Art and 
National Identity in Western Europe, 1660-1850, Smith conducts a study focusing on 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Western European (especially British and 
French) visual culture.
19
 Inspired by the abstract concept of the nation, the artists 
(especially the painters) concerned about the theme which had never emerged in the 
history of art: the creation of memorable images of the nation in the age of 
nationalism. Through the pre-existing materials like artistic symbolisms, mythologies, 
                                                 
17
 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 137. 
18
 Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,’ 
in History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and Its Critics, ed. Guibernau and Hutchinson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 140-1. Also see Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism, 206.  
19
 Smith, The Nation Made Real.  
 8 
and heroic national pasts, the rise of national art creates a new connection between the 
nation and its people to evocate an emotional bond and cognitive framework for the 
reception of national sentiments. Since that time, antiquities, relics, monuments of the 




Indeed, Smith’s book shows that the artists at that time attempt to translate the 
idea of the nation into rendered tangible and accessible works of art to appeal to the 
wider public and draw them into the conceptual and emotional world of nationalism. 
However, Smith’s researches mainly focus on Western European painting and its 
relation to the nation and nationalism. Architecture as art has not been paid enough 
attention in his book, not to mention the developments of nationalistic architecture in 
Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Japan, China and Taiwan during nation-formation. 
Therefore, nationalistic architecture is an important issue worth further study in depth 
for better understanding of the nation and its representations in art.  
 
In recent years, studies of architectural history seem to be more concerned with 
the social, cultural and political influences upon architecture. Andrew Ballantyne has 
mentioned that the discipline of architectural history traditionally tended to exclude 
political, economic and social considerations from its discussions, that fine aesthetic 
effects may not be enough to map out completed contours of architectural history. It 
has to be supplemented with knowledge of the social and political context.
21
 As Eric 
Fernie has also pointed out, architectural history, especially the history of cathedrals, 
needs to involve a wider range of disciplines.
22
 In addition, in an article titled 
‘Modernity and Architecture’, Iain Boyd Whyte noted that modern architecture must 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., p12-3. 
21
  Andrew Ballantyne, ‘Architecture as Evidence,’ in Rethinking Architecture Historiography, ed. 
Dana Arnold, Elvan A. Ergut and Belgin T. Ö zkaya (London: Routledge, 2006), 47-48. 
22
  Eric C. Fernie, ‘Art History and Architectural History,’ in Rethinking Architecture Historiography, 
ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan A. Ergut and Belgin T. Ö zkaya (London: Routledge, 2006), 20. 
 9 
be understood as a response to social, political and scientific discourses in the late 
eighteenth century. Stripped of this relationship, modernism in architecture would 
simply become an empty formalism.
23
 Therefore, this thesis will carry out a 
cross-disciplinary study, engaging architecture with the notion of nationalism and 
other relative perspectives from political, social and cultural studies.  
 
However, contemporary nationalism studies have given too much weight to 
political, social and literary issues. Only a few studies have explored the subject of 
nationalistic architecture.
24
 It should be noted that although these researchers were 
early explorers in this topic, their main focus was European, American and some 
African architecture. For example, Barry Bergdoll’s book European Architecture, 
1750-1890 (2000) was perhaps was one of the earliest studies examining the close 
relationship between architecture and nationalism in the English-speaking world.
25
 
Although this book mainly concentrated on the growth of nationalistic architecture in 
Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this model is 
obviously limited to the boundary of geopolitics in Europe. Lawrence J. Vale’s book 
Architecture, Power, and National Identity (1992), also mentions the development of 
some areas of architecture and urban planning under the influence of political power 
                                                 
23
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 However, Vale mainly put his focus on capital planning, the 
offices of President and parliament buildings, while other building types have not 
been fully presented in his book.  
 
In the introduction of an edited book Nationalism and Architecture, Raymond 
Quek points out that it was German architects who began to raise a debate over the 
issue on the adoption of the appropriate style for the nation during the early eighteenth 
century.
27
 The debate has strongly emerges and quickly became the central 
preoccupation across Europe from Scandinavia, Italy, England, France, Holland to 
Germany. Heinrich Hübsch’s book ‘In What Style Should We Build?’ was one of the 
key references provoked a serial of intense discussions on stylistic options for the 
representation of the Germen nation.
28
 Hübsch believes that the classical architectural 
doctrines (especially the Greek revival’s) impeded the establishment of a new style. 
He argues that the basic determinants of style are the four factors: material, technical 
experience, climate, and present needs.
29
 In order to attain a new style, it is necessary 
to probe into the factors for developing a style representing the present. As a result, 
Hübsch concludes that the Rundbogenstil (rounded-arch style) is the most suitable 
style for the new era, because it totally satisfies the requirement of the four factors and 




‘Ein neuer Baustyl’ (A new Style of Building) is another article shifting its focus 
of the making of an architectural style from classical architectural doctrines to the 
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 The historical background of this article was that the 
Akademie der bildenden Künste in Munich processed a competition for a new 
institution of higher education with clear intention to find a new style at the behest of 
a King. Germanic art intellectuals were sufficiently alarmed to the manipulation of 
architectural style from politics. Therefore, in 1851, the Duetsches Kunstblatt, a 
famous German language art and art criticism journal in the nineteenth century, 
published a cover article called ‘ein neuer Baustyl’ to demonstrate that the 
development of an architectural style is mainly dependent on social and political 
conditions, rather than a demand from the authority. As Quek notes, this article fully 
shows an inherent ambiguity in the problem of national identity in architecture at that 
time: a dilemma between natural origins and cultural expression of an architectural 
style.
32
   
 
However, the discussions on the national style both in Heinrich Hübsch’s book 
and Duetsches Kunstblatt’s cover article reflects a primordialist thought of 
nationalism, rather than modernist or ethno-symbolist methods in explanation for the 
development of the architectural style. As mentions earlier, primodialism tends to 
view the style as an organic body, or a linear, progressive process evolved from time 
immemorial. It indicates that the style is a fix ethnic maker attached to certain groups 
of people as a priori, but not a developing concept swayed by leading elites in 
particular time and place. In addition, due to historical and cultural differences, the 
debates over the national style in Germany barely have any influence on Far Eastern 
architecture. Therefore, this thesis will mostly focus on China’s and Taiwan’s debates 
on the national style to explore the way political ideology exercises its power over 
architecture.  
                                                 
31
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In the Chinese-speaking academic community, Fu Chao-ching’s book New 
Architecture in the Chinese Classical Style (中國古典式樣新建築) (1993) is perhaps one 
of the most widely-known books on nationalistic architecture both in China and in 
Taiwan.
33
 Indeed, in this book, Fu fully examines China’s new trend of architectural 
designs beginning in the early twentieth century, highlighting both foreign and 
Chinese architects, who had started to nudge in a new direction in adopting Chinese 
traditional building elements in modern construction. Fu’s studies have paved the way 
for examination of the development of the Chinese classical style in the twentieth 
century. However, lacking further discussion on new theoretical contributions of 
nationalism studies in these three decades, Fu merely appeals to conventional stylistic 
analysis in his studies of nationalistic architecture. This means that the idea of 
nationalism as a serious and formative factor in the creation of early modern Chinese 
architecture is essentially unexplored. The same problem can also be identified in a 
new book, Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-arts (2011), edited by Jeffery W. Cody, 
Nancy S. Steinhardt and Tony Atkin.
34
 In this book, most of the authors correctly 
point out that Beaux-arts aesthetics played a central role in the formation of the 
Chinese classical style. However, due to their overwhelming emphasis on stylistic 
analysis, they also fail to examine the way that many key public buildings and 
monuments embodied a sense of Chinese national identity in the early Republican era. 
Therefore, a further aim of this thesis is to bridge the theoretical gap between 
nationalism and architecture. Here, the stylistic analysis is only one of the auxiliary 
means to support the explanation of ethno-symbolism in nationalistic architecture.  
 
                                                 
33
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34
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The relationship between China and Taiwan in the history is controversial and 
complicated.
35
 Although fragmentary human remains have been found on the island 
which could date to 20,000 to 3,000 years ago, not until the Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644) did the Han Chinese begin settling in the new territory and start 
competing for natural resources with aborigines. From 1624 to 1662, the Dutch East 
India Company established a trading outpost in Tainan for its value of trade to 
Southeast Asia. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty, Koxinga, a Ming loyalist and 
the formal commander of Ming troops on the maritime front for the post-Ming 
monarchs, expelled the Dutch government and military from the island to establish a 
base to supporting his grand campaign against the Manchu rulers. However, in 1683, 
Koxinga’s grandson was defeated by the Qing court. The island was now formally 




When nationalism became a dominant ideology of China in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Taiwan was still a peripheral territory of the Chinese empire with 
several severe rebellions needed to be surpassed. In 1895, the Qing court was defeated 
in the First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭), and Taiwan were ceded in full sovereignty 
to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan was now became the first colony of the 
Japanese empire. The War also changed the discourse of Chinese nationalism at the 
turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.
37
 However, the new development 
of Chinese nationalism did not extend its influence over Taiwan. At that time, the 
Japanese government began to conduct the Kominka Movement (皇民化運動) with the 
aim to shift the national identity of colonial populations from China to Japan. 
                                                 
35
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Kominka means ‘transforming the colonial people into imperial subjects’ in English. 
The colonial government considered that through the Movement the Taiwanese could 
actually achieve the primary and ultimate aim of being ‘true Japanese’.
38
   
 
After the WWII, Taiwan once again became a possession of China. However, this 
time the suzerain was not the Qing court, but the Nationalist government under 
Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. The people who lived on the island were compelled to 
face another national identity crisis. After the Chinese Communist Party took full 
control of the mainland in 1949, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was forced to retreat 
to the island with around two million people, including officers, soldiers, scholars, 
professions and civilians.
39
 During the Cold War period, in order to reintegrate 
Taiwan into Chiang’s idea of a ‘new China’, Chiang began to exercise his power to 
clear away all remaining Japanese colonial monuments under the de-colonisation 
policy culturally and politically. Not only did Chinese nationalism as dominant 
political ideology be implanted to Taiwan, Chinese nationalistic architecture was also 
introduced to Taiwan and changed the city landscape of the island. Today, Taiwan is a 
democratic country. But the totalitarian legacy that the Generalissimo Chiang leaves 
to the island has not yet been totally removed. The national identity of Taiwanese 




It is clear that the development of architectural styles in Taiwan is largely 
influenced by political power. The diversity of Taiwan’s cultural heritages adequately 
reflects the attempts that every regime in the past all intend to wields its power to 
re-shape the society and the city landscape. Until now, Taiwan still has a number of 
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40
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 15 
important relics, including the Dutch Fortress, the Qing administrative offices, 
temples and academies, Japanese impressive public buildings and shrines, and grand 
monuments cladding with Chinese palace style, represent the way that politics makes 
use of architecture as a means to display power in a tangible form.
41
 
   
Based on the history, the major study period of this thesis begins from the retreat 
of the Republic from China to Taiwan after the WWII to the last grand nationalistic 
architecture in remembrance of Chiang Kai-shek during the 80s. It was also the period 
of time that Chiang exercise his power to eliminate the Japanese colonial legacy from 
Taiwan and to re-connect the historical and national bond between China and Taiwan. 
Influenced by the political ideology, a number of new architecture cladding with 
Chinese traditional style were started to emerge in every main cities of Taiwan. It 
seems fair to argue the regime and its leader Chiang had given these buildings a 
particular political function to sustain its historical and cultural links to China. 
 
Although the main focus of this thesis is Taiwan’s nationalistic architecture, it is 
also necessary for some mainland Chinese examples to be presented here. Although 
the 1940s to the 1970s was the age that witnessed a dramatic growth of nationalistic 
architecture in Taiwan, the early development of Chinese nationalistic architecture 
during the 1920s and 1930s in the mainland will also be discussed in this study. The 
reason for this is that nationalistic architecture does not originally stem from Taiwan. 
It was first developed in China and later introduced to Taiwan in the post-war period. 
The development of nationalistic architecture in the mainland had enormous influence 
on the island’s architectural evolution in the first three decades of the nationalist 
government’s rule. Therefore, nationalistic architecture in Taiwan could be viewed as 
a new development of Chinese nationalistic architecture in a new era. Without fully 
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understanding the development of Chinese nationalistic architecture in different 
periods, one cannot really understand its later progress in Taiwan.   
 
This thesis divides Taiwan’s nationalistic architecture into four different building 
types: the Martyrs’ shrine, the Museum, the Parliament building and the Memorial 
Hall. Based on these types, four directions of nationalism studies, including national 
identity, the collection and exhibition of national treasures, political transformation of 
the nation and the making of the national heroes and saviors, will be fully discussed in 
this thesis. The reason for this typological classification is that different building types 
require different background knowledge and theoretical frameworks for analysis 
although they all could be included within the scope of nationalism studies. In 
addition, this classification can help to underline different architectural characteristics 
in different types. It also demonstrates the way in which politicians utilised different 
visual elements to convey particular political and national ideology with the help of 
specialised architects.  
 
The main body of this thesis is divided into two parts. Composed of three 
chapters, part one focuses on contemporary debates in nationalism and its expression 
in architecture both in China and in Taiwan. The first chapter is a theoretical review in 
nationalism studies, and different schools and approaches will be discussed here. 
Focusing on the theoretical link between nationalism studies and architecture, this 
chapter will also construct a new framework for cross-disciplinary examination, 
providing a greater explanation of the development of Chinese nationalistic 
architecture. Chapter two is a historical review aimed at bringing the new framework 
to the study of Chinese nationalism. The origin, characteristics and debates of Chinese 
nationalism will also be presented here. Following the discussion of the previous two 
chapters, chapter three will map out a historical contour of nationalistic architecture in 
 17 
China and in Taiwan; particularly the effects of political, historical and cultural 
factors. 
 
The main focus of part two is case studies based on four different building types. 
National mythologies, heroes, political religions and the construction of national holy 
spaces will be the central topic of chapter four. Colonial and post-war martyrs’ shrines 
especially illustrate the survival of a pre-modern ethnicity in national-formation in 
modern times. In chapter five, the close relationship between museums and 
nationalism will be presented. In analysis of Beijing’s and Taipei’s National Palace 
Museum and Nanhai Academy in Taiwan, this chapter will draw attention to 
establishment of museums, the selection of collections and the building processes, 
illustrating that museums are inevitably influenced by nationalism under political 
circumstances. Chapter six shifts the focus to the parliament building. Through 
examination of the historical development of China’s and Taiwan’s parliament 
buildings, this chapter will show that parliament buildings are not merely a place for 
political assemblies and elections, they are also an ideal site to express political 
cultures and traditions of nations. In chapter seven, the controversial issues of the 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall will be explored. This chapter will further discuss 
how Chinese modern monumentality is constructed and used to serve certain national 
rituals and political figures both on the mainland and on the island.  
 
The principal limitation of this thesis is the limited number of case studies and 
their validity in supporting the main argument. Although Taiwan is a small island, 
nationalistic architecture is still a wide open topic to be investigated. There are some 
other subordinate building types, including educational institutes, religious 
architecture and commercial buildings (tourist hotels, restaurants and shopping malls), 
which will not be examined in this thesis. Instead, the buildings that are presented are 
 18 
the most representative examples, which are largely sufficient to pursue the main 
topic of this study in great depth.  
 
The other limitation of this study is the restrictions on further investigations into 
the architectural cases during field studies. For example, the Chung-shan Building are 
one of important cases for the study of nationalistic architectural in Taiwan. But the 
institution of the Building is only willing to open parts of space and rooms for visiting 
and photo taking for academic usages. Others are still under the control and not open 
to the public.
42
 The archives of the National Palace Museum also rejected all requests 
to view the files and historical documents which might record the early history of the 
Museum’s decision making on the location and the architectural design competition. 
The Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine is another example continually rejected any request to visit 
its archive. The Shrine belong to the military. Only a formal visiting to the building 
itself is allowed. Any further information about the building restored in the archive is 
classified and not open to the masses. There are many other similar problems that 
have limited a further attempt to de detailed research on nationalistic architecture in 
Taiwan. Only when one day these documents and rooms are open to the public, a 
detailed research of these building can possibly be conducted. Due to these primary 
sources are unable to obtain, the secondary sources are used to supersede at the 
present stage. 
 
In addition, while this thesis emphasises the influences of nationalism of 
particular buildings from the point of view of the political elites that played their part, 
the influence on the perspectives of the populace have largely been left undiscussed. 
That is not say that people’s perspectives and responses have no influence on 
                                                 
42
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nationalistic architecture, but there is a stark contrast between the effect and the 
purpose behind its development. This thesis may not be a complete study of 
nationalistic architecture in Taiwan, but through the systematic analysis and 
discussion of four different types of buildings and their purpose, suffice it to say at 
this point that it can offer a satisfactory explanation for the issue of the metaphorical 













Part I: The Origin of Nationalistic Architecture in China 
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Chapter One: Contemporary Debates on Nations and Nationalism 
 
 
1-1  The Modernist Approach to Nationalism  
 
It is difficult to give a satisfactory definition of nations and nationalism. 
Different theorists and schools may bring different fundamental assumptions to the 
subject for a better understanding. These diverse approaches may point out different 
directions in this field. Therefore, it is necessary to classify various approaches and 
ideas of nations and nationalism into several groups. Most scholars would accept 
that nationalism studies can be divided into three camps: modernism, primordialism, 
and ethno-symbolism.
1
 Before turning to a close scrutiny of primordialism and 
ethno-symbolism, a modernist approach is a good starting-point for review. 
 
In recent years the modernist approach has been one of the most dominant 
approaches to nationalism studies. This dominance is not only illustrated by the 
number of theorists who accept the modernist assumption and apply it to their case 
studies, but is also present in the explanatory potency of the theory in their works. 
The writings of three leading scholars of this approach (Ernest Gellner, Benedict 
Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm) have been widely used not only in nationalism 
studies but also in other disciplines. Their arguments provide a convincing 
framework to explain the most widespread and popular ideology that profoundly 
shaped our political landscape during the last two centuries.  
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Most modernists believe that nations and nationalism is a recent product made 
by modern society. It is the basic features of modernity which require nations and 
nationalism to glue populations together in this new way. Before the eighteenth 
century there was no space left for nations to develop their form as the nation-state 
that we understand today. As Ernest Gellner points out in Nations and Nationalism 
(1983), during the eighteenth century Europe faced an enormous social structural 
transformation from a highly segmented agrarian culture to a more standardised 
industrial society. The growth of industrialism gradually eroded the traditional 
society and its pre-modern values, such as kinship, religions, customs and caste. 
These values became less able to integrate society as a whole. Moreover, the growth 
of modern society encouraged mobility and context-less communication which 
sought for a standardised platform provided by a new secular education system for 
citizens who live in a designated area called ‘homeland’. It replaced a small village 
unit with a large nation-state, and asked for a highly specialised ‘high culture’ to 
forge and sustain this new type of social network in modern times. A narrow band of 
elites were involved in the making of high culture, which eventually helped to 
engender the idea of nationalism. From within this idea of nationalism persisted a 




In Gellner’s writings, many of the effects, such as mass education, 
homogeneous unitarianism and modern systems of communications, are closely 
related to industrialism. To some extent, Benedict Anderson also pays a lot of 
attention to the effects of industrialism. He coins a new term, ‘print-capitalism’, and 
argues that it is industrialism that makes it possible to sustain a strong connection 
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between capitalism and new print technology. As Anderson demonstrates in his 
Imagined Communities (1991), after the Protestant Reformation Latin texts were 
gradually being overtaken by growing demands for new secular texts written in 
local vernaculars. The texts were widely spread by new forms of print media, such 
as books, periodicals and newspapers, and sold as commodities to educated 
middle-class readers. Anderson goes on to explain that in the absence of face-to-face 
communication these types of publications can help to develop a new way of 
thinking, which circulates in a limited area among people who share the same 
vernacular print languages. For Anderson, this imaginative process creates the 
possibility for a new form of ‘imagined community’ which helps to set the stage for 
the arrival of nation-states in modern times. It also fills an emotional void left by the 
fading of pre-modern social networks and religious bonds.  
 
Eric Hobsbawm divides the development of nationalism into several phases 
from a historical point of view. He argues that it is the effect of the French 
Revolution that helps the idea of nationalism to take shape. Although he recognises 
that ‘proto-national’ bonds, such as supra-local religious ethnic communities or 
political bonds of selected groups, can link to pre-modern states, these bonds have 
no substantial relationship to the ‘nation’ as we understand it today.
3
 In his Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780 (1990), from a left-wing historical perspective on 
nationalism, Hobsbawm provides adequate evidence to suggest that there has not 
been enough political support to develop the idea of nations and nationalism in the 
pre-modern era. Hobsbawm argues that we should view nations and nationalism as a 
new political and cultural invention in modern times. It is not possible to have a 
fuller understanding of nations and nationalism without putting them into a modern 
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In short, the modernist approach to nationalism studies is widely accepted in 
academic circles. Many scholars agree with the main assumption of this approach: 
nations and nationalism emerged in the eighteenth century in Western Europe and 
America. It was there that the principle of nationalism first developed with the 
characteristics of modern society, such as a centralised administration, standardised 
communication, a specialised education system, fixed borders and popular 
identification. These general features of the nation-state spread from Europe to the 
rest of the world following the steps of modernity. To be sure, the modernist 
approach offers a powerful explanation of nations and nationalism which makes 
other theorists unable to avoid discussing it or having a theoretical dialogue with it 
in their works.  
 
However, the modernist approach is not a monolithic category. Under the 
rubric of modernism, there are some sub-divisions. The differences can be 
ascertained in the various positions that the theorists adopt. Apart from the basic 
belief, modernists all stress different factors in their accounts of nationalism. 
Anthony Giddens, for example, emphasises the state and political power which play 
an important role in the formation of nations and nationalism. He argues that 
nationalism exists only when the state has obtained a unified administrative power 
dominating a sovereign territory.
5
 Similarly, John Breuilly also stresses the 
relationship between nationalism and the state. He defines nationalism as ‘political 
movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with 
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 For him, putting nationalism back in a political context can 
offer a better understanding of the ideological glue connecting members of the 
nation with state power. Tom Nairn on the other hand brings a neo-Marxist 
framework to modernist accounts of nationalism. He highlights the role of economic 
factors and argues that the key to understanding nationalism is the notion of ‘uneven 
development’ in the capitalist world order. Liah Greenfeld, like Nairn, sets out her 
examination of nationalism from the view of capitalism. She demonstrates that it is 





Although none of these modernists mentioned rely on a single factor in their 
examinations, they have one point in common: opposition to primordialist accounts 
of nationalism. As Ernest Gellner argues, nations, unlike the position primordialists 
have assumed, are not a natural, God-given way of classifying men, waiting to be 
‘awakened’ though a long-delayed political destiny, but rather a new form of social 
organisation based on the effects of modernity.
8
 Since the 1970s the modernist 
approach has become a new established orthodoxy in nationalism studies. 
Primordialism failed to attract the support of the majority of scholars. Until now, 
only ethno-symbolists keep the momentum going in the debates on the notion of 
nationalism by challenging some of the established views inspired by the modernist 
approach. But many of the arguments that ethno-symbolists make stem from 
primordialism. Therefore it is worthwhile to look carefully at the primordialist 
approach before turning to a closer examination of ethno-symbolism. 
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1-2  Primordialism and Ethno-symbolism 
 
The earliest theoretical paradigm of nations and nationalism is primordialism. 
Before modernism established its academic reputation, primordialism was widely 
adopted in this field. As Umut Özkirimli mentions, primordialism is an umbrella 
term used to describe a group of scholars who claim that nationality is a natural part 
of being human. It has existed since time immemorial.
9
 In other words, 
primordialists tend to pay more attention to the notion of continuality between 
ethnic groups and nations in their understanding of nationalism. They tend to see 
nationalism as a modern variant of ethnicity which can be found long before the 
emergence of modern nation-states. Nations, in this vein, have evolved constantly 
from their pre-modern ethnic roots. Without the roots, nations have no foundation 
for taking their form in modern times.  
 
According to Anthony D. Smith’s and Jonathan Hearn’s definition, 
primordialism can be divided into two main categories: socio-biological (or true 
primodialist according to Hearn) and cultural perspectives (or primordialist 
theories).
10
 The former view is that a genetic principle is the central factor for 
grasping the idea of nations and ethnic groups. For example, Pierre van den Berghe, 
a leading advocate of the socio-biological perspective, argues that kin selection, like 
Darwin’s natural selection in biology, is the main genetic mechanism influencing 
animals’ sociality and communal behaviour.
11
 It also works for human sociality. 
Van den Berghe demonstrates that nations and ethnic groups can be seen as an 
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extended form of kinship stemming from ancient generations to the present 




Culturists, on the other hand, do not trace back to biological causes to observe 
kinship and ethnic ties, but share the belief with socio-biologists that kinship and 
ethnic ties play an important role in shaping ethnicity and nationality. In Walker 
Connor’s definition, a nation is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally 
related. It is the sense of kinship which holds the group together as a fully extended 
family, even if this sense is not based on factual history.
13
 For Connor, kinship ties 
are better understood as a sort of perception following subjective feelings rather 
than fact. This is why numerous nationalist leaders appeal to the power of emotions 
to mobilise the people from below. To achieve this goal, every nation requires its 
own national symbols to reach and trigger nationalistic responses. These symbols 
deliver messages to ‘our people’ and show that we belong to the same kinship and 
have common ancestry, and more importantly a shared destiny. As he argues,  
 
The core of the nation has been reached and triggered through the use of 
familial metaphors which can magically transform the mundanely tangible 
into emotion-laden phantasma…
14
 (original emphasis) 
 
Connor’s concept of the cultural dimension to primordialism can also be found 
in Edward Shils’ and Clifford Geertz’s accounts of ethnicity and nationalism.
15
 On 
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the one hand, Edward Shils recognises that Ferdinand Tönnies’ classical 
sociological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft do not totally match 
with his observations on various kinds of social bonds tying the members of a 
nation together in modern society. In keeping the society going, he argues that these 
bonds existed and evolved for a long period of time before the modern era.
16
 He 
claims that some primordial elements in Gemeinschaft, such as territory, blood and 
gender, may remain in modern society and transform into new types of bonds, 
including confraternity, brotherhood, leagues and gangs.
17
 These bonds, derived 
from a basic need of maintaining and orienting a large-scale society like modern 
nation-states, can be described as primordial. On the other hand, Clifford Geertz 
takes up the notion of primordial attachments and applies it to new states with old 
societies, like Asia and Africa. These states have emerged since the end of Western 
colonialism after the Second World War. Geertz argues that the most influential 
attachments in these states are not civil but primordial ties, stemming from ancient 
adhesive strength, such as custom, religion, language and many other cultural 




 In short, primordialists believe that every nation has its own pre-modern 
roots. Nationalism may be recent or novel, but nations are not modern phenomena. 
Nations need to be understood as a form of extended kinship which develops from 
time immemorial. Some theorists argue that the characters of kinship and ethnic 
groups can be identified via socio-biological ties. Others believe that cultural 
                                                                                                                                            
perennialist. See Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 161-5. However, Ö zkirimli and Hearn still 
categorise Connor as a primordialist. See Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, 73-74 and Hearn, 
Rethinking Nationalism, chapter 2.  
16
  Edward Shils, ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the 
Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory,’ The British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 2 (June 
1957): 131.  
17
  Ibid., 133-4. 
18
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259-60. 
29 
 
attachments are central to determine the boundary of nation and ethnicity. For the 
latter, the sense of common ancestry and unique descent need not be in accord with 
historical fact. It is the non-rational or psychological essence of ethnicity that ties 
nations in the modern world.  
 
Many critics of the primordialist approach come from modernists and 
constructivists. Among them, Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan raise the strongest 
objection to the fundamental assumption of the primordialist approach. They argue 
that primordialists tend to treat ethnicity as a priori. Their essentialised views seem 
to fix ethnic attachments to ethnic groups and leave no room for any possibility of 
multiculturalism and social change.
19
 In addition, primordialists are apt to 
over-emphasis the biological imperative of bond-formation. Their arguments 
overlook the fact that social interaction may play an important role in constructing 
emotional ties within nations.
20
 In particular, Eller and Coughlan claim that many 
cases, especially the newborn states within Africa, have shown that ‘new 
primordials’ are ‘made’, but not ‘given’. Political entrepreneurs tend to create ‘new 
primordials’ when old ones are lacking.
21
 These cases strengthen their arguments 
for a constructivist perspective of nation-building in the accounts of nations and 
nationalism. 
 
Some modernists stand in the same theoretical position with Eller and 
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Coughlan in criticising primordialism
22
; others disagree with primodialists’ basic 
belief in the antiquity of nations as cultural responses to intrinsic human needs that 
can be found both in the past and the present. They argue that the emergence of 
nationalism is not possible earlier than the eighteenth century. Nations, as 
communities of action and purpose, based on a social and political foundation of 
modernisation, can only be found in the modern world. In Ernest Gellner’s words, 
‘it is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way round’.
23
 If nationalism 
is a modern phenomenon, nations can only be modern, too.  
 
The debates in the past few years between primordialism and modernism in 
literature on nationalism continue. Although primordialism receives less support 
nowadays, more nuanced positions have emerged in this field. Ethno-symbolism is 
one of the active camps laying the groundwork for the critique of both 
primordialism and modernism. One of the key authors in ethno-symbolism is 
Anthony D. Smith. He continually criticises the modernist approach and pays a 
great deal of attention to the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for today’s 
nations.
24
 On the other hand, he also disagrees with some primodialist theoretical 
assumptions, especially the socio-biological perspective. He locates his theoretical 
position between modernism and primordialism and seeks for an alternative 




Firstly, Smith does not totally reject modernist accounts of nations and 
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nationalism. He notices that rapid social change in the modern era is an important 
trigger which constructs nations and nationalism in a new social order. However, 
opposing Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s concepts of ‘the invention of tradition’ and 
‘imagined communities’, Smith contends that nations and nationalism are scarcely 
‘invented’ or ‘imagined’. It is not possible to have ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ nations 
and nationalism ex nihilo.
26
 For him, their arguments seem to imply a view that 
every attempt to revive tradition or to envisage the nation is factitious. They dismiss 
the idea that pre-existent tradition and ethnic ties would be the solid foundation for 
national creators to build up a nation in the modern era. Smith goes on to argue that 
there must have been something ‘real’ inside the nation for ruling elites to mobilise 




Secondly, Smith rejects being labelled as a primordialist. He argues that 
primordialists preclude themselves from further exploration of historical and 
sociological accounts of nations and nationalism. This makes them unable to offer 
satisfactory explanations of different forms of ethnic and national attachments 
which have developed in the past.
28
 For Smith, studies of nationalism require a 
diachronic analysis over la longue duree. Although the changes are slower than 
generally assumed, ethnic groups undergo different influences and modifications at 
various times.
29
 But primordialists tend to highlight the unamenable features and 
the genetic principle in ethnicity and nations at all times. Moreover, primordialists’ 
main focus of ethnic attachments is actual or imagined kinship ties. Smith attempts 
to shift away from this, arguing that ethnic communities are constituted not by the 
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line of physical descent, but by the line of cultural affinity embodied in distinctive 
myths, memories, symbols and values which are upheld by groups of people who 
are culturally related.
30
   
 
Smith introduces cultural and historical dimensions to the analysis of ethnic 
groups, nations and their historical continuity. Following John Armstrong’s 
examinations of ‘myth-symbol complexes’ and ‘mythomoteurs’, a constitutive 
political myth, Smith contends that every nation has its own origin in ethnicity 
developed from the cultural root of its long-term history.
31
 He calls it ‘ethnie’, a 
term borrowed from French meaning ‘ethnic community’. According to Smith’s 
definition, an ethnie is: 
 
A named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of 
common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, 





Smith defines a nation as: 
 
A named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared 
memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to 
historic territories or “homeland”, creates and disseminates a distinctive public 
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In Smith’s definition of nations, there are some characteristics that overlap 
with the definition of ethnies. It is the principle of culture and history which 
underlies both ethnies and nations. This view reflects Smith’s belief that ethnic 
communities and nations have some significant and close relationships in common. 
In addition, in the definition of nations, Smith practically emphasises the power of 
modernity. Nations are described by modern features, such as ‘a distinctive public 
culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws’. For him, nations are the 
new modification of pre-existing ethnic communities in modern circumstances.  
 
In short, Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach provides a cultural and historical 
perspective of nationalism studies. He has taken some important steps in this 
direction, especially in his surveys on the role of ethnies, myths, memories and 
symbols. With the pictures that he provides, ethno-symbolism paves a way for 
cross-disciplinary research from traditional sociology and politics to wider 
applications in history, literature, cultural studies, visual arts, music, museology, and 
architecture.
34
 It also offers theoretical insights which formulate new explanations 
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1-3  Criticisms of the Modernist Approach to Nationalism in China                                      
 
Every approach has its limits of explanatory power to some extent. In nations 
and nationalism studies, it is true that some approaches work better for certain areas 
or countries; some are less convincing in others. Therefore, re-examining the limits 
of the practical application of current nationalism theories from a critical point of 
view is relative and important for the purpose of exploring a feasible framework to 
gain a satisfactory explanation of Chinese nationalism in China and in Taiwan.  
 
To begin with, while modernists mark out a unique departure in nationalism 
studies, their arguments have attracted a great deal of criticism. The first important 
point is that modernist explanations of nations and nationalism often imply a 
Eurocentric perspective in their basic theoretical assumptions. For example, in the 
introduction of their edited book Asian Forms of the Nation (1996), Tønnesson and 
Antlöv argue that Ernest Gellner’s account of nationalism is built mainly on the 
experience of Christian and Islamic civilizations.
36
 His main concern is always 
social change in European countries in the modern age. Some Asian nations do 
appear in his discussions, but Gellner uses them as an example only to demonstrate 
how agrarian societies preclude the developments of nationalism.
37
 Therefore, for 
Gellner, nationalism is a modern political model made by European elites. It is 
possible to see nationalism occurring in other continents outside Europe only if 
these non-Western countries can meet the requirements of the European nationalist 
model.  
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It is true that nationalism is a European form of political thinking based on 
cohesive self-conscious communities sharing a homogeneous and long-established 
collective identity into the modern era, but other parts of the world often have very 
different social structures and historical developments. As Bhikhu Parekh points out, 
Western theorists of nationalism tend to universalise their experiences and imagine 
that nationalism outside the West has the same structure as its European origin.
38
 
Undoubtedly, no one can deny that nationalist ideas were first developed in Europe 
and played a vital role in European modern history, but outside Europe, this model 
usually did not work in the same way. Many non-Western societies have their own 
collective identities and traditions of political thought which existed long before 
European powers introduced their idea of nationalism. For example, India is a 
nation which has diverse ethnic cultures and distinctive political traditions. Political 
leaders in India during the period of independent movements realised that their 
country was not and could never become a nation in the European sense.
39
 
Although these anti-colonial movements were inspired by European nationalism, 
the language they used was selectively borrowed from European nationalist 
discourses. They integrated this language into India’s political traditions and finally 
reversed it as a weapon to speak for their rights and fight for their nation and 
independence. It is wrong to argue that non-Western nationalist discourses are 
entirely derivative and heteronymous of the European model. On the contrary, these 
discourses are multi-stranded, multi-layered and multi-lingual, accompanied with 
partly autonomous and eclectic social strata that may rarely be found in Europe.  
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Sharing this sentiment, Partha Chatterjee also criticises the modernist 
approach to nationalism from a post-colonialist point of view. He disagrees with 
Benedict Anderson’s arguments on the spread of nationalism. In Anderson’s view, 
nationalism first took place in Europe, the Americas and Russia as imperative 
models, and was later largely adopted by Asia and Africa. Chatterjee argues that this 
view is so-called sociological determinism.
40
 It implies that the third-world 
countries finally would all follow the European footprint and witness the arrival of 
nationalism when they started developing their own industrialism and modernism. 
In the end, as passive consumers, these countries would wholly accept the 
overwhelming norm of the European nationalist model on the path towards 
modernity. Chatterjee objects to this argument, asserting that nationalism in the 
colonial world is not simply an imitation of the West, but a differentiated form that 





Secondly, it is also vital to notice that even in Europe not every country 
perfectly matches the modernist model. Adrian Hastings, for example, places the 
origin of English nationalism in the medieval consolidation of the relationship 
between state and religious culture in England. He argues that early English Bible 
translation provides a vernacular literature backdrop for the nation to develop its    
original model in pre-modern times.
42
 Anthony D. Smith, on the other hand, also 
argues that some nations in Europe do exist long before the birth of industrialism. 
He disagrees with Ernest Gellner’s argument that high culture and the process of 
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modernisation are an important trigger to engender the idea of nationalism. He takes 
Eastern European low culture as example to claim that it is the low culture which 
inspires a deep-rooted loyalty and ethnic attachment for the future nation-states in 
Eastern Europe. In addition, Western Europe has a strong state-oriented tendency, 
but Eastern Europe seems to develop a cohesive sense of nations earlier than that of 
states.
43
 Therefore, for Smith, to know one nation’s pre-modern ethnic roots, 
symbols, memories and myths is far more important than knowing its new version 
in modern times. 
 
Thirdly, modernists pay a great deal of attention to social and cultural 
homogeneity in nation-formation. This view denies that most nations encompass a 
varying degree of cultural differences that may generate different visions of 
community and political projects.
44
 However, as Umut Ö zkirimli points out, there 
is no nation that can meet the norm of homogeneity in the modernist sense. 
Nation-formation is a process that has not come to an end. The nationalist dream of 
a homogeneous nation is just a dream that has not yet come true.
45
 As John 
Hutchison argues, these internal social and cultural differences may cause conflicts 
within a nation or lead to social breakdown or civil war by polarising groups. Even 
if violence or civil war does not happen, such conflicts may weaken the sense of 
community in a nation.
46
 Thus, national identity in this regard is not a monolithic 
imagination without contestation or negotiation as Benedict Anderson argues, but a 
fluid network of representations containing different views of the nation from 
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The final problem with the modernist framework is that it overlooks some 
crucial factors that may broaden our understanding of nations and nationalism. First 
of all, modernist approaches can only answer ‘how’ questions but not ‘why’ 
questions or ‘who’ questions. As John Breuilly argues, in Imagined Communities, 
Anderson provides a theory to explore ‘what’ kinds of new communities emerge in 
modern times, and ‘how’ communities are organised and developed among certain 
cultural elites, but he cannot explain ‘why’ these ideas can evoke a strong response 
from the population, and ‘who’ makes all the difference.
48
 In addition, in Nations 
and Nationalism, Gellner’s functionalist view of nationalism makes him downplay 
the role of certain political thinkers and their ideas of nationalism.
49
 He prefers to 
pay more attention to the transformation of social structure, rather than to certain 
persons who have the power to shift the course. Therefore, the agency of the people 
has surprisingly disappeared from his argument.   
 
As shown above, the explanatory failure of modernist approaches on some 
theoretical levels implies that this approach cannot offer a satisfactory account of 
nationalistic origins in the development of Chinese nationalism. First, before 
industrialism and modernism were introduced to China in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the attempt to seek a clear definition of the Chinese nation had 
already attracted a great deal of attention from traditional intellectual communities. 
When the idea of ‘Chinese nationalism’ arrived in China, there was no significant 
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industrial development. China even did not truly achieve its industrialisation and 
modernisation projects in Gellner’s sense until the first third of the twentieth 
century. 
 
 China’s early developments of industrialisation and modernisation began 
from the Self-Strengthening Movement (自強運動) (1861-95). Following a series of 
military defeats by Western powers, the Qing court recognised that China had to 
learn from the West in order to strengthen itself against the West. However, the main 
focus of these industrial developments was military needs. The Qing court was 
unable to create conditions good enough for the private sector to promote new 
industrial development of other kinds.
50
 The government did not have even enough 
of a budget to carry out its modernisation reform. All of these factors made the Qing 
court the obstacle to industrial development in the late nineteenth century in 
China.
51
 In addition, economic development did not improve significantly until the 
new Republic was founded in 1912. The first major change was the war between 
Western countries in Europe during 1914-18.
52
 It triggered new economic growth, 
reaching a new high in 1930s. China finally had an opportunity to make a social 
structural change from an agricultural-based to industrial-based economy and from 




However, this new wave of economic growth remained largely in certain areas 
like Shanghai or Northeast China. Only a few big cities and rich regions gained the 
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benefits from the growth. Most rural areas were marginalised by the changes.
54
 In 
addition, these changes did not guarantee that the Chinese nation-state with its new 
industrial developments could be totally integrated as a whole. During the Beiyang 
government period of the Republic (北洋政府) (1912-28), the central government 
had little control over the warlord regimes in the provinces.
55
 Although during the 
1930s, China was reunited under the banner of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party 
(Kuomintang or KMT) (國民黨), the processes of modernisation still encountered 
unexpected obstacles within the nation. The pre-existing popular religions and local 
cultures resisted being fully integrated into the idea of a new state.
56
 China under 
Chiang’s rule still could not establish an effective administrative control over the 
countryside to achieve a real integration of a nation-state from the top to the bottom. 
Therefore, contrary to Ernest Gellner’s argument, industrialism and modernism 
barely made a distinctive contribution to the developments of Chinese nationalism. 
 
Secondly, China had its own nationalist discourses which were very different 
from the European model. First of all, after the Opium War (鴉片戰爭) (1838-42), 
China’s military defeats gradually shattered the nation’s confidence in believing that 
China was still the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the world. In 1895, the whole nation was 
badly shaken by the striking result of the First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭) 
(1894-5): China was defeated by Japan, a new born nation-state which had launched 
its Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) and industrial revolution only thirty years before. 
It also symbolised China’s failure to reach the goal of ‘self-strengthening.’
57
 Since 
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the 1860s, China’s repeated military defeats in confrontations with the West and 
Japan had eroded the confidence of the fading empire. Therefore, Chinese national 
identity did not evolve by the power of modernisation as Gellner argues, or 
print-capitalism in Anderson’s view, but by the humiliating memories caused by the 
invasions of Western powers and Imperial Japan. Due to these distinctive historical 
experiences, a unique form of national narratives and ethnic solidarity with a 




In addition, the translation of Western political and sociological books exerted 
a great influence on the early development of Chinese nationalism. These 
translations were quickly circulated in the intellectual community and had an 
enormous impact.
59
 In 1862, the Qing court gave permission to Wen-xiang (文祥) 
(1818-1879) and Prince Gong (恭親王奕訢) (1833-1898) to open an interpreters’ 
school in Beijing (北京同文館). The purpose of the school was to help the new 
generation learn European languages for absorbing Western knowledge. The school 
was later transformed into a full-fledged college with a proper curriculum of 
different subjects, such as mathematics, chemistry, geology and international law. It 
was also the first time in the history that Chinese traditional intellectuals took 
Western scholarship seriously. 
 
As well as attending these schools and the growing numbers of missionary 
universities in China, some Chinese young people chose to study abroad in Europe, 
America and Japan. In the late nineteenth century, Chinese nationalist discourses to 
some extent were profoundly influenced by Japanese academic and political 
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communities. Lots of new vocabulary, such as nationalism, democracy, feudalism 
and revolution, were first introduced to Japan and interpreted by Japanese scholars, 
and later imported to China via students returning from Japan and Chinese political 
reformers exiled to Japan.
60
 In addition, many Western political and sociological 
classics were also translated into Japanese first and later circulated in Chinese 
academia. With these translations, Chinese intellectuals borrowed Western 
philosophies and methodologies to re-examine Chinese traditional thought, and 
developed new nationalist discourses based on a Chinese context. They attempted to 
use these discourses to serve the goal of national salvation, and to defuse the 
national crisis caused by foreign invaders.  
 
After the idea of nationalism was brought to China by these young scholars 
and returned students, especially these who studied in Japan, the second wave of 
political, social, and economic reforms began to rise. It was those officers, new 
intellectuals and a new class (compradors and skilled labourers), who had an open 
mind to accept foreign ideas and knowledge, who contributed their effort to change 
China’s political landscape and make it a modern nation-state.
61
 Their aim was to 
save the nation and prevent it from becoming one of the many colonies of Western 
powers or Japanese imperialism. They were eager to search for a new way to give 
China equal status with the foreign invaders.  
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Finally, these intellectuals all brought different imaginations to the definition 
of nation. Due to their divergent political stances and rival opinions, they had 
different interpretations of Chinese history, culture and national roots. As John 
Fitzgerald argues, each leader of the major movements had advocated a distinctive 
and mutually exclusive definition of the Chinese nation. Including Confucian 
reformers, Qing loyalists, nationalist revolutionaries and patriotic students, these 
intellectuals attempted to transform Chinese culture and traditions into the source of 
national discourse that could be used for forging a new Chinese national identity.
62
 
Although their definitions of the Chinese nation were not quite the same, sometimes 
even contending with each other and offering no final consensus, they all agreed 
that China was an evolving ethnic group which deserved a new form of nation-state 





1-4  Re-examining Ethno-symbolism  
 
As shown above, modernist approaches fail to offer a convincing 
explanation of the developments of Chinese nationalism. Compared to modernism, 
ethno-symbolism emphasised that the influences of historical and cultural factors 
can provide a better framework to explain Chinese nationalism. In Anthony D. 
Smith’s theory, a nation stemmed from its pre-existing ethnic group and requires 
memories, myths and traditions as symbols to create a cultural boundary and 
identity of ‘homeland’ in modern circumstances. Nationalists can be viewed as myth 
makers who attempt to borrow symbols from the past as the best elements to define 
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the nation and to keep ethnicity alive in the present day.
64
   
 
Smith also shifts his focus from reading texts to visual representations. He 
attempts to move beyond written texts, adding a new direction to his account of 
nationalism. He criticises Benedict Anderson for excessively emphasising the nation 
as a narrative of imagination. Anderson’s view makes him miss other important 
elements that may also be central in building up a complex community like a nation. 
For example, visual elements usually contained stronger connections to the 





In an architectural study, Smith’s theory does shed light on widening the 
understanding of nationalistic architecture. Traditionally, when approaching these 
buildings, many architectural historians may pay too much attention to the form and 
style analysis, but less on social and political background research. Their 
perspective may limit our understanding, and overlook the fact that nationalist 
thoughts accompanied with political power play a vital role in shaping these 
buildings. It is clear that nationalists have their own aesthetic judgment based on 
their nationalist discourse. Although national style was the most obvious visible 
cultural marker to identify ‘ours’ from ‘others’, it should not be taken for granted. 
During the processes of nation-formation, a certain historical architectural style was 
often carefully selected as a symbol of the nation, to manifest the strong sense of 
community and identity in the modern era.  
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In the case of China, the making of Chinese national style was not a natural 
process, but a new development of an old historical style promoted by early pioneer 
architects who attempted to create new architecture with modern construction that 
could show some deference to the Chinese context. It was also then that Chinese 
nationalism became a dominant political ideology that encouraged them to borrow 
traditional architectural elements from the past for their designs and give them a 
new meaning in the modern era. Especially after Chinese architectural historians 
had reported extensive and complete surveys of Chinese traditional architecture, 
these architects could precisely apply these research results to recreating what they 
believed to be the ‘authentic’ Chinese national style in their designs. When the KMT 
under Chiang’s leadership reunited China in the late 1920s, a new image of China 
needed to be constructed. The Nationalists selected the Chinese classical style as the 





After the KMT took control of Taiwan in the post-war period, the Chinese 
classical style was also implanted in the Southern island, which had never been 
influenced architecturally by the Northern classical style. It should be noticed that, 
like the style, Chinese nationalism is also not an original thought developed in 
Taiwan. Not until the post-war period was Chinese nationalism introduced to 
Taiwan. The development of Taiwanese nationalism was earlier than 1949, the time 
when Chinese nationalism became a dominant ideology of Taiwan.
67
 In 1895, the 
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Qing court was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War and ceded the full 
sovereignty of Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan became the first colony (1895-1945) of 
Imperial Japan. Therefore, nationalist thought in Taiwan originated to resist 
Japanese rulers and troops.  
 
After the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), Chiang Kai-shek and his party 
claimed the sovereignty of Taiwan and terminated Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule. 
However, a few years after the victory, the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War 
(1946-50). Mainland China was taken by the Chinese Communist Party at the end 
of 1949 when Mao Zedong (毛澤東) (1893-1976) proclaimed the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Chiang and the nationalist troops were forced to 
retreat to Taiwan with around two million refugees.
68
 Chiang’s regime later 
completely changed the political landscape of Taiwan. The violent conflict between 
new Chinese immigrants and Taiwanese in the early post-war period was suppressed 
by the totalitarian rule of the KMT.
69
 Taiwanese nationalism was then forced to go 
underground, becoming the predominant focus of the Taiwanese independent 
movement fighting against the KMT’s rule.  
 
Under Chiang’s leadership, Chinese nationalism was the coercive political 
ideology intensely propagated in media, education and political campaigns of 
Taiwan. In the Cold War period, the US supported Chiang’s totalitarian regime and 
viewed Taiwan as the security cordon of the West Pacific Ocean to help their Asian 
allies from communisation.
70
 The position of Taiwan became a complex balance of 
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power created by the antagonism of the Communist camp and the Western camp. In 
this international situation, the issue of Taiwan’s independence became a political 
taboo. The development Chinese nationalism had reached a new culmination. The 
KMT attempted to use Chinese nationalism as a political tool to wipe out all 
Japanese colonial influences in Taiwan, and reintegrate the island’s culture, history 
and society into the Chinese nation. At that time, Chinese classical style was viewed 
as the best symbol that could fully represent Chinese nationalism and the image of 
Chiang’s regime on continuously preserving national culture and tradition in Taiwan. 
The style was later quickly spread all over the island and used as political 
propaganda to highlight a scenario: Free China in Taiwan was protecting Chinese 
culture, but communist China on the mainland was destroying their traditions during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).
71
   
 
Thus, whether in post-war Taiwan or in pre-1949 China, the leading elites 
influenced by Chinese nationalism tended to search for national symbols from 
Chinese culture and tradition to reconnect the old nation with the new regime. They 
were particularly interested in the symbols that could be visualised and 
characterised.
72
 Therefore, ethno-symbolist accounts of nations and nationalism do 
provide a theoretical insight on how Chinese nationalism plays a key role in the 
making of Chinese national style both in China and in Taiwan. 
 
However, Anthony D. Smith’s perspective may also encounter some 
theoretical problems as most modernists do. Some revisions of his theory should be 
made for it to pertain to China’s and Taiwan’s circumstances. For example, although 
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Smith offers a path-breaking contribution to the study of cultural and historical 
aspects of nationalism, he is still sceptical about political explanations of 
nationalism.
73
 He underestimates the impact of political factors on nationalism, and 
fails to consider that political power in some extent is far more important than other 
strengths in nationalism.
74
 Chinese nationalism, for example, was largely a 
top-down model manipulated by certain leading elites and politicians. National 
myths and symbols of China were frequently used to uphold the legitimacy of the 
ruling class.  
 
To conclude, nationalism is a particular use of cultural artifacts. To understand 
it properly we need to carefully survey the way in which a group of people produce 
the idea and preserve it by a series of symbols to show their distinctive identity and 
ethnic roots. Culture in nationalism is a matter of consensus determined by elites 
with the power to determine it from above, but it is not enough to define culture, 
nations and nationalism merely in terms of a symbolic system. The system has to be 
put into a broader social and political sense in order to quest for a better 
understanding. As Jonathan Hearn argues, it is power in binding that creates culture, 
but not the opposite. Culture, as an epiphenomenon of power, is an essential 
conceptual tool for carrying out certain political projects during nationhood 
building.
75
 Further questions should be borne in mind when putting the power / 
culture relationship in a priority position in nations and nationalism studies: who 
holds the power to create and define the meanings of culture for a nation? And what 
has been done?  
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Built on this theoretical insight, architecture is one of the best examples to 
show that national culture can be embodied by certain visual languages to serve the 
need of power. Especially in the age of nation-formation, nationalists accompanied 
by architects, as myth-makers, tend to adopt cultural and traditional symbols from 
the past to create a sense of community and national identity in a visual way. Thus, a 
developing predominant style is best seen as a cultural representation influenced by 
national discourse and political elites. In the case of China, the rise of Chinese 
nationalism stimulated a number of architects and architectural scholars to search 
for a national style. They traced the root of Chinese national style from the past and 
reconnected it to their new designs. A growing number of buildings cladded with 
Chinese classical style were appearing in China’s main cities after the 1930s and 
were later introduced to Taiwan after the 1950s. The power / culture and its relations 
can help us to identify the political forces at work behind these buildings. It also 
compels us to think differently about these buildings with a new theoretical 
framework out with architecture.  
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Chapter Two: Narrating the Past in the Late Qing Era 
 
 
2-1 Chinese Traditional Worldview and Its Challenges  
 
Human societies, as we know, have constantly been involved in a process of 
redefining and re-orienting their perception of themselves and the symbolic universe 
to which they relate. The symbolic universe conveys a serial network of meanings, 
values, beliefs, signs and customs to form a structured system for a certain society 
to operate. Traditional China was no exception: it held a unique worldview which 
revealed a sense of awe toward the infinity of natural forces embodied in concepts 
like ‘heaven’ (天), the ‘way’(道), Yin(陰), Yang(陽), the ‘five agents’ (五行) and the 
‘five virtues’ (五徳). This worldview set up by early thinkers in ancient China 
affected Chinese people for thousand of years by teaching them how to live in 
harmony with the universe.
1
 This worldview also established a symbolic system 
serving as a criterion to distinguish ‘Han people’ from other ethnic groups who were 
residing in the periphery of China. Theatrically the definition of ethnic groups 
between in-groups and out-groups was often determined by biological differences. 
Visual factors, like skin pigmentation, physical stature, different facial features, 
were usually used to indicate the racial differences between one group and others.
2
 
However, as Frank Dikötter points out in his research on the formation of the 
Chinese people, race is a cultural construct with no objective reality. Physical 
features are subjectively perceived and culturally constructed by the society which 
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attempted to utilise these biological differences to legitimise the hierarchy of 
cultural differences between the ‘Han Chinese’ and other races.
3
 Therefore, the 
meaning of race is best viewed as a cultural given, based on a certain ideology 
forming a particular world order to mark the distinctiveness of the group identity.  
 
However, the boundary of race is not fixed forever. As Dikötter noted, a racial 
category may change its way of grouping throughout history, according to the needs 
of social and political situations. Group definition is continually reoriented and 
reconstructed, with the in-group’s perceptions and out-groups’ valuations of the 
‘Han’ ethnic group changing from time to time. Group membership can only exist in 
a network of inter-group relations based on the perception of group definition.
4
 In 
this regard, a successful cultural system must have sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate the changes of group definition throughout history.
5
 From this 
cultural constructive point of view, cultural systems played a more important role in 
group definition than biological differences in the racial history of China. Here, 
further questions should be borne in mind: what are the main characters of the 
Chinese cultural system? How is the Chinese nation defined by this system? 
 
In traditional China, Confucianism became the predominant ideology. It 
constructed a set of signs, values and a symbolic system developed and perpetuated 
by ruling elites to adopt an attitude toward the world order called tian-xia (天下), ‘all 
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under heaven’. The world was conceived as a homogeneous unity named ‘great 
community’ (大同). The head of the empire was tian-tzu (天子), ‘son of heaven’, 
whose rule was legitimated by special rituals that marked his central position in the 
world.
6
 Following this world order, Confucianism organised society into a clear 
hierarchy based on a superior-inferior relationship from a family to the imperial 
monarchy. Each person, even the emperor, in the society had a role to perform. If 
everyone could find a way to fit in society and perform his role well, the society 
would be sustained and would operate stably. Confucianism also aimed to conserve 
traditional polity under the premise that the fundamental political system would 
remain the same in order to ensure social stability.
7
 As an idealised model, the core 
of this system passed the test of disunity of the feudal period, maintaining its 




Thus, Chinese history can be periodised by a sequence of dynasties in a 
cycle in which every ruler attempted to maintain the political unification of the 
empire until it finally broke up and was succeeded by the next dynasty. As a 
repeating pattern, leaders and elites tried to avoid a fundamental change in the 
system by following the previous historical path. This cyclical interpretation of 
history and time in Chinese historical, political and philosophical thought was 
central to the Confucian perception of the Chinese worldview.
9
 The great unity 
under the Confucian idea of world order was a promise to create stability, peace and 
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prosperity of the Chinese empire. As John K. Fairbank argues, Confucianism, which 
provides one of the great answers to the problem of social stability, was the most 
successful system in all conservatisms.
10
 As the heart of Chinese cultural ideology, 
Confucianism played a crucial role in fusing Chinese cultural unity with the 
political unit. That is to say China’s high degree of integrated government helped 
ordinary people operate together, with local elites, gentries, ruling class and the 





Confucianism not only provided a core value sustaining the cultural and 
political system for the Chinese empire, but also produced a discourse to evaluate 
other ethnic groups outside the central area of ‘Han’ culture. In the early stage of 
Chinese civilisation, ‘Han Chinese’ had already built up a hierarchic system to deal 
with the relationship between the ‘Han’ and non ‘Han’ ethnic groups. Based on the 
concept of Sinocentrism, the fundamental principle of Confucian superior-inferior 
relationships constructing the hierarchy of China’s social order was also used to 
serve China’s foreign relations.
12
 Under the assumption of tian-xia, Chinese people 
believed that the empire was the ‘Middle Kingdom’ with a cultural superiority to 
other ethnic groups who lived outside the scope of the Chinese cultural sphere. 
These ethnic groups were viewed as uncivilized, away from the centre of the 
universe. Unless they were willing to accept Chinese ways of enlightenment and 
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The tributary system (朝貢) was a unique Chinese system for managing 
non-‘Han’ regimes surrounding the empire by establishing a super 
ordination-subordination principle in conducting foreign relations.
14
 These regimes 
were not directly under the control of the Chinese emperor, but were expected to 
demonstrate their subservience to the emperor and pay tribute. In return, they would 
gain the status of the vassal, receive gifts, and they were allowed to establish a 
formal economic relationship with China. China tried not to use excessive military 
expenditures, preferring the tributary system, to maintain enough control over their 
neighbourhood countries which would not constitute a danger.
15
 However, it should 
be noted that this system also had the flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances. When China could not keep the balance of power with foreign 
regimes, maintaining coexistence with these countries would be the best strategy to 
avoid violent conflicts around the empire.
16
 Some non-‘Han’ ethnic groups even 
had the power to threaten the survival of the empire. Historically, China had been 
ruled by two non-‘Han’ regimes, Mongol (1271-1368) and Manchu (1644-1912). 
Others had also ruled parts of China, such as Khitan’s Liao dynasty (遼) (907-1125) 




It is true that separatism and foreign invasions did occasionally disrupt 
China’s unity, but the firm cultural core would eventually allow the empire to be 
reintegrated.
18
 Even when the non-‘Han’ ethnic groups reached the point of taking 
over imperial function, they still had to follow the Confucian classics in order to 
rule the empire effectively. For example, in the Qing dynasty, the Manchu 
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conqueror recognised that the teachings of Confucius had an undisputed place in 
Chinese society. In order to appeal to ‘Han Chinese’ and sustain his ruling 
legitimacy, the Manchu emperor had to show his reverence for the Confucian canon 
by following the core values of Confucianism.
19
 Therefore, the Confucian system 
of world order successfully led China’s political and social trajectory for many 
centuries without changing its main core.  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that in pre-modern times, ethnic consciousness did 
exist in Chinese people’s minds well before the arrival of Europeans in the 
nineteenth century. However, this ethnic consciousness, based on the traditional 
cultural core, confined its power merely to Asia. Before that, the Chinese empire, as 
a ‘Middle Kingdom’ conducting this political order of East Asia, was outside the 
scope of the impact of European states’ political and military forces.
20
 The empire 
did not need to use concepts corresponding to modern Western ideas of nations, 
states, sovereignty or international relations to sustain its status in Asia.  
 
Not until the early nineteenth century did the Qing court confront the serious 
political and military problems which came with Western imperialism. These 
Western invaders, unlike other Asian barbarians that China had encountered in the 
past, were unwilling to pay homage to the Qing court, rejected the tributary system 
and refused to be culturally assimilated into Chinese society.
21
 They required the 
Qing court to remove its trade barriers and treat them with equal status by following 
the modern world order. Both the Qing court and China’s intellectuals began to 
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recognise that the symbolic universe of Confucianism which had operated 
throughout many centuries in China was neither total nor absolute.
22
 They were 
also forced to start the process of adjusting the tian-xia system to the contemporary 
Western worldview by considering that the Chinese empire was one of many 
nation-states but no longer the ‘Middle Kingdom’ in the world. Lots of new ideas, 
such as nations, nationalism, and sovereignty, were introduced to China and China’s 
intellectuals became increasingly aware of the need for transforming the idea of 
Chinese ethnicity into a nation in the modern sense. In addition, the serial wars with 
Western powers and imperial Japan in the last half of the nineteenth century played 
an important role in awakening Chinese people to the issue of the survival of the 
Chinese nation.
23
 The consequence of this historical development was that Chinese 
political elites began to reconstruct the national narratives and discourses to make 
China a nation and a sovereign state in the face of foreign aggression. 
 
2-2 The Rise of Chinese Nationalism  
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century growing capitalism accompanied 
by imperialism in the west was eager for new markets and increasingly forced China 
to open up its market to world commerce. These European powers also reorganised 
the international order and required the empire follow this system. In addition, the 
military technology that they used to open up the trade barriers with the Qing court 
had deeply shocked the government and intellectuals. Their weapons made the Qing 
court and intellectuals realise that fundamental changes for China from a military, 
economical and political viewpoint were inevitable in order to save the nation from 
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a fatal blow dealt by Western imperialism. China’s intellectuals began to change 
their attitude toward Western scholarship. Beginning with the Self-strengthening 
Movement (1861-95), they started learning military technology from the West, and 
then reading and translating classical writings of Western thought. In the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, Western scholarship was systematically introduced to 
China and exerted a huge impact on the intellectual field. Their main concerns were 
to find the reasons why the Chinese empire could not compete with Western 
imperialism and search for the answers for ‘national salvation’.  
 
The most important war that changed China’s attitude toward the West was 
the Opium War (1939-42). The war began to erode China’s Sinocentric worldview, 
making the empire encounter a problem in relocating itself in the new world order. 
Chinese intellectuals attempted to address this problem by learning Western 
knowledge and technology to bridge the gap. As Liang Qi-chao ( 梁啟超 ) 
(1873-1929), the most important leader of scholarly elites and political reformers in 
the late Qing era, pointed out in his essay issued in 1922, the first time that China 




    Although the direct result of the War was that China was defeated by the 
British army and forced to open up its market to the West, the foundation of 
Confucian ideology and tian-xia system had not been shaken. Following Britain, 
other European powers also declared war on China and asked the Qing court to sign 
unequal treaties with them.
25
 However, even though a group of concession 
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territories in coastal cities were occupied and governed by foreign powers, China 
still did not fundamentally change its universal worldview. For the Qing court, if 
Westerners could not be completely repulsed, the best strategy would be to tolerate 
them staying on the edges of the empire.
26
 For the Qing court, the larger scheme 
was the survival of the Qing dynasty itself. Compared with mounting pressures of 
domestic rebellions, such as the Taiping Rebellion (太平天國之亂) (1850-64), the 
Nian rebellion (捻亂) (1851-68) and Muslim rebellion (回亂) (1876-8) sweeping over 





However, some Qing officials were anxious to know more about the West, 
their military arms and machines. For example, Li Houng-zhang ( 李鴻章 ) 
(1823-1901), a leading statesman of the late Qing dynasty, explained to Beijing that 
it was hopeless to try to drive foreigners out of China because of their powerful 
weapons but, he concluded, learning to use Western machinery for strengthening 
China itself would be the best way to solve this crisis of foreign invasion.
28
 In 
addition, these weapons were very useful to suppress domestic rebellions.
29
 As a 
result, under the approval of the Empress Dowager Cixi (慈禧太后) (1835-1908) the 
real power holder in late Qing politics, and the support from both Manchu and Han 
progressive officials, the Self-strengthening Movement was launched in 1861 to 
carry out China’s first modernisation movement. However, compared to the 
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development of modernism in the West, the Self-strengthening Movement in China 
to a large extent was based on military technology, rather than a wide range of 
transformations in wide-reaching industrial, commercial, economic and social 
reforms.
30
 Despite this, small steps had been taken, such as opening a Western 
education school, sending students to study abroad, introducing tax collection and 
re-establishing international relations with Western powers. In this sense, the 




Later, a number of government departments were also established by the 
Qing court to deal with international affairs.
32
 This significant institutional 
innovation under the shadow of unequal treaties and inhospitable international 
diplomacy indicated that the old system of tributary which had performed for so 
many centuries in China could no longer continue. In addition, some intellectuals 
started pondering the problems of the Confucian world system, searching for a new 
way of looking at the world. Zhang Zhi-don (張之洞) (1837-1909), a Confucian 
scholar-official and an advocate of the Movement, formulated a theory called 
‘Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use’ 
(中學為體西學為用), considered the best ideological framework to represent this 
Movement. In Zhang’s theory, Western arms, steamships, science and technology 
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In addition, the efforts of missionary groups, through their translations of 
major Western scientific and technical texts, their presses of books and journals and 
their schools, also provided a new opportunity for the Chinese to know the world in 
a different way.
34
 A Chinese magazine, the Review of the Times (萬國公報), 
published by missionaries from 1875 was widely circulated within the Chinese 
scholar class and quickly became a direct channel to scholars and officials who 
wanted to gain knowledge of the outside world.
35
 In addition, the Qing court 
established an interpreters’ school in Beijing which also played an important role in 
enlightening Chinese intellectuals by introducing Western knowledge to China.
36
 
These changes during the Self-strengthening Movement allowed Chinese scholars to 
have a wider perspective and view their country and its relations to the world in a 
new way.  
 
However, this first modernisation movement of China ultimately ended in 
failure.
37
 Due to Japan’s intervention in the Korean issue, China and Japan declared 
war on each other in 1894. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) in fact was a 
significant contest between these two countries after a generation of modernization, 
but the humiliating defeat of China on land and at sea in the War revealed the brutal 
fact that after more than thirty years of Self-strengthening, China still could not 
achieve the goal of modernisation and national salvation. Compared to the Meiji 
government’s successful restoration in Japan from 1868, the Qing court’s 
Self-strengthening Movement eventually proved that the Manchu monarchy was 
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unable to transform the Chinese Empire into a modern nation-state to meet the 
challenges of the new world system.
38
 In fact the monarchy itself was the major 
obstacle to reform.
39
 In addition, Sinocentrism and the Confucian world order 
obviously could not lead the nation out of the political and diplomatic predicament. 
A strong feeling of national crisis and humiliation evoked by Japan’s victory led to 
the inescapable conclusion that China must make great changes. In particular a new 
wave of imperialist expansions after the War made some Chinese begin to fear that 
their country was about to be ‘carved up like a melon’.
40
 This atmosphere of fear 
and hostility brought new questions to Chinese elites: what kind of changes were 
needed in order to save China from further aggressions of foreign powers?  
 
As Jonathan Spence pointed out, during that time a vigorous force, which 
could be encompassed under the banner of nationalism, began to develop into three 
groups with different directions: the reformers, the Boxers, and the revolutionaries. 
Although it carried a corresponding sense that all Chinese people should be united 
as a nation, different groups brought different visions of carrying out their political 
projects of nation-formation.
41
 Their divergent political stances caused coups and 
severe disputes in intellectual spheres as a consequence of their radical political 
actions.  
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  After the Qing court signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, 
many disappointed young Confucian scholars came together in Beijing and presented 
a long memorial to the Emperor requesting resistance to Japan and urging a wide 
range of economic, industrial and administrative reforms. Among them, in 1898 two 
scholars, Kang You-wei (康有為) (1858-1927) and Liang Qi-chao led a radical 
political movement, the Hundred Day’s Reform (百日維新) under the support of the 
Emperor Guangxu (光緒皇帝) (1875-1908).
42
 Between June 11 and September 21, 
Guang-xu issued more than 40 reform decrees aimed at modernising the Chinese state 
in administration, education, laws, economy, technology, military and the police 
system. However, most of them remained on paper until the Reform ended up in a 
coup d’etat launched by the Empress Dowager Cixi who saw these radical 
institutional changes as a threat to her own supremacy in the Qing court.
43
 This 
short-lived reform showed that conservatives in the Qing court still held the main 
power in the empire. They believed that maintaining the Chinese imperial system was 
the primary issue in preventing the collapse of the empire and the ruination of the 
nation. After the coup d’etat, they soon became patrons of a secret society called the 
Boxers, which assembled a patriotic force to fight against the imperialism of the West 
and Japan in North China.  
 
The Boxers United in Righteousness (義和團) began to emerge as a force in 
Shandong during 1989. In the beginning, they practised mysterious rites from a 
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variety of secret societies in response to the provocation of Western missionaries 
and their Chinese converts. The Boxers’ anti-Christian sentiment was quickly 
merged with anti-imperialism force, spreading in North China under the slogan of 
‘support the Qing, destroy the foreign’ (扶清滅洋). Through spirit possession and 
special rites, they believed that they could gain sufficient strength to fight against 
Western weapons and by their flesh and blood, expel foreign powers out of China. 
With the support of the Empress Dowager Cixi and some senior Manchu officials, 
in 1900 these Boxers launched a series of attacks on missionaries and foreigners in 
Beijing and Tianjin. However, a foreign troop consisting of soldiers from eight 
different countries rapidly suppressed the Boxer Rebellion and occupied Beijing for 
over a year.
44
 This humiliating result on the Qing court brought a widespread 
sentiment to the surface: the Manchus themselves were the source of China’s 
weakness. Their blind patriotism failed to gain the support from most intellectuals 
and officials, even the relatively moderate Han officials. Revolutionaries at that time 
also strengthened their resolve to overthrow the Qing rulers as the necessary first 




After the Rebellion, reformers regained the initiative to lead a series of 
reform programs called the New Policies (新政) from 1901 to 12, which was to be 
the last decade of the Qing dynasty. By taking the Japanese Meiji Restoration as an 
example, the New Policies proposed carrying out a variety of new reforms in the 
education system, military, laws, the administration of the central government, with 
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a promise of a constitution and parliament.
46
 However, the Qing court’s slow pace 
of reforms failed to meet the expectations of the majority and attracted sharp 
criticism from many in the intellectual field.
47
 Most importantly, the imbalance of 
power in politics between Manchu rulers and Han Chinese became a severe problem 
that forced revolutionaries to make a more radical response to this unbridgeable 
racial gulf.
48
 These revolutionaries argued that it was the Manchu rulers who 
hindered the development of China as a nation in its pace toward the modern world. 
In the Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會), Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) 
(1866-1925), a key leader of the republican revolution, declared that Manchu 
barbarians from the North had conquered the Chinese empire and imposed servitude 
upon Chinese people for more than two hundred years. Once the Manchus were 
expelled from China, it would be possible to establish China as a nation-state with 




However, it should be noted that anti-Manchu revolutionaries were not a 
united group with a proper organisation and well-trained military power, but rather 
diversified local leagues without close coordination with others.
50
 Among these 
groups, the Revolutionary Alliance leaded by Sun Yat-sen was one of the largest and 
most active. In 1911, it recruited soldiers from the New Army (新軍) and supported 
by secret societies and urban elites, the insurrection broke out on October 10 in 
Wuchang (武昌起義), was quickly echoed by different revolutionary groups and 
spread throughout the major provinces of China. These series of insurrections 
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In short, for most Chinese, the last century of the Qing dynasty was a period 
of demoralisation on many fronts. The imperial decline, military defeats, foreign 
occupations, unequal treaties and unsuccessful reforms all marked massive political 
failures. Growing anxiety over the decline of Chinese civilisation finally spurred 
different groups of intellectuals to bring their political versions into nationalist 
actions, each one more radical than the last, until the final overthrow of the Qing 
dynasty. However, the establishment of the new Chinese state did not guarantee that 
the whole nation would successfully integrate as a homogeneous unit. Politicians’ 
struggles for political power in the state were about to begin: intellectual disputes 
about national discourses and symbols had just moved to the next stage.  
 
 
2-3 The Influences of Western Scholarship 
 
As Prasejit Duara argues, nationalism in China was largely formed by global 
competition with other nations in the system of nation-state building.
52
 China’s 
repeated defeats by imperial powers had revealed the fact that its slow pace of 
reform was insufficient to solve the severest national crisis in its history. However, 
the crisis in turn served as a catalyst in spurring a sense of urgency to develop 
unique nationalist discourses on China’s national salvation and regeneration. 
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Compared to developments of nationalism in other nations, China’s discourses were 
largely based on the sentiments of national failures, humiliation, traumatic 
memories and the threat of racial extinction.
53
 Many intellectuals at that time 
deeply believed that the Chinese nation had to awaken from these negative 
sentiments to shake off the shackles of foreign imperialism and to stand wealthy, 
strong and proud as an independent nation-state in the modern world order.
54
 As 
Sun yat-sen pointed out in his six lectures on nationalism, ‘unless Chinese people 
awoke to the dangers of imperialism, the Chinese nation could not avoid perishing 
at the hands of powerful foreign invaders.’
55
 Therefore, awakening the Chinese 
people to a sense of national crisis became a vital part of Chinese nationalist 
discourse among intellectuals of the time. 
 
Another question was also crucial for these intellectuals: how to shift the 
concept of a traditional Chinese world system to the modern Western framework. 
Through the inspiration of Western thought, especially the ideas of nationalism, 
linear historical writings and Social Darwinism, Chinese intellectuals attempted to 
establish a new perspective for understanding the decline of the Chinese empire and 
find a satisfactory answer to the question of national salvation. Some key 
scholar-officials and their book publications, such as Wei Yuan’s Illustrated Treatise 
on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志) (1843) and Xu Ji-yu’s A Short Account of the 
Maritime Circuit (瀛環誌略) (1849), made an enormous contribution to the formation 
of Chinese nationalist discourse in the late Qing era. In these encyclopedic 
geography books, Wei and Xu attempted to move away from the Sino-centric 
worldview by placing the Chinese empire as one of numerous nations in the world. 
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Their books astounded most of the Chinese traditional intellectuals by presenting 
them with another world order showing that China was no longer the ‘Middle 
Kingdom’. These countries and nations outside the Chinese empire gave 
intellectuals a new imagining of world geography.
56
 As Frank Dikötter points out, 
by the process of mapping world geography with different nations, Chinese 
intellectuals in fact enhanced the identity of their own nation.
57
 Benedict Anderson 
also mentions the power of geographical mapping and argues that these visible 
charts of the world profoundly shaped the way in which elites imagined the 




Another influential book in the late Qing period was Yen Fu’s translation of 
Thomas H. Huxley’s book Evolution and Ethics. Yen Fu (嚴復) (1854-1921) was a 
famous graduate of the British naval school and a translator of Western works. Due 
to his military experience, he was deeply affected by China’s defeat in the 
Sino-Japanese War. Yen began to lash out at China’s weakness through his writings 
and translations.
59
 Darwin’s works and social Darwinism at that time immediately 
attracted his attention. Before he began to translate Huxley’s book, Yen published 
four articles in newspapers on social Darwinism related to China’s attempted 
resurgence.
60
 His main argument did not so much come from a Darwinian account 
of biological evolution, but from Herbert Spencer’s idea of struggle for survival.
61
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Spencer, an advocate of social Darwinism, adopted the theory of evolution to 
explain the origins of human relations and civilization by arguing that the ‘survival 
of the fittest’ was also the fundamental principle which governed the biological 
world as well as human societies.
62
 Not surprisingly, Yen derived most of his ideas 
and his thoughts about China’s problems and its position in the world system from 
Spencer.
63
 Most Chinese elites at that time recognised that if China failed to 
compete with other nations, the whole nation would not survive in the new world 
order. 
 
No doubt, the publication of Yen’s translated book came just in time. 
Published in 1898, this book quickly circulated among intellectuals and inspired a 
great deal of patriotic discourse on ‘saving the nation’. It also provided a new 
framework for understanding the decline of the Chinese nation due to its incapacity 
to respond to the logic of ‘natural selection’. These intellectuals believed that only 
the fittest nation in the world had the opportunity to survive in a global evolutionary 




However, Huxley was an anti-social Darwinist. In this book, Huxley actually 
represents an attack on social Darwinism. As he points out, due to the major 
difference between human society and the natural world, the doctrine of the struggle 
for existence upheld by social Darwinists cannot simply apply to human society. If 
the doctrine is allowed to operate in society freely, it might help to destroy human 
civilisation.
65
 But why did Yen Fu, Spencer’s faithful Chinese supporter, choose to 
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translate Huxley’s book instead of Spencer’s original writings? First of all, Huxley’s 
book provides a brief, vivid and almost poetic account of the main principle of 
Darwinism for Yen Fu to further explain his own views on the theory of evolution.
66
 
In this book, Yen’s own comments and footnotes contributed almost the same length 
as Huxley’s original text. Even the title of the book was changed from Evolution 
and Ethics to On Evolution (天演論). In addition, in one of his footnotes, Yen admits 
that Spencer’s writings are abundant, profound and vast. They cannot easily be 
translated.
67
 But Huxley’s book offers an excellent opportunity for him to defend 
Spencer’s views of social Darwinism.
68
 Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that 
this book was not merely a translation, but a book mixed with Yen Fu’s own 
thoughts and interpretation of social Darwinism.  
 
However, even so, Yen’s translation still had a huge influence on the 
formation of nationalist discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. His 
introduction of social Darwinism completely changed the course of Chinese 
nationalist development. This book inspired lots of intellectuals in generating new 
nationalist discourses from the social Darwinian point of view. The problem of the 
survival of the Chinese nation became the dominant concern shared by the majority 
of elites of that decade.
69
 They firmly believed that only when the Chinese empire 
successfully transformed its old system into a modern form of nation-state could the 
nation fulfill its task of survival in the social Darwinian sense of the competitive 
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2-4  National Discourses, Historiography, and Symbols 
 
Social Darwinism changed the way in which intellectuals viewed Chinese 
history. They began to search for a new path leading the historical perspective from 
the traditional cyclical view to the linear, progressive concept.
71
 As Jonathan 
Spencer points out, most Chinese historical texts implied a cyclical view of history 
and thus precluded any linear concept of ‘progress’ in China.
72
 However, in the late 
Qing period, most intellectuals had started recognising that the traditional cyclical 
narrative of the past could not continue its explanatory power in the national crisis 
that the Chinese empire had confronted since the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, after 
the Sino-Japanese War, intellectual communities began to promote new historical 
writings.
73
 According to Prasenjit Duara, the emergence of the idea of linear, 
progressive history was influenced by the mode of Enlightenment History, which 
was introduced to China with the purpose of creating it as a national subject.
74
 As 
the vehicle of passage to modernity, History became the principal method to convert 
the identity of non-nation into a nation.
75
 The arrival of social Darwinism 
reinforces the demand for using the linear, progressive view of History to 
reconstruct China’s past. As James Reeve Pusey argues, it was Darwin, not Kant, 
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Xue Fu-cheng (薛福成) (1838-94), Wang Tao (王韜) (1842-1922), Zheng 
Guan-ying (鄭觀應) (1828-97) and Kang You-wei were the earlier Confucian 
scholars whose writings of Chinese history all implied a linear, progressive 
perspective,
77
 but not until Liang Qi-chao proposed the ‘New Historiography’ (新史
學) in 1902 did the traditional cyclical view of history completely lose its support 
from academic elites.
78
 Liang views himself as a national historian who draws the 
idea of evolutionism as a determined element tying history together with 
nationalism. At the outset of New Historiography, Liang attacks the Chinese 
traditional dynastic principle of historiography by arguing that most Chinese 
historians only paid attention to the royal court, a few prominent figures and events 
that closely related to them. They failed to acknowledge the role of the people in 
history and the concept of the nation that could serve the interests of the present and 
the goal of nation-building.
79
 Therefore, for Liang, Chinese traditional 
historiography was an impractical knowledge due to its inadequacy in achieving the 
aim of shaping a modern nation. Then, Liang comes to redefine history as a process 
of evolutionary, linear development. He argues that the role of historians was to 
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In his historical writings, Liang divides Chinese history into three periods: 
the ancient period (上世史), the medieval period (中世史) and the modern period (近
世史). In this model, Liang traces the root of Chinese ethnicity and its profound 
connection to the modern Chinese nation. In his view, this historical line of the 
Chinese race has not been interrupted, but has to incorporate the non-‘Han Chinese’ 
into the ‘great nation’ of China.
81
 Liang’s New Historiography marked a new 
beginning in Chinese historical thinking and nationalist historiography.
82
 He 
attempted to address the deficiency of Chinese cultural tradition by opening up a 
new road toward a nation-oriented historiography.
83
 Many other historians after 




After the linear progressive view of history had been established, a new 
narrative of the Chinese nation started taking shape. As Luke Kwong mentioned, the 
emergence of linear history was largely linked to the response to the foreign threat 
to China’s survival and national independence.
85
 Not surprisingly, Chinese 
intellectuals at that time attempted to make use of national history to promote 
national pride and sentiments for mobilising the people.
86
 Thus, the primary 
function of the linear narrative of history was firmly tied up with political discourse 
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in the quest for re-orienting the definition of China’s culture and the nation itself.
87
 
Under these circumstances, history became a vast resource of China’s national 
narratives to secure its nationalist discourse. Three main discourses could be 
identified in the late Qing period: racial nationalism, cultural nationalism and civic 
nationalism.  
 
(1) Racial nationalism: Sun yat-sen was one of the most influential 
advocates of racial nationalism. Starting with historical evidence, Sun identifies the 
nation with the idea of race and argues that since the Qin and Han dynasties (漢) 
(206 BCE-220 CE) China had been developing a single state out of a single race.
88
 
He claims that the ‘Han Chinese’ was the world’s most perfectly formed nation 
bound together by all five natural forces (blood, livelihood, language, religion and 
custom).
89
 But as Sun notices, it did not guarantee that the nation had awakened in 
the modern sense of nations and nationalism. There was a huge historical gap 
between the dormant antiquated empire and the awakened modern nation. Sun 
argues that China was a sleeping nation, because the original national spirit of Han 
independence had been weakened by the present Manchu regime and foreign 
imperialist invasions.
90
 If the nation does not find a way to recover its lost 
nationalism, China will perish not only as a state but also as a race.
91
 According to 
the social Darwinian law of the ‘survival of the fittest’, this disastrous fate would be 
an inevitable result. In addition, Sun and his followers sought to mobilise a 
particular history, not only to uphold the Han racial core, but also to serve the ethnic 
foundation of the future Republic. Under the influence of Sun’s national discourse, 
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racial nationalism became the pivot of anti-Manchu movements.
92
 For example, in 
the influential book The Revolutionary Army (革命軍), Zou Rong (鄒容) (1885-1905), 
one of China's nationalists and revolutionary martyrs, argues that the Han race, 
according to historical texts, was the common descendant of the Yellow Emperor (黃
帝), but the Manchus were derived from the barbarian tribes which were inferior to 
the yellow race.
93
 In order to prevent the people of China from becoming a race of 
barbarians’ slaves, the ‘Han Chinese’ had to reject the Manchu yoke and seize their 
own destiny.
94
 As a result, racial nationalism was the biggest discursive boost to the 
revolutionary movements.  
 
 (2) Cultural nationalism: the rhetoric of racial nationalism and 
anti-Manchuism attracted a great deal of criticism from the reformers. As Liang 
Qi-chao points out, like most of empires in the world, China was composed of 
different ethnic groups within its territory. The revolutionaries’ definition of nation 
might erect a racial barrier to state-building in a multi-ethnic community such as 
China. Therefore, Liang invents a new term ‘broad nationalism’ to distinguish his 
ideal of multi-culturalism from ‘narrow nationalism’ which indicates 
anti-Manchuism and Han centralism.
95
 Kang You-wei also argues that it was a set 
of particular moral and cultural orders, but not racial affinity, that worked as a 
cohesive power binding the Chinese nation together. What China represents is not 
only a political entity, but also a long-standing cultural system.
96
 In addition, the 
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Manchus had already both racially and culturally assimilated into Han. It was 
unnecessary to separate the Manchus from a broader definition of the Chinese 
nation.
97
 Most importantly, this internal racial division might cause further 
fragmenting of China’s fragile social unity that made Western imperialism grasp the 
opportunity to conquer China.
98
 Therefore, Kang argued that continuing to cultivate 
and carry forward national culture and spirit would be the vital method to save the 
nation, with the attempt to undertake political reform by means of reconstructing the 
image of Confucius as a politically oriented sage-king.
99
 For Kang, Confucianism 
represented a core value of China’s traditional moral and cultural order that could 
serve as a source to legitimise and stabilise the changes to China’s present society. 
Therefore, Kang’s ideal tended to culturally promote Confucianism as a national 





(3) Civic nationalism: that the notion of nationalism contained a 
state-oriented direction within it was overlooked by many racial and cultural 
nationalist supporters. Liang Qi-chao was one of the earliest Chinese intellectuals 
who noticed this direction and led his discourse to this aspect of state-building at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Liang sets out his argument by raising a question: 
who are the ‘Chinese people’ exactly? He argues, ‘Our greater source of 
embarrassment is the fact that our country has no name. In common parlance, we 
refer to the people of Xia, Han, or Tang, which are all the names of dynasties. Such 
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foreign terms as Chendan or Shina are not the name we call ourselves.’
101
 To be 
sure, most people in China at that time failed to recognise that they actually 
constituted a nation, but the name chosen to define the people would determine who 
should be counted among them and how they should be expected to behave as a 
nation. Therefore, he links the awakened self with the community of the nation-state 
through the ideal of citizenship. He continues to argue that China can call itself a 
nation only if all Chinese people have been awakened as modern citizens.
102
 Here, 
race is not the boundary to block the people from having an equal opportunity to 
hold the same right to be part of the nation.
103
 The task of saving the nation in this 
regard could only be achieved under the condition that the Chinese people had been 
instructed in a proper sense of national citizenship. Like most reformers, Liang 
emphasised the principle of democracy and sovereignty with the purpose of 




It should be noted that these intellectuals and their nationalist debates might 
not necessarily be so sharply divided. For example, Kang You-wei’s and Liang 
Qi-chao’s views of cultural nationalism had implied a racial hierarchy in their 
arguments. In Kang’s book Book of Great Unity (大同書), he proposes a utopian 
vision of the world and argues that in order to achieve universal harmony, darker 
races should be eliminated. All possible methods to whiten them, such as dietary 
change, intermarriage, migration and sterilisation should be taken into 
consideration.
105
 In Liang’s earlier stages, he argues that in order to prevent yellow 
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races from racial extinction caused by white imperialism, they should gather 
together to fight against white domination.
106
 Although there were some common 
concerns and themes that could be identified in different nationalist camps, it did 
not mean that they had already reached a consensus on the definition of the Chinese 
nation. It is clear that in the late Qing era there was no united nationalist discourse 
or generally agreed definition of the nation in this battle of nationalism. As Prasenjit 





In addition, different nationalist camps might bring their own visions of 
nation to contest or negotiate with each other by selecting different symbols, myths, 
memories and cultural elements from history to secure their arguments. As Anthony 
D. Smith points out, nationalism operates on many levels, not only to be regarded as 
a species of political ideology or social movement, but also as a form of culture. It is 
impossible to grasp the idea of nationalism without exploring its cultural matrix 
based on a pre-existing ethnic past, myths, customs, historical figures and many 
other symbols.
108
 These nationalist signifiers play an important role in awakening 
the nation and its members through the methods of communicating the abstract 
ideology of nation in printed texts or visualised icons to evoke instant emotional 
responses from all strata of the community.
109
 In this regard, in the late Qing era 
Chinese nationalists also attempted to search for various pre-modern national 
symbols to arouse people’s national sentiments.  
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First of all, the symbolic role of the Yellow Emperor was revived as the 
common ancestor of all Chinese in the national narratives during the late Qing era. 
However, according to Charles Le Blanc’s research, the image of the Yellow 
Emperor in Chinese history was changing all the time. He was initially recognised 
as the first ancestor and the perfect ruler of the Chou court within the Chou dynasty 
(周) (1122-222 BCE).
110
 Later, he was viewed as a mythical character who played 
an important role in legitimatising the Chou rulers’ right to political domination.
111
 
He is also represented both as an epic hero and as a cultural hero who eliminated 
barbarians outside the border and pacified enemies within the border by establishing 
a new political order.
112
 In Confucian classics, the Yellow Emperor was a sage 
emperor who invented a number of technological implements and introduced many 
social institutions for society.
113
 For Taoism, he was one of the masters and divine 
beings (仙) who knew the secret of universal harmony and order.
114
 During the late 
Qing period, the image of the Yellow Emperor began to link with the destiny of the 
nation. Under the influence of the linear perspective of history and new national 
debates, the Yellow Emperor was no longer the divine being or the founder of the 
Chinese noble clans, but the common ancestor of all ‘Han Chinese’. Some 
nationalists even argued that all yellow races in pan-Asia were his descendants.
115
 
Thus, the myth of the Yellow Emperor was appropriated from its original religious 
and political functions to become the symbol of the Chinese nation’s racial heritage 
and cultural root.  
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The Yellow Emperor was also described as China’s ‘William the Conqueror’ 
who repelled barbarian tribes from the central area of China and established the 
initial racial boundary of the ‘Han’ nation.
116
 Chen Tian-hau (陳天華) (1875-1905), 
a revolutionary who wrote influential nationalist pamphlets in the late Qing era, 
argues that every family in China descends from one original lineage whose great 
ancestor is the Yellow Emperor.
117
 Chen viewed the Chinese nation as an extended 
family which had a cohesive and homogeneous racial core stemming from a 
common mythical character. Liu Shi-pei (劉師培) (1884-1919), a famous late Qing 
historian, advocated the introduction of a calendar in which the foundation year 
corresponded to the birth of the Yellow Emperor. Although the Yellow Emperor’s 
actual year of birth provoked a number of debates, the idea of setting up a national 
calendar opposed to the Western calendar attracted an enthusiastic support from the 
revolutionary instigators.
118
 In addition, the ceremony of offering sacrifice to the 
Yellow Emperor symbolically during the late Qing period became a very popular 
rite which tied national genealogical origins to the birth of the Yellow Emperor.
119
 
Thus, the Yellow Emperor and its new given meaning became a part of the process 
through which a sense of national identity was constructed by the late Qing new 




Many other historical figures whose stories could contribute to the Chinese 
national narratives were also revived at the same time. When the late Qing 
historians devoted themselves to reconstructing Chinese national history, a 
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genealogy of national heroes was created as well. For them, national heroes as the 
flesh and blood of national identity provided models of virtue to inspire the faith 
and courage of building a nation for their descendants. Based on certain political 
ideologies, these heroes were carefully selected and often their legends were 
exaggerated by nationalists with the purpose of glorifying the ancestral civilisation 
and re-educating the masses in national values, memories and myths.
121
 Koxinga 
(鄭成功) (1624-62) were good examples to explain how particular historical figures 
were nationalised and placed in the list of heroes in the late Qing period. Koxinga 
was a Ming loyalist and the commander of Ming troops on the maritime front for 
the post-Ming monarchs. He refused to recognise the Qing dynasty and later took 
over the island of Taiwan from Dutch colonisers to support his grand campaign 




Here, Koxinga’s legends revealed the nature of being a national hero chosen 
by the revolutionaries: he was a military leader who fought against barbarian rulers 
for the Chinese empire. Although eventually his missions ended in failure, he 
showed his loyalty to the country and died for his faith that his homeland would be 
reunited under orthodox ‘Han’ successions. Before Koxinga became a national hero, 
he was worshiped in local legends only in certain areas of China. But through the 
processes of making national heroes, he quickly acquired a nation-wide reputation 
and became one of the well-known icons of the nation.
123
 In addition, many other 
great emperors, navigators and explorers, statesmen, strategists and writers in the 
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history of China were placed in the genealogy of national heroes.
124
 Again, they 
might originally belong to regional beliefs, worshiped by locals, or have a great 
status in certain communities, but now their merits were expanded to meet the need 
of being national heroes who deserved reverence from the whole nation. Even these 
heroes might belong more to the realm of legend than history and, if they lived, 
knew nothing of the nation which was so enthusiastically reclaiming them as great 
men in national history.  
 
 Finally, cultural heritages and popular icons also became national symbols 
in the late Qing period. Compared to mythical characters or historical figures, their 
symbols were closer to daily life and were more easily accepted by the masses. For 
example, the Mogao Caves, the Great Wall, the Imperial Mausoleums, the 
well-known landscapes such as the Yangtze and Yellow River and other popular 
icons like the dragon, tiger and phoenix were also viewed as national symbols at 
that time. What made these symbols different from previous ones was that their 
visual forms representing the nation made it easier to communicate the abstract idea 
of nationalism with the masses and were shared as part of daily life. As Anthony D. 
Smith argues, in many ways visual forms of national symbols are the most potent 
and durable aspects of nationalism. They embody basic concepts of nationalism 
connected to national history and culture by making them visible and which also 




One dimension which must be added to this type of national symbolisation is 
the use of architecture. There are many cases in history which reveal the fact that 
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architecture is part of power constructions which are demonstrated visually for that 
purpose. In the age of nation-formation, architects often consciously accepted 
national narratives constructed by nationalists to create a new form and style of 
architecture by borrowing traditional elements from the past for representing their 
own idea of nation. National narratives can pass messages of nationalism by certain 
visual languages.
126
 Architecture as a powerful contributor of national symbolism 
cannot be ignored by those who are eager to forge the nation and fulfill their 
political blueprint though image-making and visual expressions. 
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Chapter Three: The Making of the National Style 
 
 
3-1 Early Pioneers  
 
Although the notion of nationalism had became mainstream in early twentieth 
century China, not until the 1930s did nationalism fully exert its influence in 
architectural circles. One reason was that the native architects who were trained in 
modern Western architectural education were not available until the 1920s. Before 
that, most of China’s new architecture was built by foreign architects or 
missionaries. The other reason was that not until the 1930s did Chinese architectural 
scholars have the ability to compete with Western and Japanese scholars in the study 
of Chinese classical architecture. Without their contributions, Chinese traditional 
building knowledge could not be widely spread, and the expression of Chinese 
features in architecture was also difficult to achieve. After the 1930s, the dream of 
building with a Chinese national form and style designed by Chinese architects 
could finally be fulfilled.  
 
However, before the change was made, the Chinese still did not view 
architecture as serious knowledge and art. Traditionally, construction work in China 
was not considered as a job for intellectuals, but a job for masons or carpenters who 
were viewed as belonging to a lower social position than the gentry-literati class 
within a strict Confucian social hierarchy.
1
 Architectural knowledge in this regard 
was seen not as a serious subject or profession for intellectuals to put in extra effort 
for further studies. Thus, it is no surprise that Western scholars were the first group 
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of researchers to begin the academic examination of Chinese classical architecture. 
One of the earliest books on Chinese architecture issued in England in 1752 called 
Chinese and Gothic Architecture Properly Ornamented, was written by William 
Halfpenny (1723-1755) and his son.
2
 Like many other early Western publications 
on Chinese architecture in the eighteenth century, this book was more like a 
designer reference handbook in a Chinoiserie style, rather than a serious academic 
work.
3
 In the middle of the eighteenth century, buildings and pavilions in royal 
gardens or palaces in the Chinoiserie style were a widespread phenomenon 
throughout Europe.
4
 These reference handbooks provided useful drawings and 
diagrams for European architects to imitate Chinese building style from a Western 
architectural point of view. The English architect and architectural historian Sir 
William Chambers (1723-1796) was also one of the important Chinoiserie style 
advocates who published a famous book on Chinese architecture called Design of 
Chinese Buildings, Furniture, Dresses, Machines, and Utensils in 1757. Due to his 
experiences travelling to Canton, a southeast city of China, this book provided a 
better quality and accuracy of architectural engravings of Chinese buildings than 
any other book of its kind.  
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In his book, Chambers presents drawings of Chinese building plans, sections, 
façades and details of decorative elements with his brief introductions and 
descriptions of different types of Chinese buildings. Based on these remarkable 
achievements, this book helped to build his high reputation on Chinese architecture 
in English academia.
5
 However, Chambers still made some errors in his engravings. 
For example, the building arrangement in the plan of ‘houses of the Chinese’ is not 
completely consistent with Chinese building traditions. The proportion of living 
spaces is also exaggerated by Chambers. In the section of Chinese roofs, Chambers 
only focuses on the Chinese paraboloid roof (卷棚), a special and rare type of curved 
roof, constructed with bent rafters, which is not as popular in China as other roofs, 
like hip, gabled or pointed. As Patrick Conner argues, Chambers’ plates on Chinese 
architecture appear to be the work of a draughtsman playing with oriental detail but 
imbued with Western classical principles in order to make them acceptable to his 
Western readers.
6
 In addition, Chambers also shows his biases in his descriptions of 
Chinese architecture. In the preface, compared to European grand building 
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traditions, Chambers concedes that Chinese architecture is imperfect and 
unintelligible. Chinese classical style is neither rich in materials nor remarkable for 
magnitude. Therefore, Chambers argues that it is only suitable for use in less 




A Scottish architectural historian James Fergusson (1808-1886) also brought 
his biases to his writings on Chinese architecture in the famous books A History of 
Architecture in All Countries (1865-6) and History of Indian and Eastern 
Architecture (1876 and 1910). First of all, Fergusson admits that the advanced 
photographic camera can help to bring higher quality images of Chinese architecture 
to the West to change a long-established opinion of Chinese architecture. But from a 
Western architectural point of view, Fergusson still insists that the architectural 
forms and style of China, compared to that of Egypt or other advanced civilisations, 
are still not worth further exploration.
8
 What he really appreciates in Chinese 
building art is the polychromy, which is employed on the surfaces of buildings for 
decoration.
9
 In addition, Fergusson places pagodas in the first part of the 
introduction of Chinese building types. He mistakenly applies the method of 
identifying the characters of Indian architecture, on which he established a great 
reputation in Britain, to the studies of Chinese architecture. In fact, pagodas in 
China are subsidiary buildings. They are never the main focus of an architectural 
complex. Fergusson also mistakenly views the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests (祈
年殿) in Beijing’s Temple of Heaven (天壇) as a pagoda. Actually the Hall is part of 
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imperial ritual architecture, used as a sacred place for the Emperor praying for good 
harvests for the year under his rule, and not a normal Buddhist pagoda for ordinary 
people.
10
 In the 1919 edition, Fergusson corrects this error, but still pays more 
attention to Indian architecture and less on Chinese and Japanese architecture.
11
 He 
adds a new chapter to explain the complicated bracket set system of Chinese roofs, 
but mistakenly identifies a drawing of a Japanese roof as Chinese.
12
 He also 
incorrectly illustrates the construction of Chinese curved roofs and concludes that 




Following Chambers’ and Fergusson’s arguments, Sir Banister Fletcher 
(1866-1953), an English architect and architectural historian, is also biased against 
Chinese architecture. In his famous book A History of Architecture on the 
Comparative Method (1956, 16
th
 edition), Fletcher argues that the Chinese always 
pay more attention to poetic art forms, such as gardening or painting, rather than 
architectural design, which is merely held subservient to human needs.
14
 Therefore, 
he mistakenly concludes that all Chinese building plans, from sacred to secular, and 
from public to private, are constituted by the same design principle which has 
undergone little change and progress in history.
15
 This Eurocentric architectural 
point of view is also shown in his famous diagram of the origin of architecture: the 
tree of architecture. Every style which is not categorised as part of the 
Greek-Roman-Romanesque lineage is regarded as an offshoot with no independent 
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 Following this prejudiced conception, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and 




Therefore, there is no surprise that these sorts of misunderstandings and bias 
toward Chinese architecture hindered a more comprehensive understanding of 
Chinese building traditions in Western academic circles. Not until the beginning of 
the twentieth century did new research conducted by other scholars, such as the 
German architect Ernst Boerschmann (1873-1949), Japanese architectural historian 
Ito Chuta (伊東忠太 ) (1867-1954) and Chinese native intellectuals, make a 
significant breakthrough in Chinese architectural studies. 
 
Like previous Western scholars, early missionaries who went to China for 
missionary work also did not have a favourable impression of Chinese buildings. 
The Jesuit missionary Père Louis Le Comte (1655-1728) in 1690 had written some 
disparaging comments on Chinese buildings. He argues that Chinese buildings are 
very unpleasing to foreigners.
18
 In 1735, the missionary Jean-Baptiste du Halde 
(1674-1743) also belittled Chinese architecture. He argues that the houses of 
Chinese nobility and rich people do not deserve to be mentioned in comparison with 
Western architecture. To call Chinese palaces a palace would be an abuse of the 
architectural term. These palaces are nothing but a ground-floor raised a little higher 




In the discussion of the construction of church buildings in China, these 
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European missionaries also believed that Western style had some merits that 
Chinese classical style could not compete with. In 1896 at a meeting of the 
Educational Association of China, Lucius Porter (1880-1958) pointed out the 
‘hygienic’ problem in Chinese houses. He argues that Western architectural 
technique can provide a better built environment than the Chinese one.
20
 Reverend 
P. W. Pitcher advocates missionaries erecting Western style churches with high 
steeples in the cities in order to destroy the nonsense of Chinese fung-shui (風水) 
(the Chinese art of geomancy).
21
 Early missionaries insisted that the Western 
church style was the orthodox style and should not be altered to suit Chinese 
circumstances. Therefore, from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the 
twentieth century, missionary buildings in China were predominately in the Western 
style.  
 
Although most missionaries did not appreciate the beauty of Chinese 
traditional buildings, it was the missionaries who began to question the assumption 
that church buildings in China had to wear a Western architectural mask. By the 
1920s, lots of churches, hospitals and Christian universities had changed their 
appearance to a new eclectic form combining Western construction techniques with 
the Chinese classical style to reflect some deference to the Chinese context. This 
changing attitude toward Chinese building traditions showed a shifting development 
of Christianity in China in adjusting its strategy of missionary work to reflect 
enormous changes in modern Chinese society.  
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Missionary work in China was never an easy task. Whether or not the 
orthodox Christian doctrine should adapt to suit China’s cultural and social context 
was always a controversial issue. When the first Italian Jesuit missionaries, Michele 
Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), came to southern China for 
their missionary work, China was a rich and self-satisfied empire. In order to 
penetrate the high society of China to convert the Chinese to Christianity, 
missionaries had to learn classical Chinese (the literary language of scholars and 




However the processes of carrying out missionary work were not quite as 
successful in the Qing dynasty. Although Emperor Kangxi (康熙) (1662-1722) had 
favoured the Jesuits and designated some missionaries as officials and advisers in 
the Qing court, Pope Clement XI’s disagreement on allowing Chinese converts the 
right to worship their ancestors and pay homage to Confucius had deeply defied the 
Emperor’s authority and the Chinese custom that he valued. Kangxi gave an order 
to expel missionaries who refused to sign a certificate accepting his position.
23
 This 
was the first time that Catholic missionaries had encountered significant difficulty in 
preaching the gospel in China. Emperor Yongzheng (雍正) (1678-1735) was even 
sterner than Kangxi, especially on the issue of the Chinese Rites Controversy. Most 
missionaries were assembled in Canton or Macao and forbidden to propagate 




Not until the Opium War had this strict policy of prohibiting the Christian 
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mission in China been changed. The result of the War forced the Qing court to open 
up its market for Western traders. The industrial and residential sites in foreign 
concessions of five main port cities were quickly developed by Western powers for 
commercial activities and national interests. Missionaries at that time had a new 
opportunity to re-enter China for their mission. Under the protection of unequal 
treaties, clergymen not only had the same privileged status of extraterritoriality as 
foreign business men and diplomatic personnel, but were also granted the right to 
rent or buy land for the construction of churches in foreign concessions.
25
 
Therefore, Christian churches and church buildings began to prosper and grow in 
concession cities and Christianity overall became a useful and subtle part of the 




However, several factors inhibited the development of Christianity in China. 
First of all, due to different value systems, customs, and traditions, some Christian 
doctrines and ceremonies caused a lot of misunderstanding in Chinese communities. 
Even the highly educated Chinese wrote posters or pamphlets attacking churches or 
assembled angry crowds for the anti-Christian movement.
27
 During the climax of 
anti-foreigner and Chinese nationalism movements, missionaries and Chinese 
converts became primary targets. In addition, Western governments often played a 
role as a powerful protector of church enterprises. Not only were a missionary’s 
right to promote church works fully protected, but also the delinquent behaviour of 
some Chinese coverts were covered by churches with the diplomatic privilege that 
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 Therefore, the excessive protection that churches offered their Chinese 
members often aroused great resentment in Chinese communities. Sometime this 




As a result, the emergence of anti-Christian, anti-foreigner and nationwide 
patriotic movements forced Western churches to reconsider their methods of 
propagating Christianity in China. The Roman Catholic Church started its 
Inculturation Movement to respond to the appeal for church reform made by 
Chinese Catholic coverts.
30
 For example, Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) strongly 
supported the world-wide church, to eliminate any cultural domination retained by 
Western missionaries.
31
 It was vitally important for the Church to evangelise the 
sacred texts to natives, not only by the vernacular they used, but also through the 
local culture they lived with.
32
 The Pope also advocated allowing local clergymen 
to take responsibility for the running of their own churches.
33
 On the other hand, 
Protestant churches in China did not confine themselves only to the missionary 
sector. They began to establish other enterprises such as church universities, 
hospitals and publishing companies to promote Christianity, and the educational 
sector quickly became the second great field of missionary activities.
34
 To some 
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extent, these new enterprises did help to change the Chinese attitude toward Western 
Christianity. The growth of Chinese national self-consciousness made the churches 
recognise that having a discussion on establishing a Chinese Christian church was 
an unavoidable issue.
35
 Chinese converts eventually had to carry out the 
evangelisation of the nation by themselves. Thus, more and more Protestant 





The Catholic Church’s Inculturation Movement and Protestant churches’ 
Indigenous Church Movement facilitated the rise of indigenous churches in China. 
Most missionaries began to reflect some deference to Chinese traditions and 
customs in their teachings. For example, Celso Benigno Luigi Costantini 
(1876-1958), the first Catholic Apostolic Delegate of China, highly commends 
China’s traditional art and culture. He argues that in order to treat Chinese traditions 
and cultural wisdom with respect, Chinese art forms should be adapted into the 
propagation of Christianity.
37
 As a vital part of missionary work, church buildings 
should also wear Chinese costume in order to give Chinese members a sense of 
being at home in the chapel, instead of feeling that they are in an alien 
environment.
38
 In addition, in the journal Church Missionary Review Margaret E. 
Faithfull-Davies also argues that missionaries have to recognise that church designs 
in China were very important for the image of Christianity. Christianity is daily 
judged by locals from the appearance of its buildings. Early missionaries do not put 
enough effort or thought into church buildings with regard to the quality and 
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suitable style. Later missionaries should endeavour to avoid these past errors. He 
suggests that clergymen should hire professional architects to survey Chinese 




Indeed, before the Inculturation and Indigenous Church Movements were 
taking place, most of church buildings in China were assumed to be European 
basilica or hall-church building type designed by missionaries.
40
 After the initial 
Church Movements, missionaries were aware of the need to redesign the churches 
without an obvious foreign character. As M. H. Throop criticises in the Chinese 
Recorder, the high steeples of Mid-Victorian-Gothic chapels are utterly out of 
harmony with the Chinese city and architectural tone of China. When building 
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Fig. 3-3  A Church in Showchow, 1924.  Fig 3-4 The Church of Our Savior in 





Therefore, a general consensus on the issue of an indigenous church was that 
church buildings should have a clear aesthetic link to China’s past and the Chinese 
context.
42
 In order to make church buildings closer to Chinese culture, missionaries 
began to employ professional architects to run building projects. These architects 
created the earliest Chinese church style adapted to contemporary needs of space 
without sacrificing traditional features. Based on new construction techniques and 
materials topped with Chinese decorations and grand curved roofs, these buildings 
started to match clergy’s vision of an indigenous church. As a result, the indigenous 
church style quickly became a new mainstream fashion in the Christian community.  
 
Among these architects, Henry K. Murphy (1877-1954) was one of the most 
famous and influential designers at that time. In his early career in China, Murphy’s 
concern for the preservation of Chinese tradition created what he termed an 
‘adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance’ style.
43
 He earned a great reputation in 
China’s Christian community as an architect who had found a balance between 
economy and beauty in design.
44
 When churches were expanding their educational 
activities in China, Murphy took the opportunity to embody his design ideas. In the 
case of the Ginling College for Girls in Nanjing, Murphy successfully placed 
classrooms and modern laboratory spaces under Chinese big roofs, and arranged 
them in a traditional Chinese quadrangle order with an axis corresponding to 
Nanjin’s landscape.
45
 Because his vision of Chinese church buildings coincided 
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with many of his missionary clients, Murphy quickly become a successful architect, 




Fig. 3-5 Henry Murphy’s Design of the 
Ginling College for Girls. 
Fig. 3-6 Bird’s-eye view of the Ginling 
College for Girls.  
 
 
However, as Jeffery W. Cody points out, due to the limited insight in Chinese 
traditional architecture, the results of indigenous church buildings were not quite 
convincing.
46
 Without fully understanding the real Chinese building structure and 
form, many Western architects had to use their own assumptions or imagination to 
mimic the Chinese classical style. For example, in the case of Shandong and Ginling 
collage buildings (1921-37), Chicago architects Perkins, Fellows & Hamilton 
mistakenly assumed that Chinese architecture was defined solely by the big roof.
47
 
Other architects also paid too much attention to designing a big roof copied from the 
prototype of Beijing’s Forbidden City, but overlooked that the dougong (斗拱), a 
wooden bracket set worked as a buttress for bearing the vertical loads from the top, 
also needed to be added under the roof.
48
 Even Murphy, who paid more attention to 
details than any other architect, had also made some mistakes. On the ridge finials 
of Chinese buildings, a monster, a decorative character, should symbolically 
                                                 
46
 Ibid., 5. 
47
 Ibid., 5. 
48
 Ibid., 5. 
97 
 





As Fu Chao-ching (傅朝卿), a famous Taiwanese architectural historian argues, 
these foreign architects do not precisely grasp the principle and the nature of 
Chinese traditional architecture. Their imitative designs are not significantly 
different from European Chinoiserie style.
50
 The main reason hindering these 
designers from further mastering Chinese building was the lack of sufficient 
systematic surveys on Chinese building traditions. As mentioned earlier, Western 
scholars had either shown clear biases against Chinese architecture in their historical 
writings, or had made limited investigation on real Chinese buildings. Regardless, 
Chinese scholars at that time had not yet reported on Chinese architectural traditions 
in a systematic method.
51
 Therefore, the designs of indigenous church buildings 
often contained several basic errors or misuses of elements which did not conform 




Fig. 3-7 The Administration Building of the 
Cheeloo University in Shandong.  
Fig. 3-8 Murphy’s drawing of the 
Chinese Ridge finials. 
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3-2 Chinese Successors  
 
When Western architects and missionaries had begun to erect indigenous 
church buildings in China and undertake some pioneering research in Chinese 
architecture, a number of Chinese traditional intellectuals were also aware of the 
importance of preserving their own building traditions. Although European and 
Japanese scholars had shown their interest in Chinese architecture and made 
considerable progress in research earlier than Chinese scholars, it was the Chinese 
scholars who achieved a significant breakthrough in studies of Chinese architecture. 
Their work and reports had later been adopted by many Chinese architects for the 
practice of the Chinese classical style.  
 
Zhu Qi-qian (朱啟鈐) (1872-1964) was one of the earliest Chinese intellectuals 
who had established the early academic foundation of the Chinese architectural 
investigations in China during the Republic era. He was a traditional gentry-literati 
who occupied a higher social position and normally distanced themselves from 
building work which was viewed as belonging to lower class. His interest in 
construction came from his experiences in Beiyang government as a minister of 
transportation and communications, minister of the interior and the premier of the 
State Council. He participated in the construction of the Anglo-German-funded 
railway, the span bridge across the Yellow River, railway stations in Nanxiakou and 
Dezhou and the urban renewal project in Beijing’s Forbidden City.
52
 But what 
made Zhu devote himself to the research of Chinese traditional architecture and its 
conservation was his discovery of the Yingzao Fashi (營造法式) (Treaties on 
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Architectural Methods), an old construction manual of Chinese architecture, in 
Nanjing’s Jiang-nan library (江南圖書館) in 1919.  
 
According to history, the Yingzao Fashi was first printed in 1103. The author 
Li Jie (李誡) (1065-1110) served the imperial court as director of the imperial 
construction department for thirteen years in the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127). 
In 1097, he was commissioned by the emperor to compile the Yingzao Fashi in 
order to establish a clear construction standard based on a modular system, down to 
the smallest construction unit, for officers and royal craftsmen to follow in building 
imperial public works. In so doing, the cost of materials and labour could be fully 
estimated with minimum waste.
53
 This book also could be used to prevent 
corruption in the construction department.
54
 As a practical construction manual, the 
Yingzao Fashi was still in use in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).
55
 After that, 
technical jargon and construction methods in China had undergone enormous 
changes, so this book had been forgotten for centuries. Only the imperial library and 





When Zhu discovered this book in Nanjing, he quickly recognised that what 
he found was a key text to gain access to the knowledge of Chinese architectural 
traditions. In 1920, a year after he found this book, he sent it to one of leading 
publishers, the Commercial Press, in Shanghai for reprinting. Zhu also realised that 
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the book had been transcribed many times since the Song dynasty original, so he 
attempted to reconstruct the original Song edition of 1103. He established a special 
institute for carrying out research on the book, and began to collect as many 
different versions as he could. Later, Zhu entrusted Tao Xiang (陶湘) (1870-1940), a 
well-known book restorer, to restore this book. Tao set out to collate all available 
copies of the Yingzao Fashi with the assistance of several book collectors and 
librarians. After his diligent work on re-editing, countless errors and distortions 
made by processes of transcription and printing from the original had been corrected. 
Zhu also employed a master builder of the Qing imperial palaces to redraw 
diagrams of timber structure for the book. Moreover, the original black and white 




This new edition of the Yingzao Fashi was published in 1925. It immediately 
attracted global attention from many scholars in Chinese art and architecture. The 
English sinologist Walter Perceval Yetts (1878-1957) wrote an article to introduce 
this new edition to his English readers and called it ‘triumphs of book-production’.
58
 
Some Japanese architectural scholars also used this book as a main source when 
doing Chinese architectural research.
59
 Even Liang Qi-chao recognised the 
importance of the book. He sent a copy to his son Liang Si-cheng (梁思成) (1902-72) 
who studied architecture at the University of Pennsylvania during that time. 
However, for most scholars and intellectuals, the book was not easy to understand. 
In the past eight hundred years so many technical terms had changed and some 
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descriptions of structural details were undecipherable for modern readers. In 
addition, due to the class difference, most Chinese researchers, who were traditional 
gentry-literati, were not familiar with the language that craftsmen used in the 
book.
60
 Young scholars like Liang Si-cheng, who was trained in American 




Indeed, as Zhu admits, re-editing an old construction manual of Chinese 
architecture is not enough for fully understanding Chinese building traditions. It is 
necessary to establish an academic society for research in Chinese architecture.
62
 
Zhu believed that Western scientific methodology should be introduced to the 
Society in order to conduct a systematic investigation of Chinese classical 
architecture. In so doing, Chinese scholars could contribute their knowledge to 





In addition, the series of nationalist movements in China inspired Zhu to found 
the Society. Like Liang Qi-chao and many other reformers at that time, Zhu 
attempts to find a form of unchanging ‘Chinese-ness’ in history to anchor the 
changes in modern China.
64
 He believes that Chinese culture and traditions as a 
historical foundation of the modern Chinese nation should be fully protected.
65
 The 
Yingzao Fashi is the book illustrating the greatest achievements of China’s 
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construction history. Therefore, it is an important task to restore the book and 
decipher the texts to revive Chinese culture and traditions. In addition, when China 
began its Westernisation and modernisation movements in architecture and urban 
reconstruction, the appeal of preserving traditional building techniques and 
craftsmanship did not receive enough attention. If the puzzles hidden in the book 
could not be solved, all the ancient construction knowledge and heritage would 
gradually be forgotten and disappear in the future.
66
 Most importantly, Zhu hoped 
that one day the status of Chinese architecture could be raised to the same level as 
Western architecture in the world, and that Western scholars one day would 
recognise the great achievements of Chinese architecture without bias.
67
 Therefore, 
in 1930, Zhu founded China’s first and most important research group of Chinese 
architecture, named the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture (中國營造學社), 
to conduct a systematic survey of Chinese building traditions.  
 
The Society had to save the dying knowledge of Chinese architecture. They 
carried out interviews with old master builders in order to reveal the undecipherable 
technical terms remaining in the texts. As Zhu Qi-qian argues, these builders who 
knew the building technique probably did not know the Yingzao Fashi, and these 
intellectuals who knew the texts did not understand building construction. Therefore, 
the Society had to find a ‘middle road’ to facilitate communication on both sides.
68
 
As a result, their groundbreaking researches and reports published in the Bulletin 
quickly became the most important sources of Chinese architectural studies in 
twentieth century international academia.  
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Despite this, the Society had to catch up with European and Japanese 
investigations in Chinese classical architecture. In order to set out a new approach to 
the study of the Yingzao Fashi and Chinese building relics, they began to recruit 
young scholars who studied architecture or related disciplines in Europe, America 
and Japan.
69
 Indeed, traditional gentry-literati were experts at interpreting ancient 
literature and re-editing different versions of rare books, but they could not totally 
master the architectural methodology conforming to Western academic standards. 
These young scholars, including Liang Si-cheng, a graduate of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Lin Hui-yi ( 林徽因 ) (1904-55), also from the University of 
Pennsylvania and Liu Dun-zhen (劉敦楨) (1897-1968), a graduate of the Tokyo 
Polytechnic University, later played a vital role in taking the Society in a new 




There were three major differences making the research achievement of the 
Society unique from that of European and Japanese scholars. First of all, the Society 
particularly emphasised team work. As Vimalin Rujivacharakul notices, every 
member of the Society contributed parts of their work to the final results of reports 
published in the Bulletin.
71
 This teamwork model was very different from the 
European academic tradition which required mostly a single author who conducted 
a research project independently. Secondly, due to the language and cultural 
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boundary, most Western researchers had encountered difficulties in accessing 
primary sources to advance their understanding of China’s craftsman system and 
unique Chinese timber construction. Finally, the field studies undertaken by Western 
scholars were not complete and comprehensive. For example, the famous Swedish 
art historian Osvald Sirén (1978-1966) was invited by Emperor Puyi (溥儀 ) 
(1906-67) to visit the Forbidden City and many other royal palaces and gardens. 
Sirén’s international reputation was built on his first-hand investigations, but his 
researches were confined merely to Beijing’s royal buildings and apparently too 
narrow to be called a representative study of Chinese architecture. The German 
architect Ernst Boerschmann (1873-1949) was probably the most important Western 
scholar collecting considerable materials on Chinese architecture in three years of 
field studies in China’s hinterland. However, Boerschmann’s main concern was 
mostly focussed on imperial buildings and Buddhist temples, and he did not offer a 
complete overview of the development of Chinese architecture in his writings. He 
also largely overlooked the technique part of Chinese building construction.
72
 
Because of this limited scope of study, he could not provide a comprehensive 
overview and a historical panorama of Chinese classical architecture based on an 
exhaustive field study and a thorough literature research.  
 
Compared to Western researchers, Japanese scholars have decisive advantages 
in competing with European sinologists. Japan had experienced Chinese influences 
for many centuries, not only in culture, religion and language, but also in 
architectural construction and style.
73
 Due to these affinities with China, Japanese 
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scholars quickly surpassed Western scholars in doing a more comprehensive study 
of Chinese architecture. However, their investigations also exposed some limitations. 
For example, Ito Chuta (伊東忠太) (1867-1954), the most important architectural 
historian in Japan, had visited China for architectural surveys since 1901. Although 
his investigations were among most extensive at that time, the purpose of the trip 
was to trace the origin of Japanese architecture rather than the history of Chinese 
architecture.
74
 Only a particular period of Chinese history, starting from ancient 
Chinese to the Southern and Northern dynasties (南北朝) (420-589), in which China 
began to extend her cultural influence to Japan, was mentioned in his book The 
History of Chinese Architecture (中國建築史).
75
 Other parts of history were entirely 
neglected. Moreover, Ito also displays his bias towards Chinese architecture in his 
writings. For example, Ito claims that the reason why Chinese buildings have to 
apply beautiful polychromy on the surface of wooden frames is that Chinese 
craftsmen were used to use low-grade materials to construct buildings. These rough 





Compared to European and Japanese scholars, the Society had more 
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advantages in which to carry out in-depth investigations into Chinese architecture 
and building traditions. Through their constant efforts, after the 1930s, Chinese 
architectural studies gradually became an independent discipline with its own 
methodology and systematic knowledge. Before the end of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, the Society had made a series of architectural field studies 
covering most counties of China, and made a significant breakthrough in re-editing 
and deciphering intricate ancient construction manuals. They also began to develop 
a distinctive Chinese architectural historiography different from Western and 
Japanese scholars’ perspectives.  
 
 
3-3 Liang Si-cheng and Chinese Architectural Historiography 
 
Within the Society, Liang was one of the most influential figures in twentieth 
century Chinese architecture due to his significant contributions to architectural 
history and education in China. Wilma Fairbank acclaims that Liang was the leader 
of the first generation of Chinese architectural historians.
77
 Wu Liang-yong (吳良鏞) 
(1922-), a famous Chinese architectural and urban planning scholar, also states that 
Liang was the most important founder and pathfinder who completely changed the 





Liang’s architectural career began with his studying at the architectural 
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School of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1924. The University at 
that time was an American stronghold of the Beaux-Arts tradition, conducted by a 
distinguished French architect Paul P. Cret (1876-1945). The Beaux-Arts training 
made Liang entirely focus on the world of Western classical architecture, but Liang 
recalled that it was also the University which made him begin to ponder the 
question of Chinese architectural history. In his sophomore year, Liang attended 
Professor Alfred Gumaer’s lecture on architectural history and found that he was 
very interested in architectural history.
79
 Later, Liang received the Yingzao Fashi 
sent by his father Liang Qi-chao. Liang Qi-chao wrote an accompanying letter with 
his comments on this book and acclaimed the Yingzao Fashi as a masterpiece, a 
glory to the culture of our nation.
80
 However, when first reading the book, Liang 
Si-cheng admits that he could barely understand most of the content, due to lots of 
perplexing technique terms. Despite this, he knows that what his father had given 
him was an important gateway to the research of Chinese architectural history.
81
 
After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania, Liang sent a PhD proposal to 
Harvard University. He said he would like to carry out a study on the history of 
Chinese imperial palaces. Harvard University quickly accepted his application, but a 
few months later, Liang recognised that the collection of Chinese architecture books 
in the University’s libraries was barely enough for him to cope with this topic. He 




After Liang went back to China in 1928, he helped the National Northeastern 
University in Shenyang to establish an architectural school, which entirely adopted 
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the Beaux-Arts training programme based on the Penn model. This school was the 
introduction of the American Beaux-Arts education system to China’s architectural 
circle and quickly began to extend its influence.
83
 Later, Zhu Qi-qian founded the 
Society for Research in Chinese Architecture in 1930 in Beijing. Liang was 
subsequently persuaded to join the Society to undertake research on Chinese 
architectural history. He had the enthusiasm to bring what he learned from the USA 
to the study of Chinese architecture by asking new questions that other researchers 
had disregarded.
84
 Later, after he became one of leading members, Liang exerted an 
enormous influence on the Society. He set up a new standard for Chinese 
architectural history research through his precise and thorough examinations and 
descriptions of the buildings that he surveyed. This standard was later adopted by 
Chinese scholars who followed in his footsteps in further studies of Chinese 
heritage. There are two major contributions that Liang had made to the Society and 
to the research of the Chinese classical architecture:  
 
(1) The scientific survey of Chinese classical buildings: as mentioned earlier, 
in the inaugural address of the Society, Zhu Qi-qian claimed that if China’s research 
group would like to compete with current Western and Japanese scholars, the 
scientific approach must be introduced. After Liang and other young scholars had 
joined the Society, Zhu’s vision was finally realised. In the preface of The History of 
Chinese Architecture (中國建築史), Liang also argues that it is necessary to examine 
historical materials and surviving buildings through the scientific method in order to 
reveal the nature and the ‘principle’ of Chinese architecture.
85
 Therefore, he and 
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other young scholars of the Society began to set up a systematic survey of existing 
traditional buildings throughout China. The first step was to measure whole 
buildings from main timber structures to the smallest construction units. Every 
object in the buildings must be recorded in its precise size. A series of modern 
architectural drawings, including plans, sections, façades and details, also needed to 
be made during the survey.
86
 In addition, their field trips also covered various 
buildings constructed in different dynasties throughout China. The survey results 
helped to form a more complete picture of the development of Chinese classical 
architecture from the past to the present, and to do a comparison study between 
measurements of each construction unit to measurements cited in the old manuals. 
Their surveys also began to shed light on the puzzles of early timber construction 
and ancient building knowledge described in the rare books.
87
 If some technical 
questions still remained unknown, interviews with old master craftsmen were 
starting to resolve missing areas of knowledge. Without their help, a number of 
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Fig. 3-9 The Survey Sketch on a 
Temple’s Timber Structure.  
Fig. 3-10 The Section of the Guan-yin Hall.  
 
 
The first article that adopted the Liang’s ‘scientific method’ was ‘The Survey 
on the Dule Temple, the Guanyin Hall and the Gatehouse in Ji County (薊縣獨樂寺觀
音閣山門考)’ published in the Bulletin in 1932.
89
 This article was viewed as the first 
scientific report on Chinese classical buildings, and served as pioneering research 
which largely influenced succeeding studies in the Society and in the Chinese 
architectural historical circle in general.
90
 First of all, Liang briefly reviewed the 
history of the building and fully described its present situation and the environment 
around it. Secondly, Liang begins to depict the features of building construction, 
including the roof, the main timber structure, different types of bracket sets, beams, 
columns and decoration elements. All of those construction components were 
measured in metres. Architectural drawings, diagrams and photographs were also 
used to illustrate these complicated wooden frames: the building itself was the best 
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example to elucidate the knowledge described in old construction manuals. These 
books helped to locate the date of construction of the building and to identify its 
characteristics among different buildings in other periods. Finally, after collecting 
this data, Liang used modern applied mechanics to calculate the loads of the 
building and to prove that Chinese timber construction completely conformed to the 
mechanical principle. His conclusion eliminated a long-lasting bias stemming from 
James Fergusson that Chinese timber structure was ‘unscientific’. As a result, there 
is no doubt that this original report is fully represents that the Chinese research 
group, when compared to Western and Japanese scholars, also has the ability to 




(2) Introducing the Beaux-Arts aesthetics to the Society: like many other 
Chinese architects and architectural educators, Liang received a scholarship to be 
trained as an architect at the University of Pennsylvania.
92
 The Beaux-Arts training 
deeply influenced Liang’s thoughts on Chinese architectural aesthetics and history. 
After he joined the Society, Liang began to apply the consummate drawing skills to 
his investigations into Chinese classical architecture. In his reports in the Bulletin, 
Liang not only provided all necessary drawings of these buildings, but also 
attempted to find out the similarity between Chinese architecture and Western 
architecture. For example, in the report on the Dule Temple in Ji County, Liang 
draws a comparison between the Chinese architectural principle and the Western 
classical order. He considered that Chinese wooden bracket sets resting on the top of 
columns can be viewed as Western capitals. Liang claims that the status of the 
bracket set in Chinese building construction was the same as the capital in the 
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 According to Liang’s measurements, the ratio 
between the diameter and the height of the column in the Gatehouse of the Dule 
temple was slightly smaller than that of the Ionic order in Roman architecture.
94
 In 
addition, he argues that the Greek temple’s entasis, an application of a slightly 
convex curve to a surface of columns whose diameter is decreased from the bottom 
upwards, can also be found in beams and columns of Chinese building 
construction.
95
 As a result, the similarity between Chinese and Western architecture 
can be viewed as proof to support his argument that there are some general 
principles which can be found both in Chinese and Western architectural practices.
96
 
It is clear that Liang attempted to locate Chinese architecture in a global context to 
demonstrate that it should have the same status as other great architectural systems 
in the world.  
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Fig. 3-11 Comparison of Plan Shapes 
and Columniation of Timber-framed 
Halls.  
Fig. 3-12 The Evolution of the General 
Appearance of Timber-framed Halls. 
 
 
In addition, after Liang and the Society had undertaken wide-ranging case 
studies on Chinese classical architecture, Liang could confidently make a series of 
analogous drawings on the evolution of Chinese architecture. These drawings were 
also influenced by his Beaux-Arts training.
97
 During Liang’s student years, the 
extensive notes and sketches on Western classical architecture in different periods 
helped Liang to realise that understanding the evolution of architecture was vital to 
grasp the nature of architecture.
98
 By comparing Western architectural plans, 
façades, sections and various details throughout different periods, the evolution of 
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In his book Chinese Architectural: a Pictorial History, Liang made his first 
attempt at outlining the evolution of Chinese architecture. By comparing the 
development of Chinese classical architecture from the Tang dynasty (618-907) to 
the Qing, Liang divides the development of the Chinese timber-framed system into 
three periods: the period of vigour, the period of elegance, and the period of rigidity. 
In the period of vigour, from the middle of the ninth century to the middle of the 
eleventh century, architecture is characterised by its robustness of proportion and 
construction with impressive timber bracket sets in the building façade. In the 
period of elegance, from the middle of the eleventh century to the end of the 
fourteenth century, the building feature is marked by its gracefulness in proportion 
and the refinement in details. In the period of rigidity, from the beginning of the 
fifteenth century to the end of nineteenth century, the architectural character is 
identified by its rigid proportion and the stagnation of creativity. The best example 
would be the delicate timber bracket sets which have degenerated from their 
original structural function to mere ornaments.
100
 Liang argues that if we viewed 
the history of Chinese architecture as an organic body, it reached its adolescence in 
the Han dynasty, matured into full glory and vigour in the Tang dynasty, mellowed 
with grace elegance in the Sung dynasty and finally grew old and became feeble in 




It is clear that Liang expanded on this analogy between an evolution of 
organic body and the development of Chinese architecture. This view apparently 
was influenced by the linear, progressive concept of history, developed by late Qing 
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intellectuals who tended to explain Chinese history in the social Darwinist 
framework. As mentioned earlier, in order to search for a method to ensure China’s 
survival and national independence in the competitive world, many late Qing 
historians attempted to remedy the deficiency of Chinese cultural traditions by 
introducing nationalist discourses to the new historiography. Liang Qi-chao, Liang 
Si-cheng’s father, was one of the strong supporters of the new historiography. It is 
clear that Liang Qi-chao’s perspective on Chinese history had a significant influence 




The evolution perspective of Chinese architectural history made Liang 
Si-cheng ponder a further question: after the decline of Qing architecture, what is 
the future of Chinese architecture? Influenced by both Chinese nationalist 
discourses and the Beaux-Arts training, Liang believed that the rebirth of a national 
architecture should adhere to the best principles of historical Chinese architecture. 
Liang argues that, like language, every nation’s architectural system has its own 
‘grammar’. If the rules of ‘grammar’ could be fully understood, a new form of 
national architecture could be created.
103
 Thus, the creation of new national 
architecture in China should follow the great tradition of Chinese classical 
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However, such creation was not encouraged as a rigid imitation or a crude 
copy, but as an ingenious use of historical features and principles to form a new 
national style.
105
 Liang sharply criticised foreign architects and missionaries who 
erected indigenous church buildings during the 1920s, and failed to create an 
innovative design which could successfully combine Western building technology 
with Chinese architectural traditions, because they did not gain a complete 
knowledge of Chinese architecture at the time.
106
 To counter this, Liang compiled 
an authoritative designer reference handbook named A Pictorial Reference book for 
the Chinese Architectural Design (建築設計參考圖集) for Chinese architects to 
correctly make use of Chinese architectural elements in their designs without 
making the same mistakes that foreign architects and missionaries had made in the 
past.
107
 In the preface, Liang encourages new Chinese architects to engage in the 
conscious creation of architecture, just like European architects who made a 
departure from the ‘drifting and unconscious craftsmanship’ of the medieval in the 
Renaissance era.
108
 As a result, this designer reference handbook became the most 
important reference handbook in creating Chinese classical style in new architecture 
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3-4  Searching for the ‘Authentic’ Chinese National Style 
 
The Society and Liang Si-cheng’s great contributions to Chinese architectural 
circles in providing an enormous historical resource of new architecture in the 
Chinese classical style had completely changed the development of modern Chinese 
architecture. Early foreign architects’ and missionaries’ achievements in exploring a 
suitable style for indigenous church buildings had been greatly surpassed by 
successive native Chinese designers. The rise of nationalism nudged these architects 
concerned about the future of their nation in the direction of searching for an 
‘authentic’ national style to represent the nation’s glorious past and present. The 
1930s were the critical period for the development of Chinese nationalistic 
architecture. In the next five decades, nationalistic architecture kept exercising its 
power in the architectural developments in Communist China and in Taiwan. Before 
turning to a close scrutiny of Taiwan’s nationalistic architectural development, three 
points should be considered:  
 
(1) The rise of nationalism at the turn of the century: after the Qing court 
began to promote the Self-strengthening Movement in 1861, a new demand for 
Western construction was burgeoning. Western powers and entrepreneurs began to 
invest huge amounts of money in infrastructure, urban planning and architecture for 
promoting trade and business in the concession cities. A growing number of Western 
style buildings, like banks, office buildings, hotels and trade centres, appeared in 
China for the first time.
109
 Although most of designers were foreign architects and 
engineers, some Chinese construction firms were entrusted to run their building 
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projects. While significant urban developments were taking place only in coastal 
cities, the Chinese began to learn Western construction techniques and to copy their 
architectural style.
110
 These native architects and engineers who advocated Western 
style architecture at that time belittled Chinese traditional buildings. They argued 
that traditional timber construction tended to decay, did not conform to scientific 
standards and could not satisfy the new functions and demands of modern 
housing.
111
 Therefore, in the late Qing period, what Western style represented was 
not only the current development of the Chinese construction industry, but also 
China’s commitment towards modernisation and Westernisation.  
 
Not until a group of returned students, with Western architectural education, 
who started to contribute their learning from Western countries to Chinese 
architectural circles in the 1920s, could a new kind of architectural discourse fully 
gather momentum. Those students not only brought new architectural techniques 
and knowledge back to China, but also began to ponder the question of an 
‘authentic’ Chinese national style. They were stimulated by nationalist discourse at 
that time to gain inspiration from their own rich building traditions instead of 
strictly looking to the West for models of architectural design. They believed that 
Chinese architects should create their own national style.
112
 As a result, the making 
of a national style in China had made enormous progress by the 1930s. It 
symbolised the idea that the Chinese nation should not lose its voice on the road 
toward modernisation and Westernisation. However, what is the ‘authentic’ Chinese 
national style? How should it be applied to architectural design?  
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(2) The Beaux-Arts aesthetics and the making of national style: it should be 
noticed that many returned students were trained as architects in the American 
Beaux-Arts universities. According to Xing Ruan’s research, over 60 percent of 
active foreign-trained Chinese architects practising in China during the 1920s and 
1930s were trained in the USA. Most of them graduated from the University of 
Pennsylvania.
113
 Except Liang Si-cheng, Yang Ting-bao (楊廷寶) (1901-1982), Lu 
Yan-zhi (呂彥直) (1894-1929), Guan Song-sheng (關頌聲) (1892-1960) and many 
other famous Chinese architects or architectural scholars, who were called the first 
generation of Chinese architects, also graduated from the American Beaux-Arts 
universities.
114
 They exerted a great influence upon Chinese architectural circles 
when they taught in China’s universities and practised on the mainland. 
 
The profound influence of Pennsylvania’s curriculum on architectural 
education of China began in the 1920s. Although the first Architectural Department 
was founded in 1923 in the National Suzhou Polytechnic (蘇州理工) and based on 
the Japanese model, the Polytechnic was later merged into the National Central 
University (中央大學) in 1928 and was penetrated by the Beaux-Arts trained 
graduates.
115
 In addition, Liang Si-cheng also established an Architectural 
Department which copied Penn’s model at the National Northeastern University in 
1928. After the 1930s, except for a few colleges, most Architectural Departments in 
China’s universities adopted the American Beaux-Arts education.
116
 The majority 
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of the faculty members were also recruited from these Beaux-Arts graduates.
117
 In 
the following decades, among these universities the National Central University in 
Nanjing wielded the biggest influence on Chinese architectural circles. Yang 
Ting-bao, the head of Department, was not only a distinguished architect, but also a 





The American Beaux-Arts tradition also had great impact on the architectural 
industry in China during the 1930s. As discussed earlier, the American architect 
Henry K. Murphy, who conducted a number of indigenous church building projects 
in the early twentieth century, incorporated Beaux-Arts aesthetics in his designs. His 
architectural offices in New York and in Shanghai also trained many young Chinese 
architects who later followed Murphy’s idea of the ‘adaptive Chinese architectural 
renaissance’ in their architectural projects. For example, Lu Yan-zhi was one of the 
Chinese employees who worked for Murphy’s New York and Shanghai offices for a 
while. Later, he founded his own architecture firm and became famous for his 





Aside from Murphy and his followers, many Beaux-Arts trained native 
Chinese architects also seized the opportunity to show their ability to construct new 
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architecture. Yang Ting-bao, for example, who directed one of the biggest Chinese 
architectural firms, Kwan, Chu & Yang Architects and Engineers (基泰工程司), at 
that time also attempted to transform Beaux-Arts aesthetics into a Chinese style in 
his designs.
120
 As Xing Ruan argues, the reason that these Chinese architects 
experienced little culture shock on the Beaux-Arts aesthetics was that a close 
affinity between the Beaux-Arts aesthetics and Chinese art traditions did exist.
121
 
For example, the Beaux-Arts atelier system was similar to the traditional Chinese 
master-pupil relationship. The eclectic attitude to architectural style made it easier to 
add Chinese architectural elements to Western building constructions. In addition, 
most of the Beaux-Arts design principles, such as harmonious proportion, perfect 
balance between solidity and volume and coordination among different elements, 
could also be found in Chinese art forms.
122
 Most importantly, Liang Si-cheng and 
the Society’s research results had provided these architects with the best resource to 
create a Chinese national style. As discussed earlier, Liang’s research was deeply 
influenced by the Beaux-Arts aesthetics. Due to the common architectural language 
that they shared, Liang’s reports and design reference handbooks made it easier for 
these architects to make use of Chinese architectural elements for their designs 
without encountering major problems.  
 
(3) The influence of political power: in the 1930s, China had also entered a 
new era of politics. As Frederic Wakeman points out, the fall of the imperial 
government not only led the entire political order of China to a tremendous 
destruction, but also caused the collapse of classical traditions that had buttressed 
society for centuries. Successive governments consequently had to create a new past, 
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a new history, to establish their claim to rule.
123
 After the fall of the Qing Empire, 
the new Beiyang government tried to establish a sustainable democratic system with 
a two-chamber parliament under a new draft for a provisional constitution. But after 
the leader Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凱) (1959-1916) failed to expand its power to the whole 
of China, losing the trust of local political elites, gentry-literati and the majority of 
people themselves, the new political order could barely be maintained. After Yuan 
died, warlords whose main political concern was to consolidate their local regimes 
in different bases took control of Northern China.
124
 In 1917, Sun Yat-sen’s 
Guangzhou-based KMT government began to challenge the Beiyang government’s 
legitimacy. Sun’s follower, Chiang Kai-shek, launched a Northern Expedition in 
1926-8 to wipe out all Beiyang warlords and to reunite China under the banner of 
the Republic of China.
125
 Now the Nanjing Nationalist government led by Chiang 
and the KMT had to look for a new way to strengthen their political legitimacy from 
a wider social basis. Especially when Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, a new political 
order and discourse had to be constructed.  
 
Not long after Sun’s death, the construction of the myth of Sun Yat-senism (孫
文主義) was undertaken by the KMT’s propaganda apparatus. Sun was now hailed as 
the founding father of the Republic who had exclusively conducted the Chinese 
Republic revolution.
126
 Dai Ji-tao (戴季陶) (1891-1949), an early KMT member and 
ideologue, promoted Sun Yat-senism based on his analyses and reinterpretations of 
Sun’s books, especially The Three Principles of the People (三民主義). According to 
his exegesis, Sun had followed the path of traditional Confucian thought. A clear 
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connection could be found in Sun’s books that linked his ideal model of political 
order to the Confucian classics.
127
 Sun even attempted to strengthen China’s 
orthodox cultural and moral heritage to maintain Chinese political order. Dai 
concludes that the KMT had to follow Sun’s teaching on the political and social 





After Sun Yat-senism was established, Chiang Kai-shek constantly reminded 
his people of his close personal and political relationship to Sun. He drew on Dai’s 
analyses to produce his own political discourse and represented himself as a zealous 
disciple and the faithful guardian of Sun’s thoughts in order to legitimate his 
regime.
129
 In many speeches Chiang illustrated his concern about the issue of 
reconstructing Confucian orthodoxy in a modern Chinese society. The Confucian 
orthodoxy was viewed the core value of Confucianism inherited from ancient sage 
emperors, Confucian philosophers, all great thinkers in the past and national heroes. 
Chiang believed that Sun had completely succeeded in integrating this great 
orthodoxy of the past. He declared that he would follow Sun’s footsteps and carry 




Chiang’s view was deeply influenced by nationalist discourses which 
considered history as a linear, progressive development. In Confucian orthodoxy, 
Chinese historical heroes and figures were carefully selected and tied together as a 
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continuous genealogical line to highlight the strong connection between the new 
regime and the nation’s past.
131
 Through Sun Yat-senism the Nationalist 
government under Chiang’s leadership had created such an image to strengthen its 




When the KMT decided to reconstruct Nanjing as a new capital city, Chinese 
classical style was considered the most suitable style to illustrate the great 
achievements that the KMT had fulfilled in the mission of national reunification and 
social reconstruction.
133
 Many government buildings were cladded with Chinese 
classical style to manifest the glory of Chinese traditions and culture. The most 
famous examples were the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution (1928-35), 
the Main Building for Ministry of Transportation and Communications (1930-4), 
the National Central Stadium (1931), the Great Hall of the National Assembly 
(1935-6), the Exhibition Hall of KMT’s History (1935-6), the National Central 
Museum (1937) and the Institute of Sociology in Academia Sinica (1947).
134
 Most 
of them were designed by Beaux-Arts trained Chinese architects who brought the 
style to a new climax.  
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Fig. 3-13 The Swimming Pool of the 
National Central Stadium, 1931. 




Fig. 3-15 The Institute of Sociology in 
Academia Sinica, 1947.  




Although many public works were forced to halt during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the post-war period saw the Chinese classical style 
still the dominant style at government level. However, the result of Chinese Civil 
War (1945-9) divided China into two: Communist China on the mainland and Free 
China in Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had raised doubts as to 
whether Chinese classical style could fully represent the socialist ideal of 
architectural form. After a series of debates and political struggles, Chinese classical 
style was still considered as the main style and continued to be adopted in the 
principal official buildings on the mainland. Not until Chinese economic reform was 
126 
 
launched in 1978 did this architectural discourse fundamentally change.
135
 After 
Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT lost the war, the entire Nationalist government was 
forced to retreat to Taiwan. Around two million people, including officers, soldiers, 
scholars, professions and civilians, decided to move with the government. Many 
Beaux-Arts trained architects and their students, including Guan Song-sheng, Lu 
Yu-jun (盧毓駿) (1904-75), Huang Bao-yu (黃寶瑜) (1918-2000), Lin Jian-ye (林建業) 
and Siou Ze-lan (修澤蘭) (1925-), also followed the KMT to settle in Taiwan. Later, 
they contributed to another wave of Chinese classical style in Taiwan.  
 
However, at the beginning, KMT’s control over Taiwan was unstable. 
Although the result of the Second Sino-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty years of 
colonial rule, reintegration of the island was no simpler than decolonisation. After 
Chen Yi (陳儀) (1883-1950) took control of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative 
Executive Office, the Nationalists began to wrestle with the problems of post-war 
Taiwan that Japan had left.
136
 As a result, Chen’s coercive rule caused ethnic 
friction, cultural conflicts, economic chaos and social unrest for most of the latter 
half of the 1940s. The simmering tensions between the newly arrived government 
and local society finally exploded in what became known as the February 28 
Incident, 1947. Military reinforcements from the mainland helped to suppress all 
opposition in Taiwan and ensured consolidation of Chen’s rule. Thousands of 
protesters and political reformers were massacred. This disastrous result proved that 
KMT’s early rule over Taiwan failed to reintegrate the island into a revised sense of 
a ‘new China’. Two years after the Incident, the Nationalist government had entirely 
retreated to Taiwan. Now Chiang Kai-shek’s regime had to develop a more effective 
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Chiang also had another reason to tie Taiwan closer to his regime. In 1947, the 
US president Harry Truman (1884-1972) disagreed with American military planers’ 
suggestion that Taiwan could be an important part of the island chain in the Far East 
to fence in the Communist camp. Truman was persuaded by another report 
suggesting that continued military assistance to Chiang’s regime would waste 
American money and erode American prestige due to its corruption and 
incompetence.
138
 At the same time, the Sino-Soviet alliance increased the 
possibility of the CCP forces launching an invasion across the strait.
139
 Without US 
support, Chiang had to strengthen his control over the island and prepare to defend 
it for the survival of the regime. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
changed Truman’s position on the Taiwan issue. The USA redrew its defensive 
perimeter to include Taiwan in the Pacific frontline island chain to ensure that the 
island would not be the weak link in the anti-Communist campaign. During the 
Cold War period, political and ideological antagonism between Communist China 
and Free China grew sharper. The position of Taiwan became part of the complex 
balance of power between the Communist camp (the Soviet Union and the PRC) 
and the Western camp (the USA and the ROC) in East Asia.
140
 Ironically, the 
exigencies of the Communist threat now gave Chiang’s regime a chance to prolong 
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its totalitarian rule in Taiwan. In successive political campaigns, such as the White 
Terror and the ‘clearing of the villages’ (清鄉), the KMT embarked on authoritarian 
political campaigns to suppress all potential opposition that might threaten its rule in 




If the KMT wanted to strengthen its legitimacy to rule Taiwan, it was 
insufficient to gain large-scale social support from below by using military power as 
the sole method of rule. Therefore, a new nationalist discourse had to be created to 
bring the pre-1945 population of the island into the Chinese nation. During the Cold 
War period, the Nationalists attempted to reconstruct cultural, historical and ethnic 
relationships between Taiwan and China. They also tried to wipe out all traces of 
Japanese colonial heritage in Taiwan and to redirect social identification toward 
KMT’s version of Chinese traditions.
142
 As part of the KMT’s effort to continue the 
legacy of the Republic in the Nanjing period, the Nationalists began a series of 
cultural movements to nationalise Taiwan though education, media, social and 
political life. Chinese culture was now used to create a sense of national 
consciousness linking the mainland before 1949 to Taiwan thereafter.
143
 The 
Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動) in 1966 was the most 
important cultural movement at that time. This Movement endeavoured to redefine 
the content of Chinese traditional culture and replant it in Taiwan by reconstructing 
orthodox Confucianism, promoting Chinese traditional values, preserving national 
treasures, propagating anti-Communism and advocating many other cultural and 
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As a part of cultural reinvention, architecture was also considered one of the 
best symbols to manifest Chinese national culture. In the early part of the KMT’s 
rule, many official buildings were cladded with Chinese classical big roofs, splendid 
bracket sets and decorative elements made with modern construction materials such 
as concrete and steel, similar to what the KMT had requested from its Nanjing 
architectural designers. The notable cases were the National Palace Museum (1965), 
the National Assembly (1966), Martyrs’ Shrines and Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall 
(1976). Many other private universities, churches, Buddhist temples and 
commercial buildings also adopted the Chinese classical style.
145
 A new trend of 




Fig. 3-17 Taipei’s National Palace 
Museum, 1965.  
Fig. 3-18 The Chungshan Building, 1966.  
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Fig. 3-19  The Grand Hotel, 1961. Fig. 3-20 The Chinese Culture Univeristy, 
Dai-ren Hall, 1961. 
 
 
However, in architectural academia, Taiwan’s modernist supporters held a 
questioning attitude toward this trend. From the late 1950s, KMT’s discourses began 
to place an increasing emphasis on promoting economic growth in Taiwan. Chiang 
sided with economic reformers and accepted an offer from the American 
government to implement an early stage of free-market capitalism in Taiwan. The 
USA also assigned many consultants to Taiwan to carry out construction projects 
based on the modernist model. In addition, more and more returned students who 
were trained in American Bauhaus education were also in favour of modernist 
architecture. However, unlike West Germany or Japan, which embraced modernist 
architecture as a symbol of welcoming American liberalism and capitalism in the 
post-war period, Chiang still preferred conservative art forms rather than pure 
modernist expression. As a result, the trend of Chinese classical style continued 
taking root in Taiwan  
 
However, this trend attracted a great deal of criticism from modernist 
advocates. They argued that the imitation of Chinese traditional architectural style 
might restrict the architect’s freedom to design, and hinder the new development of 
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modern architecture. They claimed that modernism was the best architectural model 
to satisfy contemporary needs of architectural form and function for post-war 
Taiwan.
146
 In the 1970s, Taiwan’s enormous economic growth also enhanced the 
demands for modernist buildings. In the early 1980s, the Chinese classical style had 
almost been forgotten due to its rigid form and obsolete appearance. The Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall (1976) was the last significant official building cladded 
with Chinese classical style. Beginning from the 1980s, postmodernism, 
regionalism and Taiwan’s indigenous style inspired lots of architects and 
architectural theorists to search for a new style that could fully represent Taiwan’s 
identity in the global era.  
 
To conclude, Chinese classical style was the product of Chinese nationalism. It 
was originally developed by foreign missionaries and architects who were forced to 
change the way they promoted Christianity in China because of the rise of Chinese 
nationalism, and this reflected the change in architecture. But later Chinese 
successors who were also inspired by Chinese nationalism surpassed these early 
pioneers’ achievements and carried out extensive and exhaustive surveys of Chinese 
traditional buildings to help native architects imitate these buildings correctly and 
completely. These architectural historians and designers found a perfect balance 
between modern construction technologies and Chinese classical style in the 
Beaux-Arts aesthetics. Under the lead of certain political elites, especially Chiang 
Kai-shek and the KMT, these architects began to serve politics in order to erect 
architecture which satisfied the requirements of their national imagination and 
political ideology in pre-1945 China and in post-war Taiwan. Although nationalistic 
architecture has now gradually lost its political influence, it left an irrefutable 
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nationalist and totalitarian mark in the development of modern architecture in 
Taiwan. 
 
Indeed, Chinese nationalism did have a strong ethnic orientation. Primarily, 
Chinese nationalists constantly searched for historical symbols to identify the 
continuity between the old empire in the past and the new nation in the modern era. 
On the other hand, political elites in China also played a key role in developing 
Chinese nationalist discourse. They not only reinterpreted Chinese culture and 
tradition to fit into the framework of the nationalist discourses, but also chose 
architecture as the most important visual symbol to represent the glory of national 
history and culture. Therefore, Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolist does provide a 
theoretical insight into the development of nationalistic architecture both in China 
and in Taiwan. In addition, Jonathan Hearn’ framework of power / culture 
relationship also gives a satisfactory explanation for understanding the close 
relationship between political power, Chinese nationalism and the making of 


















Part II: The New Develpoments in Taiwan  
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 August 2009, a group of Taiwan’s aborigines led by Gao Jin Su-mei 
(高金素梅), an incumbent legislator, went to Tokyo’s Yasukuni shrine for the 
campaign to ‘Return Our Ancestral Souls’ (還我祖靈). This shrine is Japan’s national 
holy space where the spirits of ‘Japanese’ soldiers who died for the empire in 
wartime are worshipped and consecrated. Gao Jin and the leaders of the group were 
representing the bereaved families of Taiwan’s Takasago volunteer soldiers (高砂義
勇軍). In World War II, around 2,000 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers died for the 
Japanese empire and are now enshrined in the Yasukuni. Gao Jin and her people 
requested official compensation from the Japanese government and the return of 
their ancestors’ spirits. They wanted to worship these spirits in their own traditional 
way at home. However, their intrusion into the Yasukuni shrine quickly aroused a 
group of Japanese policemen to arrest them and deport them back to Taiwan.
1
 The 
Yasukuni shrine still enshrines those colonial subjects who once were ‘Japanese’ 
and now lie among tens of thousands of Japanese departed souls commemorating 
their enduring dedication to the Japanese emperor and their nation.  
 
This episode happens every year in front of the Yasukuni shrine in the 
post-war period. Since the 1970s, more and more bereaved families from former 
colonies (Taiwan and Korea) have gone to the Yasukuni shrine to ask for the return 
of their ancestors’ spirits. They object to their ancestors being worshipped at the 
Yasukuni as ‘Japanese’ kami, divine beings or gods, especially when fourteen Class 
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A war criminals and around 2,000 Class B and C war criminals are also enshrined in 
the same place. The Yasukuni has consistently rejected all requests and argued that:  
 
 Since they were Japanese at the time of their death in battle, they do not stop 
being Japanese in death. They fought and died believing that they would be 




The Yasukuni also argues that returning the ancestors’ souls to their families 
does not conform to Japan’s Shinto customs. These souls are like fire and are 
burning as a whole on a higher level in the shrine and cannot be separated or taken 
away individually.
3
 This stance does not satisfy the protestors. As Gao Jin has 
argued, it is the greatest humiliation for their ancestors to be tied so firmly with 
notorious Japanese war criminals in the Yasukuni shrine. This way of worshipping 





The word Yasukuni means ‘pacifying the country’ in English. It is designed as 
a national holy space where the spirits of fallen soldiers could be transfigured into 
sacred divine beings, and the sorrow of bereaved families could sublimate into 
joyful pride that their losses in war were glorious sacrifices for the imperial state 
and the emperor.
5
 In fact, in the post-war era the Yasukuni shrine has never been the 
peaceful place it was planned to be. The diplomatic, religious and political rows 
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over the controversial issues evoked by the shrine will not end until the Yasukuni 
proposes a satisfactory solution with those ‘non-Japanese’ bereaved families.  
 
The main focus of this chapter is Taiwan’s colonial shrines, KMT’s martyrs’ 
shrines and the making of the national holy space. In order to address these issues 
from a broader perspective, the notion of national identity, state ideology and 
political religion will also be explored. The research period of this chapter begins 
from construction of the Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine in 1869 to Taipei’s Martyrs’ 
Shrine in 1969. The origin of Japanese shrines and the birth of China’s martyrs’ 
shrine will also be discussed. Without fully examining these cultural, political and 
historical factors, this thesis believes shrines as an important national symbolic 
space cannot be fully understood.  
 
 
4-1 Nationalism, Political Religion and Japanese Shinto Shrines in 
Colonial Taiwan 
 
The Yasukuni shrine is not a conventional shrine. Originally, it was a shrine 
constructed after the Meiji Restoration started in 1868 to worship the spirits of those 
loyalists who had died during battles related to the Restoration.
6
 In 1871, traditional 
Shinto belief was established as the new state religion of Japan to serve the Meiji 
government. During that time, the government attempted to find a new way to 
strengthen Japanese national identity. Traditional Shinto belief was viewed as the 
best tool to fulfill this goal. Therefore, after the Meiji government was established, 
Shinto had quickly been nationalised and reconstructed as part of government 
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institutions bringing the imperial cult into the state, forming a new spiritual 
foundation to unify the population into the cult.
7
 At that time, all shrines across the 
country were given official grades based on their relationship to the imperial family 
and placed under the administrative control of the government.
8
 As a result, Japan 
became a modern nation-state with a rigid state religion led by the emperor as its 
head priest.
9
 Among these shrines, the Yasukuni was one of the most important 
newly built shrines that served an essential political function in conducting national 
rites of worship for the spirits of those who died in war and fought for the Japanese 




As Takahashi Tetsuya has pointed out, the Yasukuni was one of Japan’s trinity 
of war institutions used to create a sense of ‘national morality’ which required that 
the subjects offer their lives to protect the emperor and the nation in the ‘holy 
wars’.
11
 In addition, the Meiji government not only recruited the Japanese to join 
the growing expansion of the empire, but also mobilised many colonial subjects 
from Taiwan and Korea to fight for the nation. At the end of the Second World War, 
there were around 2,460,000 fallen soldiers which included 2,000 Taiwanese 
military volunteer soldiers enshrined in the Yasukuni as national ‘heroic spirits’.
12
 
As a result, based on the Imperial System, State Shinto and the Yasukuni shrine 
were the most important war institutions and were meant to evoke a strong patriotic 
and loyal response from society.
13
 However, how did this national belief-system 
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work? How did it help the government to mobilise the people?  
 
In order to find out the answer to why some ethnic groups survive but others 
perish in modern society, and what the main factors are that help to sustain ethnic 
communities, Anthony D. Smith has framed a concept of ‘political religion’ to 
explain the formation of nationalism.
14
 Smith argues that in some cases nationalism 
does reinforce and politicise the old myths of ethnic communities to ensure that the 
communities can survive in the secular world.
15
 The foundations and resources of 
national identity can be dated back to earlier belief-systems. Nationalism is not a 
totally new ideological artifact created in modern society as modernists have 
claimed. In fact, nationalists drew many key elements of pre-modern religions to 
form a new belief-system. They even sharpened earlier ideas, sentiments, symbols 
and beliefs through the lens of nationalism to give them a new life with a solid 
modern political foundation.
16
 In pre-modern times, certain cultural markers appear 
in the myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions of ethnic communities as a 
distinctive indicator to prove that the members of the communities are ancestrally 
related and culturally distinct. Most importantly, a particular cult is required to help 
to transform the community into an ethno-religious communion. This cult allows 
the members to see themselves as a holy, unique ‘chosen people’ with certain moral 




Therefore, it is no accident that many modern national celebrations, 
ceremonies and monuments created for new political purpose are modelled on 
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earlier traditions and older religious rituals.
18
 In addition, nationalists in the period 
of nation building also attempt to reinterpret the genealogy and the historical 
common ancestor of their community to relate themselves to the heroic past. Certain 
political elites manipulate these myths, memories, values and symbols to prolong 
the survival of the community and to legitimise the existence of the nation in the 
present.
19
 Therefore, the myths of ethnic election help to mobilise the community 





In the case of Japan, it is clear that Japan’s traditional Shinto had been 
manipulated by nationalists to construct a new national religion for unification of 
the nation since the Meiji Restoration. Many pre-existing Shinto myths, traditions, 
rituals and symbols were carefully selected to ensure that the Japanese ethnic 
community could be sustained in the modern era. Those nationalists also 
strengthened the pre-modern Emperor System as the state’s highest institution of 
ruling authority after state power had returned to the Meiji emperor (1852-1912).
21
 
He was depicted as a Shinto deity whose ancestor was Amaterasu (天造大神), the 
Sun of Goddess, from whom the Japanese imperial lineage was believed to be 
descended.
22
 Venerated as a kami, the emperor became the dominant symbol of 
Japanese nationalism spreading the imperial cult all over the country. All Japan’s 
shrines at the time were forced to join a national association led by the Grand Shrine 
of Ise (伊勢神宮), the most important imperial shrine, at the head. Japan was now 
described as a land of kami whose descendants were required to protect and defend 
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 As a result, State Shinto, the Emperor System and Japanese 
nationalism eventually paved the way towards the growth of imperialism in the 
nation.  
 
However, in pre-modern times, traditional Shinto belief did not have a strong 
link with the government and the Emperor System. Shinto is considered to be the 
indigenous religion of Japan based on its distinctive myths, traditions, rituals and 
symbols. Traditionally, Japanese view kami as divine powers in nature where deities 
coexist with people’s everyday life. It is also believed that the birth of Shinto can be 
dated back to a pre-historical age when Japanese mythological deities ruled the 
land.
24
 Based on these myths, later Shinto evolved for thousands of years into an 




Shrines are places where kami manifested themselves and made their dwelling. 
They are usually close to significant natural phenomena, such as a sacred mountain 
or a secluded land where the divine power is highly concentrated.
26
 In order to 
sustain power, shrines in general are surrounded by a series of constructions, such as 
torrii (gateway), kaki (fences), honden (main hall) and haiden (worship hall) to 
purify the holy spaces and to mark the sanctity of the places.
27
 Shrines are also sites 
for Shinto’s rituals, festivals and many other religious activities to summon kami at 
specific times for particular purposes.
28
 Because the development of Shinto has a 
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strong link to local communities, the shrines’ venerated kami, form and style, 
festivals and worship calendars are all different from one region to another. 
However, not until the Shinto had been nationalised in the Meiji period had the 




During the Japanese colonial period, more than 200 Japanese shrines were 
built in Taiwan. At the beginning, the colonial government did not use Shinto as a 
method to express colonial authority or to force the subjects to show their loyalty to 
the emperor. Shinto was mostly promoted by Japanese citizens. Some of them were 
built by settlers in Taiwan who wanted to keep their traditional belief and protect 
their enterprises in the colony.
30
 However, when Japan was expanding its empire in 
Asia, religious policy faced enormous changes. The military expansion was well 
beyond Japan’s capabilities and required more manpower and war materials from 
colonies to sustain the wars. Thus, Taiwan’s colonial government began to conduct 
the Kominka Movement (皇民化運動 ) to mobilise colonial populations. The 
Religious Reform was high on the agenda of the Kominka Movement to impose 




Kominka means ‘transforming the colonial people into imperial subjects’ in 
English. It was considered that through these campaigns the Kominka Movement 
could actually achieve the primary and ultimate aim of turning the Taiwanese into 
‘true Japanese’, especially given that Taiwan had been a former possession of the 
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Qing empire for hundreds of years. The military tension between China and Japan 
in the Second Sino-Japanese War made the Japanese government reinforce the 
processes of assimilation in order to prevent its colonial subjects from betraying 
their suzerainty.
32
 As a result, during the wartime, the Japanese government 
changed its earlier religious policy and began to systematically promote State Shinto 
in Taiwan at the expense of Taiwan’s indigenous religions.
33
 State Shinto and 
shrines began to play a central role in the Kominka Movement. Not only was the 
relationship between the Taiwanese and the emperor strengthened, but also the lives 
of the islanders changed. The Taiwanese were forced to dedicate war materials and 
manpower for the empire during their lifetime. Even if they died in battle, their 
souls would be enshrined at Yasukuni to fulfill their enduring service to the emperor.  
 
First of all, the kami that were worshipped in colonial shrines all had special 
meanings in politics. Amaterasu and the present emperor were the most general and 
important kami worshipped in Taiwan’s shrines. They symbolised that the imperial 
lineage had a superior status in the Japanese nation and its colonies. It was expected 
that all Taiwanese should express the greatest reverence to these kami and prove 
their enthusiasm for being docile subjects.
34
 In addition, Okuninushi (大国主) was a 
widespread kami enshrined in most colonial shrines. He is a mythical character, a 
guardian of territory and a god of nation-building who explored a new land for the 
nation.
35
 In Taiwan, Okuninushi was viewed as the protective deity of Japan’s 
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colonial properties in Taiwan.
36
 Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (北白川宮能久親王) 
(1847-1895) was another kami commonly worshipped in Taiwan. He was a major 
general in the Japanese Imperial Army who was appointed to suppress Taiwan’s 
revolts at the beginning of Japan’s colonial rule and who died in Tainan (台南) 
during the battle. Later, he was elevated as a kami and became one of the popular 
deities consecrated in Taiwan’s shrines as a protector of Japanese rule.
 37
 Koxinga 
(鄭成功) (1624-1662) was special kami venerated in Taiwan. He was a military 
leader who resisted Qing’s rule and defeated the Dutch colonial government in 
Taiwan in 1661. Because his mother was Japanese, his image was reconstructed as 
an outstandingly faithful Taiwanese hero who had Japanese ‘blood’. Enshrining 
Koxinga as a Japanese kami had a symbolic meaning showing that the most popular 
Taiwanese hero had a deep ethnic lineage to the Japanese nation.  
 
In addition, the location of shrines in Taiwan had been deliberately chosen by 
the colonisers attempting to strengthen the control of colonial cities and 
communities under their surveillance. Some important shrines were built on the top 
or the slope of hills with a panoramic view of cities. This location made these 
shrines significant landmarks and eye-catching spots of the cities. It also implied a 
symbolic relationship between colonial authority and its ruling cities.
38
 Others were 
located in special sites coordinated with the City Renovation Plan (市區改正), a 
modern urban planning scheme for Taiwan with a rigid grid system introduced by 
the Japanese government. Parts of them were placed in city centre parks to fit in the 
new urban configuration. Others were built at the end of the urban axis with a 
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For example, built in 1901, the Taiwan Grand Shrine was located on the top of 
Yuanshan (圓山) hill on the north side of Taipei city fringe. This shrine had a 
superior view of the whole of Taipei city. The colonial government constructed a 
new wide avenue called the Chokushi Road (敕使街道) to link the city centre to the 
shrine. The government even demolished the Qing’s city wall for the avenue and 
drew up a new urban plan directing the urban development towards the north by 
following this avenue.
40
 Moreover, the government particularly chose the Shimmei 
style (神明造 ) to build the shrine. This style was viewed as the vernacular 
architectural style of the Japanese nation which could only be used in the most 
important shrines like the Grand Shrine of Ise.
41
 Therefore, adopting the Shimmei 
style implied that the Taiwan Grand Shrine had the highest religious and political 
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Fig. 4-1 The Bird’s-eye view of the Taiwan 
Grand Shrine. 
Fig. 4-2 The Chokushi Road led to the Taiwan 




status, representing Japanese colonial authority in Taiwan.
42
  
   
Finally, in the climax of the Kominka Movement, the Shinto belief-system 
began to exert its influence on every Taiwanese community and family. Numerous 
Shinto shrines, including 68 state-held shrines in the most important sites of main 
cities, auxiliary shrines (攝社) in towns, subordinate shrines (末社) on streets, 
honorific halls (奉安殿) in schools and Shinto altars in homes, had been built in the 
last decade of Japanese colonial rule. Without a doubt they were used as political 
apparatus to evoke patriotic sentiments in Taiwan’s society in wartime.
43
 Shrines 
became the centre of communities. All members of communities were asked to raise 
funds for building a local shrine and participate in Shinto ceremonies. Government 
employees, organisation members and school children were forced to make regular 




Secondly, shrines became the centre of Kominka education. Every school in 
Taiwan had to build a honorific hall in front of the main gate. When students passed 
by the hall, they were obliged to bow reverently to kami and the Imperial Rescript 
on Education (教育敕語), a guiding principle of education in the Japanese empire. 
                                                 
42
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Students were also forced to take cleaning and maintenance jobs at local shrines to 
express their obeisance to kami. School textbooks also taught them stories of 





Finally, shrines became the centre of religious life. The colonial government 
attempted to stamp out Taiwan’s indigenous religions, including Buddhism, Taoism 
and many other folk beliefs, in order to pave a way for State Shinto.
46
 Hundreds of 
temples were demolished; countless statues of Taiwanese deities were burnt.
47
 The 
government also managed to remove all Taiwanese ancestors’ altars from the living 
rooms of every house, replacing them with Japanese Shinto altars. Traditionally, 
ancestors’ altars represented family roots and cultural identity for the Taiwanese. 
Replacing them with Japanese altars meant uprooting their identity and the 




As a result, many young Taiwanese had a strong response to Japan’s 
assimilation policy. They were enthusiastic about the Military Volunteer Program 
which required sacrificing their lives for the Japanese empire and the emperor in the 
so called ‘holy wars’. For these young men, the military was an ideal place where 
colonial subjects could truly compete with the ethnic Japanese and prove that the 
quality of their race was ‘more Japanese than a Japanese’.
49
 In addition, it was also 
considered that the highest honour for colonial subjects was to die in battle and be 
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enshrined at the Yasukuni shine as kami perpetually protecting the Japanese nation 
and the emperor.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that State Shinto was not a common religion. It was a 
political religion imposed upon colonial Taiwan with the purpose of assimilation 
and manifestation of Japanese authority. It was also utilised within Taiwanese 
society as a catalyst to promote Japanese identity and loyalty towards the nation and 
the emperor. The colonial government deliberately borrowed Japan’s Shinto 
traditions, myths, symbols and ceremonies to achieve the goal of political and 
military mobilisation. In this context, Shinto shrines were widely built in the most 
important sites of cities and became the centre of local community and religious life 
in Taiwan. As a result, the construction of shrines fundamentally changed the 
cultural and urban landscape of Taiwan.  
 
 
4-2 From Japanese Shinto Shrines to the KMT’s Martyrs’ Shrines  
 
The result of the Second Sino-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty year colonial 
rule of Taiwan. The island once again became a possession of China. At the same 
time, the Chinese Civil War had broken out on the mainland. The government under 
Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership was struggling against the Chinese Communist Party. 
The Civil War also threatened the stability of Chen Yi’s rule in Taiwan and led him 
to adopt a more stringent method of domination to tie the island closer to the 
mainland. George H. Kerr, a US diplomat at the time, reported what he observed in 




The Formosans found many of the Party’s ceremonial requirements much too 
similar to the ceremonial Emperor-worship of the Japanese State cult….For 
example, in the Japanese era a portrait of the reigning Emperor had to be placed 
in every school. It had to be treated with the utmost show of reverence. There 
were weekly services at which all government employees and school children 
had to bow reverently before the imperial portrait or toward the imperial palace 
at Tokyo, classed as ‘worshiping from afar.’ Now under the new Nationalist 
regime, portraits of Sun Yat-sen, the ‘National Father’ or of Chiang Kai-shek, 
the ‘National Leader’ had simply replaced the Japanese Emperor’s portrait 
everywhere. On Monday morning in every week all Government offices, all 
military posts and all Party organizations were required to hold an hour-long 
Memorial Service. Participants were required to bow three times before Sun’s 
portrait and before the flags of the nation and the Party. They were required to 
sing the National Anthem which was the Party Song. School children, Youth 
Corps members and many other groups were required to show the outward 
forms of respect to these symbols of Party, Army, and Government.
50
      
 
Kerr’s observation of the shift of national ceremonies conducted by the KMT 
shows that the nature of the ruling power between Japanese colonial government 
and the KMT had no fundamental difference. Only the national symbols, rituals and 
myths changed. When the KMT took control over Taiwan, removing all Japanese 
colonial heritage was one of their primary missions.
51
 The Japanese emperor’s 
portraits, Imperial Rescript on Education, military flags and many other symbols 
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hung on every school and public space were removed and replaced by Chinese 
national icons and pictures of political leaders. In addition, Shinto shrines were also 
viewed as the symbols of imperial Japan and as it was regarded as the Japanese 
national religion it had to be demolished in the first wave of the de-colonisation 
campaign. 
 
After the KMT had entirely retreated to Taiwan, most of the colonial shrines 
were demolished. Few relics or ruins remain. Only one shrine, the Taoyuan shrine, 
is entirely preserved in its original state, but only due to it being used as the 
Taoyuan county Martyrs’ shrine. Like this shrine, some important official shrines 
survived, but were refurbished as Martyrs’ shrines for the new political purpose at 
that time. Among those demolished shrines which had been forgotten in the 
wilderness, there were three important official shrines which had been torn down for 




Fig. 4-3 The Kenkou Shrine.  Fig. 4-4 The former Central Library.  
  
 
First of all, the Kenkou shrine (建功神社), Taiwan’s Yasukuni shrine, was 
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refurbished as the Central Library in the post-war era. The Kenkou shrine was 
designed for worshipping the spirits of the Japanese who had joined the colonial 
conquest and died in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese who made great contributions to 
the Japanese colonial government.
52
 The designer was Ide Kaoru (井手薰), who 
worked for the Governor-General of Taiwan in the Building Department. Ide 
considered that adopting ‘progressive’ Western styles and Taiwanese local building 
elements to create a new type of shrine was also vital for redesigning colonial 
shrines. As a consequence, the Kenkou shrine was a unique ritual building 
constructed in concrete with a Western grand central dome, noticeable Taiwanese 





However, the Kenkou shrine belonged to the Yasukuni tradition of worship. It 
symbolised the highest status of national ritual in imperial Japan. Therefore, in the 
post-war period, the shrine was abandoned for a while before being converted into 
the Central Library.
54
 Due to the budget constraints in building a new library, the 
shrine was not totally demolished. The main body of the shrine remained, but all 
Japanese decorative elements were removed and replaced by Chinese ones. The 
original dome remained, but cladded with a Chinese conical roof. New reading 
rooms were added in front of the main hall and surrounded the courtyard. An 
impressive Chinese roof was also placed on the top of the gate hall building 
underlining the image of the Chinese building tradition. This building now shows no 
trace of its original shrine appearance.  
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Fig. 4-5 The Bird’s-eye view of the Grand 
Hotel of Taipei. 
Fig. 4-6 The Grand Hotel of Taipei. 
 
 
The other important demolished shrine was the Taiwan Grand Shrine. This site 
is now used as an impressive hotel, the Grand Hotel of Taipei. As discussed earlier, 
the Taiwan Grand Shrine had the highest status of all State Shinto shrines in Taiwan 
during the colonial period. It also symbolised the supreme authority of Japan’s 
colonial government. After Chiang Kai-shek’s regime had retreated to Taiwan, this 
Shrine undoubtedly became one of the noticeable targets to be destroyed under the 
de-colonisation policy. In order to promote Taiwan to the world as the true heir of 
Chinese orthodox culture, building a splendid hotel embodying Chinese cultural 




Located on the top of the Yuanshan Mountain, the Taiwan Grand Shrine 
occupied the best site in the city with a fantastic view of the urban landscape. This 
site certainly was ideally placed for establishing a new deluxe hotel. The architect 
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Yang Cho-cheng (楊卓成) was responsible for the architectural design. The main 
building was constructed in 1961. Yang attempted to build a high-rise hotel with the 
image of a Chinese Buddhist pagoda, meant to impress every traveller who visited 




Fig. 4-7 The Kaishan Shrine.  Fig. 4-8The Yian-ping King Temple.  
 
 
Finally, the Kaishan shrine (開山神社) was demolished to make way for the 
Yian-ping King Temple (延平郡王祠) in 1966. The Kaishan shrine was Taiwan’s first 
official shrine established in 1896. It was also the first shrine in which Taiwan’s 
most popular local deity Koxinga was worshipped.
56
 The shrine was originally 
converted from a local temple which had enshrined Koxinga dating from 1662, a 
year after his death. In 1875, the Qing court accepted the local gentry's suggestion to 
raise the cult of Koxinga from a local belief to a part of the imperial ritual system.
57
 
During the Japanese colonial period, the Tainan governor recognised the importance 
of the cult. Similarly, like the Qing court, the colonial government decided to covert 
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the Temple into a State Shinto shrine to worship Koxinga. However, the old Temple 
was not demolished, but was used as a Shinto main hall instead. A new worship hall, 
ablution pavilion and many other Shinto symbols, such as sacred ropes and kami 
altars, were added in the courtyard to make the shrine conform to Shinto worship 
rituals.  
 
When the KMT took control of the island, this image of Koxinga once again 
was manipulated and reinterpreted by the new regime. Koxinga had defeated the 
Dutch colonial government. This was now viewed as a glorious deed bringing 
Taiwan back to the Chinese nation.
58
 In order to highlight Koxinga’s Chinese ethnic 
lineage, the architect He-chen Cih (賀陳詞) (1918- ) decided to demolish the whole 
of the Minnan temple and the Japanese shrine and build a brand-new temple cladded 
with the Chinese classical style to reflect a suitable style for Koxinga’s new temple. 
He argued that Minnan's style was merely a southern Chinese local style, which 
could not represent the orthodoxy of the great Chinese architectural tradition. Only 
the Chinese classical style could signify Koxinga’s heroic historical exploits to the 
nation.
59
 A Japanese Torii (gateway arch) had its upper beam removed to make it 
look like a double ten, which symbolised the national birthday of the Republic, the 
tenth of October. The Nationalist Party’s emblem also hung on the top the Torii. As 
a result, these symbols reinforced the idea that the Yina-ping King Temple and 
worship of Koxinga had a particular political purpose which conformed to KMT’s 
ideology.  
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Aside from demolishing Shinto shrines or utilising these buildings for other 
purposes, the Nationalist government also attempted to conduct a series of 
de-colonisation campaigns to get rid of the Japanese colonial influences. The 
ultimate aim of these campaigns was to convert the Taiwanese into ‘true Chinese’.
60
 
From the KMT’s view, the Taiwanese were seen as an ethnic group that had not 
awakened to their national consciousness.
61
 Therefore, the goal of re-sinicisation 
policies were intended to clean the ‘toxins’ of Japan’s ‘enslavement education’, 
helping to pave the way for introducing orthodox Chinese culture to Taiwan.
62
 It 
was also necessary to re-educate the masses about their culture, language and 
history though schools and public media. In order to do this, the foundation of 
KMT’s political ideology and China’s traditional moral values were circulated to 




Therefore, Chinese national rituals and religion were viewed as an effective 
method to promote Chinese nationalism and patriotic sentiments in Taiwan. The 
Yellow Emperor, a mythological character of China, was one of myths reintroduced 
by certain late Qing elites and politicians for a new political purpose.
64
 The Yellow 
Emperor was now raised to the status of the common ancestor of the Chinese 
nation.
65
 The Emperor became another main deity of the national religion 
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consecrated by the government to symbolise a strong connection between the 
Republic and its cultural roots. The traditional Tomb Sweeping Day (清明節), a date 
when Chinese family members come to the grave sites to remember and honour 
their ancestors, was chosen to be a national holiday not only for ancestors of the 
general population, but also for the Yellow Emperor.
66
 This new national holiday 
was later introduced to Taiwan, using Martyrs’ shrines as national ‘holy spaces’ to 
conduct the special ritual.  
 
Aside from the cult of the Yellow Emperor, traditional worship for military 
leaders who were loyal to Chinese emperors in the past was also integrated into 
national rituals. The cult of Chinese martyrs was divided into two systems: the 
imperial and local. In the imperial tradition, the martial temples (武廟) were the 
official sacred buildings which enshrined meritorious military officers who fought 
for the empire and died in battle. In the local system, the loyalty memorial (昭忠祠) 
or Guan-di temples (關帝廟) were centres used to worship famous local military 
leaders or historical heroes who had protected local communities or regions.
67
 After 
the Republic was established, the government began to set up a new national 
worship system to amalgamate the imperial and local cults of war deaths.  
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In 1928 the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution (國民革命軍陣亡將士公
墓), the first of its type of dedicated space for fallen soldiers, was placed on the 
eastern side of Purple Mountain in Nanjing. The Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum was also 
located next to the hill. Chiang Kai-shek appointed the US architect Henry Murphy 
to conduct the building project. The purpose of establishing the Cemetery Hall was 
to commemorate those souls who had died during the battles related to the Northern 
Expedition (1926-8).
68
 The worship hall was reconstructed from a thirteenth 
century brick arch hall of an old temple. Another building complex, including the 
gateway arch, the memorial hall and the memorial tower, was adopted in what 
Murphy called the ‘adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance’ style.  
 
After the construction of the Cemetery Hall, the KMT attempted to build 
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Fig. 4-9 The Gateway Arch of the 
Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the 
Revolution.  
Fig. 4-10 The Worship Hall of the Cemetery 




similar memorial buildings on the mainland. In 1933, during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, a special bill had been passed to request local governments to 
build Martyrs’ shrines for worshipping the spirits of those who had died in wars 
since the Republic had been established. Due to the limited budget, local 
governments were allowed to convert regional martial temples, loyalty memorial 
temples and Guan-di temples into Martyrs’ shrines instead of building entirely new 
ones. Every year local governments were encouraged to formally revere war deaths 





Converting old temples into new Martyrs’ shrines did not encounter any major 
difficulty during wartime. Originally, Martyrs’ shrines played a similar role to 
temples in local communities. The differences were the spirits that they worshipped 
and the hosts who conducted the national rituals. According to record, at the end of 
the War there were a total 766 local Martyrs’ shrines established in China.
70
 But 
what obsessed Chiang Kai-shek was the idea of constructing a Martyrs’ shrine in the 
capital city for all Chinese war dead and their bereaved families; and since 1940 the 
KMT had begun to plan the capital Martyrs’ shrine. However, because of the war, 
the capital city was moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, the biggest city in the 
south-west of China. Finding a suitable site for the shrine in Chongqing was more 
difficult than expected. In addition, economical inflation during the war made the 
building project prohibitively expensive. Finally, the outbreak of the Chinese Civil 
War made the project a daunting task.
71
 It was not until the Nationalist government 
completely retreated to Taiwan that the dream of constructing a grand capital 
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Martyrs’ shrine even became a possibility. 
 
 
4-3  Creating a National Holy Space in Taiwan 
 
Following traditional military worship and the cult of the Yellow Emperor, the 
Martyrs’ shrine was constructed as a locus of ‘political religion’, designed as a 
spiritual foundation to reinforce patriotic sentiments and national loyalty. The 
Nationalist government endeavoured to continue the tradition of Chinese worship, 
giving it a new meaning for national cohesion in modern times. Now fallen soldiers 
and devoted officers who died for the nation were to be enshrined in the Martyrs’ 
shrine and paid reverence by the incumbent president of the Republic. Therefore, 
the shrine is not only a sacred hall where the cultural and genealogical boundaries 
are identified through their distinctive myths, symbols and cults, but is also an 
important political institution to evoke a deep sense of national consciousness in the 
population. 
 
In the early post-war period, the KMT used Shinto shrines as temporary 
Martyrs’ shrines in Taiwan. The main reasons for adopting those colonial shrines for 
the Chinese war dead, instead of building new ones, were due to financial shortages 
in wartime. Therefore, it was a practical choice to make use of current Shinto 
shrines for the new regime’s national rituals.  
 
In addition, Martyrs’ shrines and colonial shrines in Taiwan play a similar role 
in politics. As discussed earlier, Shinto shrines were the product of a ‘political 
religion’, particularly designed for conducting sacred ceremonies for Japanese 
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imperialism. Although the KMT ended Japanese rule in Taiwan after the War, the 
shrines still remained the main focus of the Nationalist government, attempting to 
treat these shrines as an important symbol of political authority allowing the KMT 
to perform National Government’s national rituals. Because the location of Shinto 
shrines was also carefully selected by the colonial government, that made them ideal 





However, the architectural space and the performance of worship in Shinto 
shrines and Martyrs’ shrines still retained some differences. The core of shrine 
buildings is composed of two different parts: the main hall and the worship hall. The 
main hall is a shelter where kami are enshrined. Only the clergy are allowed to enter 
the hall. The hall is usually arranged at the end of building complex of the shrine. 
The worship hall is set on the front side of the main hall. It is a place where visitors 
pray and services are conducted.
72
 In China, Buddhist and Taoist temples do not 
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Fig. 4-11 The Worship Hall of the Taoyuan 
Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-12 The Main Hall of the 




distinguish between the main hall and the worship hall. The worship hall is used as 
both the main and worship hall. When Shinto shrines were renovated into Martyrs’ 
shrines, the main hall was usually discarded. All the altars and spirit tablets were 




Fig. 4-13 The Torii and the Stone Lantern at 
Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-14 The War Horse. 
 
 
The Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine is a good example to illustrate how an existing 
Shinto shrine was converted to a Martyrs’ shrine. The Taoyuan shrine is the only 
one that still preserves its original Shinto appearance. The shrine is located on the 
hillside of the Hutou Mountain with a fantastic view to Taoyuan city. The main 
architectural complex is still well preserved, but many Shinto symbols and 
decorative elements have been removed. The upper beam of the Torii was also 
removed and made to resemble the shape of a double ten. Stone lanterns still stand 
along the approach to the shrine, but all the Japanese characters have been scraped 
off. The Imperial Japanese army emblem carved on the sculpture of the war horse 
erected in the gateway was also replaced by the KMT’s emblem. New symbols and 
icons of the regime were added to the building in order to make it look like a 
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Chinese temple containing plaques inscribing patriotic virtue, moral doctrine and 
maxims, as well as altars and fallen soldiers’ spirit tablets. The space in the worship 
hall was rearranged to conform to the tradition of Chinese worship. The major 
deities enshrined in the main alttar are Koxinga, Qiu Feng-jia (邱逢甲) (1864-1912) 
and Liu Yong-fu (劉永福) (1837-1917), who are considered the symbolic historical 
characters of anti-Japanese imperialism. Although the main structure of the building 
still retains some Japanese architectural characters, the old Shinto shrine space now 
is completely transformed into a fully functional Martyrs’ shrine for the worship of 




Fig. 4-15The Chinese Plaques Hung on the Worship 
Hall of the Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-16 The Chinese Altars Placed 




However, many other shrines did not have the same fortune as the Taoyuan 
shrine. According to the record, of among 204 shrines in total, 150 had been 
demolished and left ruined in the wilderness. 54 of them were torn down for other 
buildings, such as schools, temples and hospitals.
73
 21 of them had been renovated 
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into Martyrs’ shrines. Among these, 13 of them were rebuilt. Two of them were also 
to be rebuilt but were later moved to other sites. The main and worship hall of one 
of them (the Chiayi shrine) was burned down in an accident in 1995. The Taoyaun 
shrine is the only one to keep its original Shinto building structure entirely in 




Fig. 4-17 The Worship Hall of the Tongsiao 
Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-18 The Demolished Main Hall.  
 
 
Tongsiao and Yilan are the earliest cases of those 13 newly built Martyrs’ 
shrines. Tongsiao shrine, for example, was reconstructed in 1948. Located on the 
top of the Hutou Mountain, Tongsiao shrine was the main religious centre of 
Tongsiao town during the Japanese colonial period. After the KMT took control 
over Taiwan, the shrine was to be renovated into a Martyrs’ shrine. The mayor of 
Tongsiao led the building project and viewed the shrine as a type of local martial 
temple.
74
 However, unlike other later newly built shrines, the Tongsiao Martyrs’ 
shrine adopted a Minnan style as the main style for the building design. The main 
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timber frame of the Shinto worship hall remained, but the Minnan style of curved 
roof and brick wall was added to the exterior of the shrine and made to look like a 
Minnan temple. The main hall sitting behind the worship hall had also been 
demolished. The KMT’s emblem was also added on the top of the roof to mark out 
the political importance of the shrine.  
 
It is reasonable to argue that the main reason that the Minnan style had been 
chosen for those two Martyrs’ shrines was that the two cities are located on the 
periphery of Taipei’s cultural and political authority. They attracted less attention 
from central government and mainstream architectural circles. In addition, local 
political leaders dominated the projects and projected their preferences onto the 
building designs. These shrines were the first ones chosen to be designed with 
cladding which reflected the island’s distinct local architectural style. However, 
after those two shrines were built, the design of shrines in general underwent an 
enormous change. Chinese classical style later replaced the Minnan style and 
became the mainstream style adopted throughout most of Taiwan. The Chinese 
classical style was regarded as the most suitable style to fully represent the glory of 
the nation and the sanctity of the national ‘holy space’. The establishment of the 







Fig. 4-19 The Gateway Arch of the 
Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-20 The Worship Hall of the Taipei 
Martyrs’ Shrine.  
 
 
The Taipei Martyrs’ shrine has the highest status of all shrines in Taiwan. It is 
the capital Martyr's shrine that Chiang Kai-shek did not have time to build on the 
mainland before the government retreated to Taiwan. After the regime had settled 
down on the island, the plan of constructing a capital Martyrs’ shrine in Taipei was 
finally formulated. Before the shrine was constructed, the provisional government 
used the Gokoku shrine (台灣護國神社) as the capital shrine in Taipei. Gokoku means 
‘protecting the nation’ in English. Built in 1942, the shrine was the second Yasukuni 
shrine in Taiwan and it sat on the western side of the Yuanshan Mountain just next 
to the Taiwan Grand Shrine.
75
 After it had been converted to the Taipei Martyrs’ 
shrine, the interior space was rearranged to reflect the need for a new form of 
worship.  
 
In 1966, a new wave of architectural trends initiated by the Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance Movement had influenced the design of many governmental buildings. 
The Taipei Martyrs’ shrine was one of those buildings that adopted the Chinese 
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classical style to manifest the cultural tradition of China. In 1967, the central 
government conducted an architectural competition for the construction of a new 
shrine in Taipei. The winner of the competition was the architect Yao Yuan-jhong 
(姚元中). In his design, the Qing royal architectural style became the main reference. 
He argued that the Qing royal style was more resplendent than any other style in the 
history of China. Because of this, he believed that the style was the most suitable for 




During the construction processes, Chiang Kai-shek met the architect and gave 
his opinions of the architectural design. Chiang also visited the building site several 
times to make sure the result would faithfully reflect his vision of a national ‘holy 
space’.
77
 In an interview on the design of the Taipei Martyrs’ shrine, Yao 
particularly mentioned that the main reference that helped him to create the shrine 
was Liang Si-cheng’s books on Qing structural regulations.
78
 Although the building 
is made from concrete, all the structural and decorative elements, including the roof, 
bracket sets, beams and columns, imitate traditional Chinese timber framing. This 
makes the shrine look like an exact replica of a Qing royal palace. It also recalled 
Nanjing’s new direction of Chinese modern architecture which took place in the 
                                                 
76
 Ma Yi-gong 馬以工, ‘訪姚元中 (Interview with Yao Yuan-jhong),’ 建築師雜誌 Taiwan Architect 
Magazine, January and February 1979, 105. 
77
  Anonymous, ‘石城建築師事務所的姚胖子: 姚元中建築師 (Introduction to the Architect Yao 
Yuan-jhong),’ 房屋市場 (Housing Market Monthly), September 1973, 37. Also see Academia 
Historica, the Documents of the President Chiang Ching-kuo (國史館藏蔣經國總統文物), 國民黨
中央評議委員何應欽呈總統蔣中正為臺北市圓山忠烈祠改建案約談建築師、及組成圓山忠烈祠
改建委員會、建築師所繪正殿圖案請予核定等 (Presenting the Architectural Design of the Taipei 
Martyrs’ Shine to the President Chiang Kai-shek and Arranging a Meeting with the Architect), 
Archive Ref. no. 005-010202-00113-006 (02 May 1967); Academia Historica, the Documents of the 
President Chiang Kai-shek (國史館藏蔣中正總統文物), 總統蔣中正巡視忠烈祠擴建工程 (The 
President Chiang Kai-shek Visiting the Building Site of the Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine), Archive Ref. no. 
002-050101-00072-079, 25 December 1968.  
78
  ‘Yao Yuan-jhong on the Design of the Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine (國民革命忠烈祠設計者---姚元中建




1930s. Due to the success of the design, many other local governments took it as a 




Fig. 4-21 The Worship Deities of the 
Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine.  
Fig. 4-22 The Main Altar of the 
Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine. 
 
 
It should be noted that the Martyrs’ shrines in Taiwan have three points that 
made them different from shrines on the mainland. First of all, the deities that they 
worshipped are different. Koxinga is the most common deity venerated in most of 
Taiwan’s shrines. Not only does he symbolise an orthodox Chinese regime ending 
foreign occupation of Taiwan, but also signifies the KMT taking Taiwan as a 
stronghold to achieve its ultimate political goal of recovering its lost homeland. In 
addition, in order to manifest anti-Japanese imperialist ideology and erase the trace 
of Japanese influences in Taiwan, the KMT particularly emphasised Taiwan’s 
anti-colonial campaigns. These warriors who fought against Japanese rule were now 
viewed as national heroes and embodied within the Martyrs’ shrines. Chiang 
Kai-shek had given a special order individual room for these heroes to be made in 
the worship halls of shrines.
79
 This illustrates that Chiang did pay a great deal of 
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attention to the Taiwanese history of resistance to Japanese rule.  
 
Among these heroes, Lai He (賴和) (1894-31) serves as a good example to 
show that anti-Japanese imperialist ideology was enhanced through national rituals 
performed in the Martyrs’ shrines. Lai He was a famous doctor living in Changhua 
(彰化), a town in the middle of Taiwan. He was also a poet who wrote classical 
Chinese poetry. Influenced by China’s May Fourth Movement (1919), he started 
writing poetry and novels in modern Chinese mixed with Taiwanese. He was also a 
leader of anti-Japanese colonial associations and a supporter of Taiwan’s socialist 
movements, which had a close relationship to the Taiwanese communist party.
80
 
Because of his political stance, Lai He became a very controversial figure in 
post-war Taiwan. 
 
Due to his leadership of anti-Japanese campaigns, Lai He was among the first 
group of Taiwanese who were approved to be enshrined as national heroes in the 
Changhua Martyrs’ shrine. Subsequently, the decision to consecrate Taiwanese into 
Martyrs’ shrines had a highly symbolic meaning in politics. It conveyed a clear 
message that the KMT attempted to draw a boundary of political ideology in the 
issue of national holy spaces, by only allowing those that conformed to the KMT’s 
ideology the privilege of being worshipped in a Martyrs’ shrine as a Chinese 
national hero.  
 
However, in 1958, Lai He was deprived of his title within the Martyrs’ Shrine 
                                                                                                                                            
Kai-shek Gave an Order to Make a Room for These Martyrs who Joined the Anti-colonial 
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because of the socialist trend of his writings and pro-communist activities in the 
colonial period. During the Cold War, the government viewed the Chinese 
Communist Party as the greatest threat to the freedom of Taiwan and its allies. The 
KMT attempted to eliminate any challenge related to communism that might 
overthrow its reign. Thus, removing Lai He’s spirit tablet from the Martyrs’ shrine 
indicated another boundary of political ideology: any person who might have a 
relationship to communism would not be allowed reverence in such a public icon.  
 
Nowadays, the Cold War is over and Taiwan is a democratic country. The role 
of the Martyrs’ shrines has also experienced a significant change. At present, any 
officer, policeman, or citizen who has demonstrated great contribution to the nation, 
and has been approved by the government, can also be enshrined. The Martyrs’ 
shrine to some extent may have been secularised, but it is still a national holy space 




Fig. 4-23 The Spirit Tablets of the Revolutionary 
Army and the Yellow Emperor in the Altar 
of the Tainan County Martyr’s Shrine.  
Fig. 4-24 The Altar and Spirit Tablets of 
the Taipei Martyrs’ Shrine. 
 
 
Another difference between the shrines in Taiwan and in China is that the 
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shrines in Taiwan have brought the cult of the Yellow Emperor into worship there. 
During wartime on the mainland, a Martyrs’ shrine venerated only military leaders 
and fallen soldiers. The rituals to pay reverence and offer sacrifice to the Yellow 
Emperor were normally held in other places and and at other times.
81
 In Taiwan, 
however, the two rituals are combined and performed in shrines at the same time. 
Initiated by Chiang Kai-shek, the incumbent President of the ROC would officiate 
in the ritual in person. Many politicians, senior officers and bereaved families would 




In the worship halls of shrines in Taiwan, there are two main spirit tablets 
placed in the middle of the altar: one is the revolutionary army of the ROC, the 
other is the Yellow Emperor. It is significant in Taiwanese culture that the two 
tablets are placed in the same position in the hall. As mentioned earlier, according to 
the political discourse of Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese Republic revolution is seen as 
truly safeguarding the Confucian orthodoxy of China. Beginning from the Yellow 
Emperor, the orthodoxy is thought to be a political heritage continuously preserved 
by ancient sages, fought for by national heroes in previous dynasties and the 
founding of a new Republic, linked in an endless historical line. Therefore, the spirit 
tablet of the Yellow Emperor placed with that of the revolutionary army in the 
worship halls symbolises that a solid foundation of Chinese orthodoxy is being 
continuously built through ceremony. That ceremony, borrowed from Chinese 
religion, has also been used as a political apparatus to reconfirm the relationship 
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between the new regime and the old empire, and to serve as a perpetual reminder.          
 
 Finally, Chiang Kai-shek’s unfinished dream of building a capital shrine had 
finally been fulfilled in Taipei. In mainland China, no new shrines were being built. 
Most of them were converted from martial temples or local loyalty memorial 
temples. However, after the establishment of the Taipei Martyrs’ shrine, a new wave 
of constructing new spaces for the worship of national heroes occurred. Many old 
Shinto shrines were demolished and replaced by newly built specific national ‘holy 
spaces’.  
 
To conclude, nationalism and religion have a close relationship that can fully 
be demonstrated in the case of Japanese shrines and the KMT’s use of Martyrs’ 
shrines in Taiwan. Through the utilisation of a political religion, the Japanese 
colonial government introduced State Shinto to Taiwan with the purpose of 
strengthening the Kominka Movement and transforming the Taiwanese into ‘true 
Japanese’. It also helped to foster strong patriotic responses in the populace to the 
Japanese empire and the emperor. Even now, there are still some Taiwanese who 
suffer from this colonial legacy. The ‘Return Our Ancestral Souls’ campaign 
launched in front of the Yasukuni shrine every year is a prime example revealing  
this still tangible trauma of colonisation.  
 
In implanting a political religion for a changing Taiwanese identity, there was 
little fundamental difference in the nature of two regimes, the KMT and the 
Japanese colonial government. The Martyrs’ shrine as a national ‘holy space’ was 
introduced to Taiwan with the same purpose by the colonial government. Both used 





The cultural and political transformation of Taiwan can be embodied in the 
establishment of Japanese Shinto shrines and Chinese Martyrs’ shrines. As the most 
important political and cultural symbol, either constructing a shrine or demolishing 
it conveys a clear political message. As a result, Martyrs’ shrines replacing Shinto 
shrines as national holy spaces was meant to manifest the orthodoxy and legitimacy 
of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. By specifically choosing sites, construction styles 
and deity worship, the use of architecture firmly tied Taiwan politically, historically 
and genealogically to the mainland and to its own identity. In the case of Taiwan’s 
colonial and Martyrs’ shrines, political leaders could exercise their influence on 
architecture as a profound representation of nationalism and political power, 






Chapter Five : Reshaping National Culture of Taiwan: the Nanhai 
Academy and the National Palace Museum 
 
 
In 2000, Benedict Anderson, the author of an influential book Imagined 
Communities which marked a turning point in nationalism studies, visited Taiwan 
and had a short discussion about the contemporary development of Taiwan’s 
nationalism with Chen Wun-hsien (陳文茜), a former Taiwan legislator and TV 
commentator. Anderson argued that the National Palace Museum (故宮博物院) was 
the political legacy of the KMT's rule over Taiwan. In the post-war period, Chiang 
Kai-Shek took most of the Qing royal collections from Beijing’s Forbidden City and 
preserved them in Taipei’s National Palace Museum. Chiang treated these collections 
as ‘national treasures’ to demonstrate that he was the real heir of orthodox Chinese 
culture and the nation. However, after a successful process of democratisation had 
taken place in the post-martial law era of Taiwan, the KMT attempted to get rid of 
Chiang’s legacy and its close connection with Chinese nationalism. To achieve this, 
Anderson suggested that returning all royal collections back to mainland China 
should be considered.  
  
Anderson’s suggestion has shown that museums, especially national museums, 
are not a neutral phenomenon. The material in museums is more than just collections. 
Museums imply a general process of political inheritance at work. It is a profoundly 
political concept of a nation that shapes museums and makes them possible. 
Anderson called it a form of political museumising.
1
 In other words, museums, 
displaying particular objects that have been carefully selected, must be understood as 
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political and cultural symbols that embody certain regimes’ legitimacy of rule and 
privilege to represent the nation.  
 
Indeed, a strong link does exist between Chinese nationalism and the National 
Palace Museum of Taipei. As Anderson has acutely pointed out, the Museum and its 
collections provided Chiang Kai-shek with secure and substantial support for his 
claim that he was still the legitimate ruler of all China, even if he and his regime had 
already retreated to Taiwan after 1949. The Museum had been given a political 
function and loaded with powerful political icons, including the sculpture of Sun 
Yat-sen in the exhibition hall, the sculpture of Chiang in the front square, the portrait 
of Chiang in the main hall. Sun’s calligraphy ‘All under Heaven Belong to the 
People’ (天下為公) in the archway and the official name of the Museum, Chungshan 
Museum (中山博物院), was given by Chiang to highlight the close relationship 
between ‘national treasures’ and their legitimate successors. In addition, many 
building features in the Museum, such as the axial arrangement of the plane, the 
Qing royal palace-like façade, pseudo-Chinese classical decorations, and the 
mingtang (明堂) shape of spaces, exhibition and storage rooms, marked an explicit 
image of the Chinese nation and its imperial past. All the characteristics implied that 
the Museum was expected to be a cultural and political landmark to manifest the 
legitimacy of Chiang’s regime and its strong connection with the history of the 
Chinese nation. Tu Cheng-sheng (杜正勝), the former curator of the Museum, has 
asserted that compared to other museums in the world, the National Palace Museum 
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This chapter attempts to show the close relationship between the museum and 
the representation of the nation by looking at them through the theory of nationalism 
and new museology, an expanding academic subject of museum studies in recent 
years. Nationalism studies and the new museology are believed to offer a different 
analysis and a better understanding of the development of museums both in China 
and in Taiwan. By putting these museums into a historical context, the symbolic 
meanings of the ‘national treasures’ and the idea of constructing grand national 
museums for preserving them under different periods and political situations can 
help to reveal that museums have a political function bringing the imagination of the 
nation into a visible form. Thus, it is the power of nationalism that plays a central 
role in shaping the museums that we see today.  
 
The main study period in this chapter begins from the opening day of the 
Beijing’s National Palace Museum in 1925 to the establishment of the Taipei’s 
National Palace Museum in 1966. Although the notion of ‘museum’ can date back 
to ancient Greece, not until the nineteenth century did the European begin to build 
the museums for their nations in modern senses. Therefore, these relative issues 
about the making of the museum will also be discussed in this chapter. As Anderson 
has argued, when museums become part of the institutions of power, the cultural 
landscape and the ways in which we imagine the nation are profoundly changed. 
The National Palace Museum and other national museums in early post-war Taiwan 






5-1 Museums and the New Museology  
 
It is difficult to imagine a world without museums. In the second half of the 
twentieth century the numbers of museums have grown at an extraordinary rate. It is 
said that since World War II ninety-five per cent of existing museums have been 
founded throughout the world.
3
 These institutions, from local collections to national 
galleries, are so omnipresent and valuable they cannot be ignored. The reason why 
they are so important to our society is that they are not only dominant features in the 
cultural landscape of society, but they also frame our understanding of the past and 
of ourselves. In addition, museums are often likened to the idea of a treasure trove of 
knowledge. It is believed that visiting museums is like reading books. Visitors can 
learn and gain knowledge from what they see in museums, which are viewed as an 
authentic mirror of history without conflict or contradiction.
4
 In academia, museum 
theorists had held the same belief. A long-established attitude viewed museums as 
repositories of knowledge. However, in recent years a group of new theorists has 
started to question this attitude. As Jane C. Ju argues,  
 
Museum studies have been limited to studying the practical side of the role and 
function of museums, and not the impact of museums in shaping knowledge, in 




It is generally agreed that recent studies in new museology, or critical museum 
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theory, have introduced a broader sense of social and historical perspectives to 
museum studies, improving the way we view and understand them. The first scholar 
who used ‘the new museology’ as a term to describe this phenomenon is Peter Vergo.
 
6
 In 1989, he edited a book with the title, ‘The New Museology’, and his book 
became an original source of research in this direction. In the introduction, Vergo 
separated ‘the new museology’ from the ‘the old’,defining his concept as: ‘a state of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the “old” museology…what is wrong with the “old” 
museology is that it is too much about museum methods, and too little about the 
purpose of museum’.
7
 Vergo continued,  
 
Unless a radical re-examination of the role of museums within society – by 
which I do not mean measuring their ‘success’ merely in terms of criteria such 
as more money and more visitors – takes place, museums in his country, and 




The authors grouped together under the rubric of ‘the new museology’ all 
attempted to shift their focus on museums to a more theoretical and sociological 
perspective. They came to recognize that understanding museums requires moving 
beyond intra-disciplinary concerns to a wider social and political context. They all 
suggest that when we visit museums, a series of questions should be borne in mind: 
who decides on the objects being viewed here? What is the meaning of the objects 
represented?  
 
These Foucauldian research questions reveal an important part of the new 
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museological analysis: the close relationship between power and museums. As 
Eilean Hooper-Greenhill has pointed out in her book, Museums and the Shaping of 
Knowledge, Foucault offers new museologists a clear language and comprehensive 
structure in understanding the formation of museums. She further asks: 
 
Do the rituals of power relationships that allow some objects to be valued and 
others to be rejected operate to control the parameters of knowledge in the same 
way as the timetabling rituals and the power of relationships of teachers, 





In the following chapters, Hooper-Greenhill gives these questions a definite 
answer. She provides solid evidence in her book to show that, from pre-modern 
curiosity cabinets to modern museums, power and its relationships play an important 
role in framing and shaping museums and knowledge.  
 
It is true that Foucault’s ideas of power and knowledge have been particularly 
influential in museums studies since the 1980s, but Rhiannon Mason argues that 
many other theoretical resources, such as Post-modernism, Post-structuralism, 
Critical Theory and Cultural Studies, drawn from disciplines outside the traditional 
museum world, also have been adopted and used in new museological researches 
and practices.
10
 These theories provide sharp analytical tools to challenge the old 
orthodoxy of museum studies and to shake up the way in which we view museums. 
While the tenets of new museology are argued by a disparate group of researchers, 
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common threads can be found in their work. 
 
The first is a call to understand that ‘objects’ displayed in museums have been 
isolated from their original context. Objects are inserted into museums, new 
environments providing total protection against the decay of natural forces. Objects 
cease to perform their original function in daily usage and start to circulate in the 
world as private properties. Time is completely frozen in museums in order to 
preserve the objects on a long term basis or even in perpetuity for the purpose of 
collection, examination and exhibition. This change in use and ownership makes the 
objects become the collections of museums, conceived to be meaningful as the most 
important treasures of our society.  
 
The second is recontextualisation. When objects have been put into museums, 
their life is different from their pre-collection existence. They enter a new stage and 
obtain a new status as authorised collection in museums. In addition, objects are 
labelled by their distinctive forms and levels of scarcity. In other words, the value of 
objects is not derived from their original context, but rather is given by curators and 
museum professionals who have the authority to judge the objects and place them in 
exhibition rooms. In other words, museums recontextualise objects and imply a set 
of power relationships which controls the way they are re-interpreted and exhibited.  
 
The third concern is that only some particular objects are selected to be 
protected and displayed in museums. As Susan A. Crane has argued, the purpose of 
museums is to fix the past of our cultures and societies through objects by selecting 
what deserves to be kept, remembered and saved out of time.
11
 As a result, 
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museums create a vision of the past and future based on contemporary needs. They 
also formulate an organisational principle to collect, arrange and preserve the objects 
for reconstructing the past. In addition, museums draw a boundary based on cultural, 
social and territorial differences. Thus it is the hierarchical distinction of society that 




The fourth issue of the New Museology is ideology. For these new museum 
researchers, museums are not neutral spaces telling the ‘real’ stories of nature or 
human creations. As they have pointed out, objects in museums are not ‘pure’, 
‘authentic’, or ‘untouched since they had been found or had been made’. It is the 
effect of ideology which plays an important role in museums in framing the way in 
which we view the collections and experience the museum spaces. According to new 
museology, there are three types of ideology: evolutionary chronology, iconographic 
programme and nationalism.  
 
(1) Evolutionary chronology is the first and the most frequently employed 
ideology employed as a form of classification in museums. Derived from 
Enlightenment thinkers in the early modern era, the idea of evolutionary chronology 
gradually became a new framework which raised consciousness of the phenomenon 
of change. European museums at that time started building and organising 
exhibitions and collections in an enlightenment mode. It helped to create a new 
rational order of things. It also helped to naturalise and neutralise the way in which 
we view objects in museums. As a consequence, objects are classified in 
chronological order. Each of them represents a particular period of progressive 
development in form and style to exemplify evolutionary changes in history. This 
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makes the experience of walking through museums like passing through time.  
 
(2) The second ideology is the iconographic programme. Carol Duncan and 
Alan Wallach are the first scholars to use this term to explain that museums are a 
type of ceremonial architecture, sharing the same fundamental characteristics as 
many other traditional monuments, such as temples, churches and shrines.
13
 They 
suggest that museums should be seen as a kind of cultural shrine. The key function 
of these shrines is to impress visitors and make them believe that what they see in 
exhibitions are the most revered treasures of societies. The installations of 
exhibitions, layout of rooms and sequence of collections all create experiences that 
resemble traditional religious experiences. Like other ceremonial monuments, 
museums are complex architectural forms which organise visitors’ spatial 
experiences as a script organises a performance. By following the script, visitors 
engage in a visual activity full of ritual meanings. Duncan and Wallach call this 
visual experience the iconographic programme. They further argue that even though 
we live in a secular age, and museums are deemed as secular institutions, the effect 





Nothing will illustrate the contemporary iconographic programme better than 
the notion of object lessons in modern public museums. When works of art no longer 
serve as royal collections but are claimed as national treasures, they are used to show 
the wealth of nations to impress ‘new visitors’, usually citizens of the nation. 
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Nowadays most national treasures belong to the public. Every citizen has an equal 
opportunity to view these treasures in public museums. Hence museums are given a 
new function providing the object lesson to the public with the intention of 
education.
15
 These citizens are given a lesson in museums about the history of their 
nation and their own roots. As a result, the object lesson becomes the most 
frequently practised form of iconographic programme in modern museums.  
 
(3) The third ideology is nationalism. Like many other architectural types, 
museums provide a cultural underpinning for the development of the modern 
nation-state. When nationalism first emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, 
museums still maintained their power and influence but began to shift their focus to 
the idea of the nation and nationalism. When the old monarchies were replaced by 
new European nation-states, the states themselves came to assume the major 
responsibility for establishing national museums for their own nations. Throughout 





After nationalism became mainstream ideology in the early modern age, 
museum objects were calculated as part of the wealth of the nation, and 
‘rediscovered’ their unique national characteristics. New objects were chosen to be 
protected and displayed in museums, because they had distinctive features which 
could represent the nation. On the other hand, old collections could be reorganised 
to fit within new national ideological frameworks. Objects were given a new 
identity, different from their previous existence, as cultural and political symbols of 
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the nation. The nation-states even monopolise interpretation of the objects. As a 
result, objects in museums are nationalised and codified as part of the visible 
evidence of the historical narrative of the nation.
17
 In other words, objects, whether 
new or old, all bring the imagination of the nation into a more visible form. They 




As new museologists have observed, these three ideologies, evolutionary 
chronology, iconographic programme and nationalism, have set up a new 
epistemological framework leading visitors to gain new spatial experiences in 
museums without being aware of the invisible parts of ideologies behind the 
exhibition rooms. In effect, museums are reconstructed as places of ‘neutrality’, 
‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’, shaping perception as well as perspective. 
 
It should be noticed that these three ideologies in museums do not work 
separately, but rather mutually.
19
 In fact, in most museums around the world we can 
find hints of the collaboration of these three ideologies. What these ideologies have 
changed is not only the means of classification and exhibition, but also the museum’s 
architectural design, form and style.  
 
Objects do not directly and automatically transmit meaning to visitors. The 
meaning of objects depends on the context of other objects, the spatial design, the 
method of representation and the environment of museums. Museum architecture is 
of central importance to the visitor experience. One of the long-standing ways to 
envision museums is that museum architecture is a sacred space protecting national 
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treasures from the outside world.
20
 The architectural form of museums is expected 
to visualise the image of the cultural shrine that can give visitors a sense of privilege 
and an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the mysterious past. In order to create this 
ritual experience, grand gateways, impressive corridors, picturesque views, dramatic 
lighting, splendid ornaments and many other elements help bring the image of the 
sacred space into reality.  
 
Although frequently compared to temples, churches and certain types of sacred 
spaces, museums as we know them today are closer in age to other building types 
such as prisons, stations or department stores.
21
 Museums are a relatively recent 
cultural phenomena which date back no further than the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Museums inherit the etymological origins of the ancient Greek penchant for 
cult sites devoted to the muses and the legend of the Mouseion of Alexandria. 
Because of this, the study of museum architecture should consider its cultural and 
political demands and long-term historical context. 
 
It is generally agreed that the notion of ‘museum’ can be dated back to ancient 
Greece. The association of the ‘museum’ with systematic collecting and 
classification of specimens began with Aristotle’s travelling and studying in the 
island of Lesbos around 340 BC, which led to the establishment of the Lyceum for 
his students and research.
22
 During the period of Roman expansion between 211 to 
60 B.C., Greek art, statuary and paintings were looted from conquered lands and 
used to ornament the exteriors of new buildings and monuments throughout Rome.
23
 
Concepts of stewardship, now known as curatorship, were established to take care of 
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these works of art. Later, the Greek art in Rome henceforth was considered as public 




It is clear that politics had a strong influence on the development of ‘the 
museum’. Although during the Renaissance era the idea of ‘museum’ changed, 
politics retained its power in shaping museums. One of the profound changes at that 
time was the discovery of the New World and European colonial expansion there. 
Many missionaries, colonial governors and explorers brought new specimens and 
indigenous artifacts back to Europe. Their findings quickly triggered a new wave of 
systematic research. New cabinets, cases, drawers and many other specialised 
furnishings and storage rooms were designed to accommodate these objects in the 




In order to broaden the range of collections, a number of scholars and collectors 
started seeking support from church leaders and royal societies.
26
 Later, most 
European monarchs had their own collections. This transformation gradually led 
these collections to become symbols of status and tools of propaganda.
27
 From the 
Renaissance through to the eighteenth century, royal collections were often housed 
in official reception rooms and served as a setting to impress a monarch’s private 
audience, such as visiting monarchs, foreign ambassadors and local dignitaries.
28
 In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the public museum was 
conceived. Many royal collections were opened to the public and preserved in 
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‘museums’, a new type of building particularly designed for protecting and 
displaying the collections.  
 
In the nineteenth century, museum design quickly became a new profession. 
Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand’s research on the systematisation of the museum 
building type had changed the way in which architects created an ideal exhibition 
space for the ‘cultural shrine’. He published a book called Précis des leçons which 
provided early nineteenth-century architects with a blueprint for museum design.
29
 
In Durand’s opinion, the ideal plan of a museum was composed of a Greek cross 
with four wings around a central rotunda. Each of the wings had a separate entrance 
marked by a splendid portico and a plinth-like podium. Four entrances were linked 
by a long corridor that made the shape of the plan an exact square. In addition, 
Durand viewed the museum as both a house of treasure and a repository of 
knowledge preserving and displaying different types of objects for audiences.
30
 This 
idea could be linked to the traditional vision of a museum, that is, the museum as a 
sacred space or a cultural shrine protecting the treasures of our civilisation from the 
outside world. Durand’s ideal plan had a great influence on museum design across 
Europe. The most important examples at that time were Leo von Klenze’s 
Glyptothek (1815-30) in Munich, Karl Friedrich von Schinkel’s Altes Museum 
(1823-30) in Berlin and Sir Robert Smirke’s British Museum (1823-52) in London. 
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Fig. 5-1. Durand’s museum 
layout.  
Fig. 5-2. Sir Robert Smirke’s design of 
the British Museum in 1852.  
 
 
However, many innovative ideas of establishing a modern national museum for 
the public were derived from the Louvre in Paris. The Louvre can be viewed as the 
prototype of national museums, which restored multiple art works and anthological 
and archaeological objects viewed as national treasures. The Louvre is also the 
largest and most influential museum of its type.
31
 The contributions of the Louvre 
can be categorised into three points. Firstly, the royal collections no longer belonged 
to the monarch, but to the newly born nation.
32
 Secondly, the collections of 
museums also implied a new set of social relationships. When the former royal 
collections became the national patrimony, the state itself, as a guardian of 
civilisation took responsibility for protecting it. Citizens in this new relationship 
were taught that they inherited the spiritual wealth of the nation. They did not 
directly own the patrimony but owned it through the medium of the state. Thus, the 
Louvre was the site of a symbolic transaction between the citizens and the state. It 
shared the spiritual wealth of the nation with citizens and intensified national 
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Finally, when visitors passed through the main entrance of the museum, the 
museum’s iconographic programme began. Monumental halls, grand staircases, 
marvellous ceilings and many other architectural elements all led visitors to join a 
ceremonial procession of art in the museum. Beginning with the Victory of 
Samothrace, visitors faced a number of possible routes linking different halls that 
divided the art works into chronological order. Visitors had their paths confined by 
the general character of the architectural space. No matter which route they took, 
they all led to French art. This arrangement of space had a symbolic meaning: 




The success of the Louvre attracted new nations to take it as a model for 
imitation. One of the largest in Asia was the Beijing National Palace Museum. After 
the Qing emperor was forced to move out of the Forbidden City in 1924, several 
politicians and cultural elites took the Louvre as example to support the 
establishment of the National Palace Museum in the Forbidden City. They suggested 
that the government should take the responsibility for protecting the royal treasures 




However, the establishment of the National Palace Museum was more intricate 
than that of the Louvre. Soon after it was opened in 1925, the Second Sino-Japanese 
War took place. The Museum was forced to close due to the spread of the War in 
Northern China, with the national treasures retreating with the Nationalist 
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government from North to Southwest of China. When the Chinese Communist party 
took control of China, the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan and carried most the 
important treasures with them. It took another forty years of waiting to witness 
Taipei’s National Palace Museum opening in 1965. The changing political situation 
in these forty years reinforced the relationship between the National Palace Museum 
and Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. As a result, the Museum and its collections 
eventually became the most valuable source of political and cultural legitimacy of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime over Taiwan.  
 
 




 October 1925, a ceremony was held to mark the official opening of 
Beijing’s National Palace Museum. The date was not a usual one. It was the 
fourteenth anniversary of the National Founding Day of the Republic of China. It 
drew explicit symbolic connections between the founding of the nation and the 
founding of the Museum. As Huang Fu (黃郛) (1880-1936), one of the members of 
the museum council, mentioned in his inaugural speech: 
 
The opening day of the Museum is the Double Ten Day (雙十節). From now on, 
this day will have two levels of meaning: the founding day of the nation and 
museum. Those who might attempt to loot the museum will also be viewed as 
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Huang’s speech showed that the National Palace Museum had been given a 
prominent symbolic role in creating a sense of nationhood, although in the early 
development of China’s museums, the concept of museum did not directly link to the 
idea of nationalism. Before the National Palace Museum was founded, several 
museums were established by foreign missionaries during the late nineteenth century. 
In 1868, China’s first museum was founded by the French Catholic missionary 
Pierre Marie Heude (1836-1902) in Shanghai to display objects of natural history. 
Following his model, other missionaries began to build private missionary museums 
in China. The purpose of these museums was to correct Chinese people’s 
misunderstandings about Western civilization, and to show new scientific 
achievements of the West to the Chinese.
37
 As a result, Chinese visitors flocked to 
these museums for an opportunity to know Western culture and scientific knowledge. 
After witnessing the success of missionary museums, these Chinese visitors began to 




After the founding of the Republic, the Beiyang government also embarked on 
establishing several national museums based on the Western model. In 1912, two 
minor royal palaces in Beijing were used to display the Qing royal family 
collections.
39
 Later, another two state held museums were founded in the Forbidden 
City. One was the National History Museum (國立歷史博物館), which firstly used 
Guozijian (Imperial Academy) (國子監) as an exhibition space and later moved to the 
Meridian Gate (午門) of the City in 1918. The other was the Beijing Antique 
Exhibition Hall (北平古物陳列所) which occupied the Outer Court of the City in 
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 Although these two museums were founded in the Outer Court of the City 
and opened to the public, Puyi (溥儀) (1906-1967), the last emperor of the Qing 
dynasty, his family and palace eunuchs still lived in the Inner Court, the residential 
area for the royal family in the City. They had continued to live in the Inner Court 
for thirteen years after Puyi’s abdication in 1911. The reason that Puyi did not 
immediately move out of the City after his abdication was that he signed the ‘Article 
of Favourable Treatment of the Emperor of the Great Qing ’ (清室退位優待條件) with 
the Beiyang government to retain his imperial title and to protect his right to live in 
the Inner Court during the interim period.  
 
 Feng Yu-xiang (馮玉祥) (1882-1948), however, launched the Beijing coup 
d’etat in 1924 and forced Puyi to accept a change to the ‘Article’, expelling the royal 
family from the City.
41
 The government also claimed that all Qing property no 
longer belonged to the emperor, but to the Republic.
42
 The Qing royal family’s art, 
books, antiquities and many other collections were now officially transferred to the 
government and became part of state property. 
 
The government set up two committees to deal with these collections in 
preparation for a new grand museum, which became the Beijing National Palace 
Museum, constructed in both the Inner and the Outer Court of the Forbidden City.
43
 
The museum committee was comprised largely of university scholars who were 
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charged with the task of cataloging the collections and protecting them from theft or 
looting.
44
 Taking the Louvre as an example, most committee members advocated 
converting the imperial palace into a national museum. They believed that the 
Forbidden City and the royal collections were the witness of thousands of years of 
Chinese history and culture. Preserving them would benefit citizens, who would gain 
a great opportunity to know their nation, and academic researchers, who had access 
to primary materials for more studies on Chinese imperial history.
45
 In addition, the 
government was also convinced that erecting an impressive national museum could 
help to foster a sense of Chinese national identity during the transition toward 
nationhood.
46
 As a result, in 1925 the government decided to convert the entire 




 October 1925, a new tablet carved with the name of the museum was 
hung on the Gate of Divine Might (神武門) to mark the opening day of Beijing’s 
National Palace Museum. Zhuang Yun-kuan (莊蘊寬) (1866-1932), the Beiyang 
government’s minister of Audit, hosted the opening ceremony in front of the Palace 
of Heavenly Purity (乾清宮). Many prominent officials and personages, including 
Huang Fu, attended the ceremony and made a speech on stage. According to records, 
tickets were sold out on that day.
47
 Crowds of visitors flocked into the Museum, and 
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despite its huge size, the palace did not have enough space to accommodate so many. 
Some of them were stuck on the pathway to the ceremony stage for more than two 
hours. They could not wait to see the real scale of the Forbidden City, which had not 
been opened to the public for six hundred years since it was built in the Ming 
dynasty.
48





Many palaces which used to be the emperor’s offices, residences and study 
rooms in the Inner Court were now renovated for a new function: exhibition rooms 
of the Museum. In addition, because the Museum was directly built on the old palace, 
the effect of an iconographic programme was more powerful than in other museums 
in China. The collections not only provided the best object lesson for visitors, but 
also offered an unrivalled visual and spatial experience of pilgrimage to Chinese 
culture and history. In order to guide visitors to numerous exhibition halls in the 
Forbidden City, visiting routes were grouped into three lines: the west line, the 
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Fig. 5-3. The Gate of Divine Might in the 
Opening Day of the National Palace 
Museum in Beijing.  
Fig. 5-4. The Porcelain Exhibition Room in the 




middle line and the east line.
49
 At first the Museum was open for six days, two days 
for each line. Each line led visitors to different exhibition halls: the Ancient Artifacts 
and Art Exhibition Halls (古物書畫陳列室), the Library Exhibition Halls (圖書陳列室) 




The collections displayed in different Halls were now being recontextualised. 
Originally the Museum objects were scattered around the City as a part of interior 
settings, ornaments or articles of the royal family’s daily life. However, in order to 
convert the whole imperial palace into the Museum, these collections were now 
removed from their original contexts and categorised as museum objects for display 
in exhibition rooms. For example, the most renowned treasure of the Museum is the 
Jadeite Cabbage with Insects (翠玉白菜). Initially it was placed in the Palace of 
Eternal Harmony (永和宮), the residence of Consort Jin (瑾妃) (1873-1924). It was 
thought to be a dowry gift for Jin, to symbolise her purity and to offer blessings for 
bearing many children for emperor Guangxu (光緒) (1871-1908). The Jadeite 
Cabbage was an inconspicuous item put into an enamel flowerpot with a Lingzhi 
mushroom around a corner. When the Jade Exhibition Hall was established, the 
Jadeite Cabbage was displayed in a new place. The curator decided to simply put it 
in a showcase without the distraction of other objects. This way of displaying it 
made the Jadeite Cabbage become the most outstanding and popular object in the 
Museum. As a result, other numerous paintings, ornaments and articles were 
recontextualised in the same way to transform the ordinary royal collections into 
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From 1926 to 1928, Chiang Kai-shek and the National Revolutionary Army 
conducted the Northern Expedition (北伐) to reunify China under the KMT by 
ending the rule of the Beiyang government and local warlords in Northern China. 
After Chiang’s Nationalist government took control over Beijing, the National 
Palace Museum was re-opened to the public. Chiang fully recognised the 
metaphorical meaning of the Museum and its collections for his rule. As a 
consequence, he immediately passed ‘the Organic Act of the National Palace 
Museum’ (故宮博物院組織法) to give the Museum a higher administrative position 
directly subordinate to the Nationalist government. He also established a new 
museum committee to set up a clear organisation for the Museum to develop a 
standard classification system and new enterprises such as publishing.
52
 It is clear 
that since the Museums had been established Chiang was the most powerful political 
figure to pay more attention to the image making of the Museum than any other 
politicians in the Republic. As a result, Chiang profoundly changed the orientation of 
the Museum and its strong link to Chinese nationalism.  
 
However, not long after the Museum had re-opened, the Japanese army posed a 
serious threat to Northern China. In order to protect these national treasures from the 
threat of war, Chiang Kai-shek decided to remove the most important part of the 
collections to a safe place.
53
 From 1931, these collections had begun their journey of 
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retreat with the Nationalist government from Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Chongqing, 
and eventually to Taipei. Other museums and academic research institutes, such as 
Guozijian, the National History Museum and the Beijing Antique Exhibition Hall 
also crated their collections and joined the journey.  
 
The act of evacuating the collections from the Museum in Beijing conformed to 
Chiang’s political thought in the Nanjing Decade (1927-37). Since China had been 
reunited under the rule of the Nationalist government, Chiang went to great efforts to 
reconnect the new regime with the old nation.
54
 He also viewed the royal collections 
as a source of cultural and political legitimacy, which would help to reinforce an 
image of an inherited relationship between his authority and the nation. There is no 
doubt that Chiang would do his utmost to prevent the collections from being 
destroyed by Japanese troops and to show his determination to protect China’s 
national culture and treasures.
55
 As a result, the survival of the Museum and its 
collections was strongly connected to the survival of the nation.
56
 During the 
journey of retreat, the collections were also displayed for the public in Shanghai 
(1935), Nanjing (1937), Chongqing (1943-4), Gungzhou (1944) and Chengdu (1946). 
It was believed that these exhibitions could play an important role in boosting 
national morale. During the war period, the exhibitions also created an image of 
China’s national culture and treasures still surviving under the full protection of the 
regime. 
 
In 1934, the British Royal Academy of Arts invited the Museum’s curator to 
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arrange an exhibition in London celebrating the thirty years anniversary of King 
George V’s ascending the throne. The Nationalist government decided to loan the 
most valuable part of the collections to the London exhibition. In order to protect 
these national treasures on the way to Britain, the British government sent the 
Cruiser HMS Suffolk to transport them.
57
 Undoubtedly, requesting help from the 
British navy to ship the collections reinforced the image that these treasures were so 
important to the Chinese nation that the government could not afford any risk of 
losing them. On 28
th
 November 1935, the International Exhibition of Chinese Art 
was opened in London’s Royal Academy of Arts. King George V and other European 
nobles and personages came to visit the exhibition, and Britain’s main newspapers 
and magazines did special features to cover the event. More than twenty lectures 
relative to the exhibition were also held at the same time to introduce the beauty of 
Chinese Art to the British. During these three months, the exhibition attracted four 




The success of the London exhibition quickly gained an international reputation 
for the Museum. The exhibition was not only the first time that the Museum loaned 
its collections to a foreign country, but also marked a new method of promoting 
Chinese national culture to the West with diplomatic and political purposes.
59
 As 
Chiang Fu-tsung (蔣復璁) (1898-1990), the first curator of Taipei’s National Palace 
Museum, has mentioned, the exhibition gave Western countries a direct channel to 
know the real Chinese culture. He goes on to argue that the primary way of knowing 
Eastern cultures in the West was by the dominance of Japanese scholars through 
introduction and publications. It gave Western people the narrow idea that Japanese 
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culture was the mainstay culture of the whole of Asia, but after the success of the 
exhibition in London, he believed that this misleading idea would quickly be 
overturned. The exhibition offered evidence to prove that it was China, not Japan, 
that was the origin and stronghold of Eastern cultures. As such, it can also be said 




Although the short trip to London was enormously successful, the long retreat 
of the collections had only just begun. After the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese 
Communist Party took control of mainland China in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek and his 
regime were forced to retreat to Taiwan. The most valuable part of the collections 
was also brought to Taiwan with the government.
61
 Initially the collections did not 
immediately settle down in Taipei. Before the National Palace Museum was rebuilt, 
all packaged collections were temporarily housed in Beigoukou (北溝口), Taichung 
(台中).
62
 These objects were unpacked only for academic research on special request 
of related scholars. In 1957, the Asian Foundation, a US private organization with 
government affiliation, financed an exhibition room for displaying some collections 
for the public next to storehouses.
63
 This small exhibition room attracted numerous 
sinologists, Chinese art historians and a great number of ordinary people. It took 
decades of waiting for the re-opening of the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and 
the Museum in crates, retreating on a long journey to Free China, quickly became a 
legend in the stories of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. 
                                                 
60
  Chiang, 中華文化復興運動與國立故宮博物院 (The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement 
and the National Palace Museum), 57-8. 
61
  Due to time pressure, only around one fifth of special selected collections were moved to Taiwan. 
Please see The Committee of the National Palace Museum, 故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across 
Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1) , 193. 
62
  Considering the dry climate, Taichung was viewed as the ideal place to preserve the collections. See 
Na, 典守故宮國寶七十年 (Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for 
Seventy Years), 149. 
63
 Suo Yu-ming 索予明, ‘文物與國運 (The Cultural Artifacts and the Destiny of the Nation),’故宮文
物月刊 (The National Palace Museum Monthly of Chinese Art), April 1983, 10. 
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The humiliation of the war helped to strengthen the relationship between the royal 
collections and nationalism. 
 
Before Taipei’s National Palace Museum was re-opened in 1965, the KMT used 
the previous Japanese colonial government’s exhibition spaces to display 
mainstream Chinese art. For example, the most important museum in Taiwan during 
the colonial era was the Museum of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. Its Greek 
Revival style of façade and the objects that were collected by Japanese biological, 
archaeological and anthropological scholars completely represented the coloniser’s 
authority and ambition to catalogue and analyse the constituents of the empire and 
her subjects.
64
 In order to erase all traces of Japanese cultural influence, the 
Nationalist government made enormous changes to the Museum. The name of the 
Museum was changed to the Taiwan Provincial Museum. The main building 
survived, but the collections were evacuated to make room for Chinese cultural and 
historical relics.
65
 It is clear that these changes reflected the KMT’s regime attempt 
to shift Taiwan’s cultural landscape by changing the exhibition content of museums 
to show the supremacy of Chinese culture.  
   
The Nanhai Academy (南海學園) was among the first group of cultural and 
educational facilities constructed for the public by the KMT with a definite political 
purpose in post-war Taiwan. The idea of the Academy was the foundation of a 
Chinese museum acropolis in Taipei to preserve Chinese cultural relics and rare 
book collections that retreated with the government from mainland China. The 
acropolis also served the function of promoting the orthodox culture of China. The 
                                                 
64
  Edward Vickers, ‘Re-writing Museums in Taiwan,’ in Re-writing Culture in Taiwan, eds. Fang-long 
Shih, Stuart Thompson and Paul-Francois Tremlett (London: Routledge, 2009), 75. 
65
 Ibid., 75-6. 
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Academy was located next to the Taipei Botanical Garden in the heart of Taipei’s 
political district. In 1953, after Chiang Kai-shek visited the Garden, he asked Chang 
Chi-yun (張其昀) (1901-85), the minister of education, to build a series of pubic 
buildings which included the Central Library (1955), the National Taiwan Arts 
Education Centre (1956), the Confucius-Mencius Society of the Republic of China 
(1956), the National Taiwan Science Education Centre (1958), The National 
Museum of History (1956-64) and many other governmental institutes to promote 
cultural and educational affairs.  
 
During the Japanese occupation, Taipei’s Botanical Garden was also an 
important site for exhibitions. Originally the Garden itself served a role in 
displaying flora and fauna collected from different regions of the world. In 1916, 
based on the model of the Western Universal Exposition, the Japanese authorities 
used the Garden to host the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition to show the industrial 
progress and achievements of the island under Japanese rule to world-wide political 
and commercial leaders.
66
 The reception hall later served as an exhibition hall for 
the colonial government to display Taiwan’s industrial, agricultural and handicraft 
products to international investors. The Kenkou Shrine (建功神社), one of the most 
important shrines in Taiwan for worshipping martyrs who made significant 
contributions to the colonial government, Japanese historical heroes and divine 
beings, was also located in the heart of the Garden to mark the political importance 
of the site to colonial rulers.
67
 Therefore, it was no surprise that Chiang Kai-shek 
                                                 
66
  Lu Shao-li 呂紹理, 展示台灣: 權力、空間、與殖民統治的形象表述  (Exhibiting Taiwan: 
Power, Space, and Image Representation of Japanese Colonial Rule) (Taipei: Rye Field, 2005), 
214-41.  
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 More details about the founding of the Kenkou Shrine see Huang, Shih-chuan 黃士娟, ‘日治時期
台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of 
Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation)’ (MA Dissertation, Chung Yuan 
Christian University, 1998). 
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Fig. 5-5. The Nanhai Academy. Source: Google Maps. 
 
 
The first building founded in the Academy was the Central Library (中央圖書
館).
68
 Due to a limited budget, the government decided to adapt the old Kenkou 
Shrine instead of building a whole new library. The main structure of the Shrine 
remained, but Japanese roofs, decorations and the main gate were replaced by 
Chinese architectural decorative elements. A new courtyard was placed in front of 
the main building and surrounded by reading rooms extending from the main hall. A 
new gate hall building was also constructed in the Chinese classical style to mark a 
new entrance for the ‘cultural shrine’ of book collections. The Library’s appearance 
now showed no external hint of the original shrine. The magnificent decorations of 
the Library also expressed an attempt to compete with Beijing’s Central Library, the 
                                                 
68
  This building has been used for the National Academy for Educational Research since 1987.  
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first national library in China.  
 
The second important building of the Academy was the National Taiwan 
Science Education Centre (國立科學教育館) designed by Lu Yu-chun (盧毓駿) 
(1904-75).
69
 The aim of the Museum was to improve science education in Taiwan.
70
 
In 1954, Chiang Kai-shek announced that it was the year of ‘science developments’. 
Building a science museum for the public was one of the goals to strengthen the 
foundation of Taiwan’s science education.
71
 In doing so, the Education Centre was 
built as a distinctive cultural landmark located on one corner of the Garden as part of 
the Academy building complex. The upper half of the building was made in a 
cylinder shape based on a nonagon volume of construction. On lower floors, the core 
of the Centre was spiral staircases and ramps surrounded by different exhibition 
rooms. On upper floors, the ramps were conversely protruding and surrounding 
central exhibition spaces to echo the shape of the conical roof inspired by Beijing’s 
Temple of Heaven (天壇). The Centre shows an obvious Chinese building character 
on the outside, but Le Corbusier’s modernist architectural principles, such as spiral 
staircases, ramps and the open plan, were the inspiration for the inner spaces. It is 
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  The Museum had now moved to the other site. The building currently is empty. Graduated from one 
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  Ciou Mei-hong 邱美虹 and Liou Jun-geng 劉俊庚, ‘我國科學教育發展回顧與展望 (Review 
and Forecast of the Development of Our Country’s Science Education),’ in 我國百年教育回顧與展
望 (Centennial Review and Forecast of Our Country’s Education), ed. The National Academy for 




clear that Lu tried to combine Chinese architectural design philosophy with Western 
modernist principles in this Centre. This attempt to reshape the new direction of 
Chinese modern architecture earned him a great reputation in architectural circles in 




Fig. 5-6. The Central Library.  Fig. 5-7. The National Taiwan Science 




Fig. 5-8. The 3
rd
 Floor of the National 
Taiwan Science Education 
Centre. 
Fig. 5-9. The National Museum of History. 
 
 
The National Museum of History was the earliest museum founded at the 
Academy. The Museum initially adapted Taipei’s Commodity Exhibition Hall built 





 After Chiang Kai-shek renamed the Museum and reorientated its function, a 
series of new exhibition halls was gradually taking shape.
73
 In 1964, the last main 
exhibition hall of the Museum was finished. The tall red walls of the façade and the 
curved saddle roofs were located on the top of main hall and cladded with the 
Chinese classical style evoking a vivid image of Beijing’s Forbidden City. It was an 
image that could totally represent the idea of a Chinese ‘cultural shrine’. Before the 
National Palace Museum was re-opened, this museum was the most important 
cultural landmark in the centre of Taipei city.  
 
In short, from the journey of protecting national treasures to early designs of 
Taiwan’s national museums, Chinese nationalism played an important role in 
fostering a close relationship between museums and the nation. Since the royal 
collections had become national patrimony, the state shaped itself to protect national 
treasures as a guardian of civilisation. From the establishment of Beijing’s National 
Palace Museum to Taipei’s Nanhai Academy, it is clear that museums were 
constructed as ‘cultural shrines’ to glorify certain high culture of the nation, coupled 
with a particular political purpose. Thus, it is no surprise that Taiwan’s early 
museums were given a political function to reconnect the link between Chinese 
nationalism and the Taiwanese inhabitants. We can see Chiang Kai-shek deeply 
committed to founding a museum as a method of creating an image of Chinese 
culture. In doing so, from museum design to the collections, Taiwan’s early national 
museums became a visible vehicle for conveying a message that the cultural and 
political legitimacy of the nation had been firmly tied to the regime. 
                                                 
72
  The initial exhibition collections of the Museum were derived from the He-nan Province Museum, 
which was also removed from mainland China with the National Palace Museum. See the Committee 
of the National Museum of History, ed., 國立歷史博物館沿革與發展  (the History and 
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5-3 The Making of Taipei’s National Palace Museum  
 
Although Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War, they 
achieved partial victory in the cultural struggle. Taipei’s National Palace Museum 
was a prime example to illustrate that it was Chiang’s regime, not Mao Ze-dong’s, 
that protected the core of Chinese national culture for China. In order to satisfy the 
need to promote national culture and to show that Chiang’s regime and the Chinese 
nation’s destiny had been firmly linked, in 1960 Chiang decided to build a grand 
museum to display Qing imperial collections after their long journey from the 
mainland that took seventeen years (1933-49).
74
 Without doubt, apart from its 
exhibition and preservation purposes, this museum exemplified a political function 
that could comprehensively represent the political ideology of the regime from the 
outset. Furthermore, there are three points which should be highlighted in the 
explanation of the making of the museum:  
 
(1) Sun Yat-senism and the legitimacy of the nation: as mentioned earlier, Sun 
Yat-senism was a sort of political ideology developed in the late 1920s. This 
ideology was promoted by Sun’s followers who viewed him as a founding father of 
the Republic and the true heir of orthodox Confucianism. Chiang Kai-shek was one 
of the leading advocates of Sun Yat-senism. He not only propagated Sun’s teaching 
in his speeches and political thought, but also implemented a plan to establish Sun’s 
birthday as a national holiday. Every year on that day, the Nationalist government 
and the party would hold a grand official ceremony to commemorate Sun’s 
contributions to the nation, including hanging national flags in main streets, paying 
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  The Committee of the National Palace Museum, 故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century 
Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1), 240. 
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respects to Sun in his Mausoleum or reciting his will in public.
75
 Many important 
political campaigns were also launched on that day. Therefore, it was no surprise 
that in 1965, Chiang chose Sun’s centennial birthday as the day for the re-opening 
of Taipei’s National Palace Museum. It conveyed a clear message that the Museum 
was built to honour Sun who left a rich cultural and political legacy to the nation.  
 
On the day of the re-opening, Chiang visited the Museum and made a famous 
speech to re-affirm that Sun was the true successor who had inherited the 
long-established Confucian tradition from previous cultural sages and national 
heroes. Chiang also denominated the Museum as the Chungshan Museum (中山博物
院) in remembrance of Sun.
76
 For Chiang, rebuilding the Museum in Taipei was one 
of the ideal ways to realise Sun’s cultural and political thought.
77
 It also showed 
that Chiang and the KMT would take the responsibility for protecting Chinese 
culture, whereas Mao and his Communist regime on the mainland were the 
destroyers of Chinese culture. As a result, through the promotion of Sun Yat-senism, 
the National Palace Museum was viewed not only as the most important symbol of 
Chinese culture, but also symbolised the regime’s determination to guard the 
valuable treasures of the nation.  
 
 (2) Anti-Communist ideology and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement:  
as mentioned earlier, the beginning of the Cold War marked a turning point in US 
                                                 
75
 Jhou, ‘塑造黨國之民 (The Making of the National Citizens),’ 403-12 
76
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  The Committee of the National Palace Museum, 故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century 
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global strategy. Truman’s government began to shift its support from Mao’s 
Communist China to Chiang’s Free China. It gave Taiwan sufficient financial aid to 
help the island develop its agricultural, industrial and cultural enterprises. For 
example, the construction fees of the Museum’s first exhibition room in Beigoukou 
(北溝口) was subsidised by the Asian Foundation. Research funding and academic 
support for preserving and categorising the collections also came from the same 
source.
78
 In addition, part of the funds for reconstructing the Museum in Taipei was 




It was in the same period of time that Communist China closed itself off from 
the world. Researchers who were interested in Chinese culture and history had to 
come to Taiwan for their primary sources. Taipei’s National Palace Museum was the 
only place that preserved the largest number of Chinese art and imperial documents 
outside mainland China. This made the Museum the most important site for 
Sinological studies in the world.
80
 As a result, the Museum became one of the 
must-see attractions for foreign scholars and tourists who visited Taiwan for 
academic or diplomatic purposes. The tension between Communist China and Free 
China also created an opportunity for the Nationalist government to promote an 
image that it was Taiwan and not the mainland that was the true stronghold of 
Chinese culture.  
 
In order to show the firm friendship between the US government and the 
Nationalist government, the Museum was invited to a tour exhibition in the US from 
1961 to 1962. The success of the American exhibition tour in five major cities, 
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Washington D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco, immediately 
earned a great international reputation for the Museum.
81
 Apart from its great 
impact on Chinese art and historical studies in American academia, the tour from the 
outset had a strong impact in politics and diplomacy. First of all, like the London 
tour of the Museum in 1935, the US government sent a naval ship to transport fine 
selected objects to America.
82
 The US Department of State also made a commitment 
to the Nationalist government that all the collections belonged to the ROC and 
would return to Taiwan at the end of the tour. The Communist government would 
have no right to claim ownership of the collections and seize them while they were 
in transit.
83
 As a result, this tour showed a clear message that the United State’s 
political stance at that time was to support the Nationalist government from the 
threat of Communism. It also presented a positive image that Chinese traditional 
culture during the Cold War period was well-preserved in Free China.  
 
In 1966, the Chinese Communist Party launched the Cultural Revolution under 
the leadership of Mao. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT viewed the Revolution as a 
threat to Chinese traditional culture. Chiang immediately launched the Chinese 
Culture Renaissance Movement to fight against the Revolution. The goal of the 
Movement was to revive Chinese traditional culture through the leadership of 
Chiang’s cultural policies. The Movement attempted to strengthen the role of the 
National Palace Museum, instituting a political ideological mission, glorifying 
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nationalist spirit and patriotic sentiments.
84
 As Chiang Fu-tsung (蔣復璁) mentioned, 
the aim of the Museum during the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was to 
provide hard evidence to the public, that compared to other civilisations, China also 
had a long history and distinctive culture. This could easily be found in the 
Museum’s enormous wide-ranging collection of thousands of years of bronze ware, 
porcelains, calligraphy and paintings. No other museum could compete with that.
85
 
Chiang goes on to argue that every visitor to the Museum is a witness of Chinese 
culture, who after viewing the collections, could testify to the glory of the national 
past.
86
 We can see that through the visiting experience the Museum could help 
achieve the goal of the Movement by fostering a sense of nationalist identity and 
sentiment.  
 
(3) Nationalism and the object lesson: Like other museums around the world, 
Taipei’s National Palace Museum also had a function in education. The Museum’s 
rich collections of Chinese culture could help the Taiwanese to understand the 
history of their motherland in a variety of ways, such as school visiting programmes 
and cultural lessons for the public specifically produced by the Museum. By this 
process it was argued that the Taiwanese would come to recognise that they were 




As Duncan and Wallach have argued, museums and their collections worked as 
a symbolic transaction between visitors and the nation. Having object lessons in the 
museum, the experience of symbolic transaction would help older subjects of the 
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empire turn into new citizens of the nation.
88
 As a result, Taipei’s National Palace 
Museum played an important role in providing these object lessons to the Taiwanese, 






When Chiang Kai-shek decided to build a grand museum to house the royal 
collects in Taipei, a closed architectural design competition for the Museum was held 
by the museum committee in 1961. The five important architects at that time, 
including Guan Song-sheng (關頌聲 ), Yang Jhuo-cheng (1892-1960) (楊卓成 ) 
(1914-2006), Wu Wen-xi (吳文喜) and Wang Da-hong (王大閎) (1918- ), were invited 
to the competition.
89
 As a result, Wang Da-hong was the winner of the competition. 
 
Wang is a famous architect who gained a great reputation for his creative 
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  Duncan and Wallach, ‘The Universal Survey Museum,’ 58-9 
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 Shyu Ming-song (徐明松), ‘華人庭園與合院的現代性詮釋 (Wang Da-hong: A Modernist 
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Fig. 5-10. Wang Da-hong’s design of the 
National Palace Museum.  
Fig. 5-11. Wang Da-hong’s design of the 
National Palace Museum, the Ground 
Floor Plan.  
210 
 
designs in transforming Chinese traditional architectural form into a modernist 
language. A graduate of Cambridge and Harvard University, Wang was heavily 
influenced by a modernist architectural education.
90
 The new design wave of 
Chinese classical style spreading from the mainland to post-war Taiwan architectural 
circles did not wholly convince him. He also disapproved of Taiwanese architects 
who directly copied the model of Western modernist architecture in their work.
91
 He 
was looking for an alternative direction of architectural expression based on pure 
modernist architectural principles without losing a traditional Chinese character. The 
design of the Museum was one of Wang’s early attempts. 
 
In this design, the main body of the Museum is a modernist rectangular box 
topped with three reverse umbrella-shaped roofs. The curve indicates the outline of 
Chinese traditional building roofs, but was made in a pure modernist form and with 
new concrete technology. The window grid in the ground floor also referred to 
Chinese classical window patterns. This design showed that Wang attempted to 
combine the creative structure system and simple modernist form with Chinese 
classical architectural motifs to express a new image of modern Chinese architecture. 
It also fully represented early experiments of Taiwanese architects, who insisted on 
adopting the modernist architectural approach to express Chinese cultural tradition in 
their designs in the 1960s.  
 
Although Wang won the competition, his design did not actually carry out. 
When Wang Shi-jie (王世杰) (1891-1981), the chairman of the museum committee, 
presented Wang’s entry to Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang was very dissatisfied with the 
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result. He thought that the design did not fulfil his vision of the Museum which 
planned to display the most important national treasures of China. So Chiang asked 
Wang to alter his design and added more explicit Chinese elements to the building. 
But Wang rejected to do that.
92
 As a result, the museum committee finally decided 
to transfer the project to Huang Bao-yu (黃寶瑜) (1918-2000), a famous Chinese 
architectural historian and an active architect in post-war Taiwan. In an interview, 
Huang also revealed some of the reasons that Chiang disapproved of Wang 
Da-hong’s design:  
 
A general consensus on the construction of a national museum for preserving 





 That is to say, what Chiang and the committee expected was not an abstract, 
implicit, or modernist style of building, but rather an explicit, straightforward and 
revivalist style of museum. In the final project, Huang presented a grand museum 
cladded with palace-like roofs and Chinese classical building decorations. His design 
directly conformed to the museum committee’s imagination of an impressive museum 
for housing the most important national treasures of the nation.  
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93








From Wang Da-hong’s unfulfilled project to Huang Bao-yu’s design, the 
building of the National Palace Museum highlights that in the 1960s the modernist 
approach to architectural form was not widely adopted in most official buildings, 
especially with the highly politicised buildings. The result of the competition also 
conveyed the clear message that museums to some extent were cultural and political 
icons helping to express the nation’s cultural authority and political legitimacy. As 
Tamara Hamlish has argued, what the state preserves in the museum is not the 
collections themselves but their symbolic significance as a sign of political authority 
and legitimacy.
94
 The design of Taipei’s National Palace Museum shows the 
intention for museums to be some of the most significant cultural and political 
representations expressing the might of nationhood, by creating an image of a 
splendid national cultural shrine. 
 
Huang Bao-yu and Wang Da-hong had very different educational backgrounds. 
Huang graduated from the National Central University, a stronghold of Chinese 
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Beaux-Art training colleges. Following his famous teacher Liu Dun-zhen (劉敦楨) 
(1897-1968), Huang joined the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture and 
obtained his masters degree from the University of Pennsylvania. When the 
Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, he was one of the members of the 
Society who decided to go with the government.
95 
Due to his relationship with the 
Society and his knowledge of Chinese architectural history, he was the author of 
Taiwan’s first textbook on Chinese architectural history.
96
 It is no surprise that his 
design of the Museum would reproduce the Chinese classical style that once 
prevailed in Nanjing during the 1930s. In the design, there are three important 
points that should be considered. 
 
 (1) The axis, monumentality and impregnability: Taipei’s National Palace 
Museum is located in a scenic area of Waishuagxi (外雙溪), a suburb of Taipei near to 
the Yangming Mountain (陽明山) and Shilin (士林). Many foreign embassies are 
located in that area. The Mountain and the nearby Tianmu (天母) are also the popular 
residential districts for foreigners, where large numbers of them would spend a great 
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Fig. 5-13. Taipei’s National Palace Museum. Fig. 5-14. The Museum’s storage 
space inside the mountain.  
 
 
  Therefore, one of the main reasons that the Museum was chosen to be built here 
was that it was an easily accessible location for foreigners.
97
 In addition, many other 
Chinese political and cultural elites lived near Waishuangxi. Chiang Kai-shek also 
had a residence close to Shilin. When the Museum was reopened, Chiang visited the 
Museum more often than before.
98
 The advantage of the location marked the site as 
the best place for the Museum to promote the Nationalist government’s political and 
cultural ideology to foreign and domestic tourists. 
 
Huang Boa-yu’s design placed a long, horizontal axis to welcome visitors from 
the gateway arch through the Museum main building to the mountain behind the 
Museum. Like most Chinese imperial palaces, the axis started from the gateway arch 
highlighting the monumentality of the Museum. The axis was an elaborate design of 
the iconography programme used to impress visitors with a sense of imperial China. 
The gateway arch also symbolised the beginning of the journey taking visitors 
                                                 
97
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  Suo Yu-ming 索予明, ‘總統 蔣公與故宮博物 (The President Chiang and the National Palace 




through a time tunnel from the present day to the ancient past.
99
 Here, they prepared 
themselves to leave the secular world behind, to face the sacred shrine in front of 
them. Following the axis, architects placed a long and vast square, magnificent 
outdoor staircase. The grand museum main hall and its storage tunnel lay hidden in 
the mountain as a sequence of spatial experiences. The climax of the axis was the 
Museum’s top floor, a mingtang space (明堂), also known as the prototype of 
Chinese imperial building in the ancient era. This space dominated the axis visually 
from the beginning to the main entrance of the Museum, indicating that the Museum 
had a strong spatial link to its imperial past.   
 
The end of the axis was a mountain, an ideal place to preserve national treasures. 
The architects dug a huge tunnel inside the mountain as storage space for the 
collections. The tunnel was well-built for its purpose, meeting the highest standards 
of safety, preserving the treasures from theft, looting, or destruction by natural 
disasters and war. The tunnel could even be used as a fortress to protect the president 
and important politicians during wartime.
100
 Hidden in the mountain, this tunnel 
created an image of impregnability to express the determination that the government 
would do whatever it took to protect the treasure from the outside world.  
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 The gateway arch was built in 1967. see The Committee of the National Palace Museum, 故宮跨世
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100
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Fig. 5-15. The Illustration of the Chushih 
(衢室) in Yao’s Era.  
Fig. 5-16. The Illustration of the 
Shihshih (世室).  
 
 
(2) The traditional mingtang space: in Huang’s design, the arrangement of the 
exhibition halls was composed of four square rooms surrounding a tall central lobby 
in the middle. This sort of design referred to the traditional mingtang space. 
According to Lu Yu-chun’s research, the mingtang space was the place that 
represented the ideal model of the highest level of political space in ancient China. 
The space was also viewed as the origin of China’s imperial buildings. The 
mingtang space might have different names, such as chushih or shihshih, but all had 
similar structures in common. Originally, it was an open, empty square hall, built on 
a raised ground floor surrounded by four other rooms in four directions without 
intervention by walls or windows. Like the Greek Agora or Roman Forum, the 





                                                 
101
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Fig. 5-17. The Site Plan of the National Palace 
Museum.  
Fig. 5-18. The Ground Floor of the National 




Fig. 5-19. The Perspective of the National 
Palace Museum.  




Huang’s design attempted to reconstruct a mingtang space in the Museum. In the 
layout, a tall central lobby was surrounded by four square exhibition rooms in four 
directions. This layout clearly referred to the original idea of the mingtang space. On 
the top floor above the lobby to welcome every visitor, Huang also rebuilt a 
mingtang shaped hall surrounded by a winding corridor. This hall was called the 
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Sanxi Hall (三希堂), named after Emperor Qianlong’s favorite study room in 
Beijing’s Forbidden City.
102
 The Hall was the apogee of the axis that led every 
tourist to the Museum from the outside. Inside, no matter which routes or exhibition 
rooms that tourists chose to visit first, they would all finally be guided to the same 
hall, the Sanxi Hall on the top floor. Therefore, the Sanxi Hall was the centre of the 
iconographic programme which dominated visitors’ visual and spatial experiences 
from the outside and the inside. Not only did the name of the Hall imply that the 
collections in the Museum recalled a memory of the golden age of Qianlong’s Pax 
Sinica, but also the shape of the Hall indicated that the Museum’s architectural style 




In the exhibition spaces of the Museum, all the collections were grouped by 
their types; bronze ornaments, paintings, calligraphy and porcelains, all displayed in 
separate rooms. The objects of each group were arranged in chronological order 
from the ancient era to the Qing dynasty. This order implied an evolutionary view of 
history displaying the national past in a modern form of classification. Emphasised 
by spotlights from above, the objects were placed individually in glass showcases 
with plenty of space. The old Emperors' collections now were treated as an ‘art’ 
preserved by cutting edge technology in a modern museum. Ju Jane C. calls this new 
way of exhibition and conservation the formation of ‘canons of Chinese art’.
104
 In 
other words, the process of recontextualisation now gives the collections a new life. 
They no longer are the property of the royal family, but state-owned art work 
                                                 
102
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(3) Political symbols: apart from the axis, architectural style, layouts and ways 
of exhibiting, there are many other political symbols attached to the Museum. First 
of all, Sun Yat-san’s favorite maxim and original calligraphy ‘All under Heaven 
belongs to the People’ was inscribed on the gateway arch. This phrase came from 
one of the Chinese five classics of the Confucian canon, the Words of the Great 
Unity (大同), in the Book of Rites (禮記). Sun quotes this phrase in his book The 
Three Principles of the People,asserting that this phrase fully represents the ideal 
model of Confucian political thought that should be introduced to modern society in 
order to reconstruct China’s contemporary political order.
105
 In addition, the full 
text of the Words of the Great Unity was inscribed on the wall next to the side 
entrance, and these inscriptions were to keep reminding visitors of Sun’s political 
legacy and its relationship to the Museum. 
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 Wang Sheng, The Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise), p. 29-30. 
  
Fig. 5-21. Chiang Kai-shek visiting 
the Museum.  
Fig. 5-22. The sculpture of Sun Yat-sen in the 




Statues and portraits of Chinese political figures are also displayed in the 
Museum. The most famous statue among them is Sun Yat-sen’s statue standing in 
the middle of the central lobby. The statue was a copy of French sculptor Paul 
Landowski’s original work, ordered by the Nationalist government for Nanjing’s 
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum.
106
 Chiang Kai-shek’s portraits also hung in the central 
lobby next to the statue and near the front gate.
107
 These statues and portraits made 
certain that the Museum reflected an element of political atmosphere. Thus it is no 
wonder that Tu Cheng-sheng, the former curator of the Museum, asserts that 
Taipei’s National Palace Museum is the museum that has perhaps the largest number 




In fact, the political influences upon the Museum were more than what could 
be seen from the outside. As mentioned earlier, Chiang Kai-shek held the authority 
to overturn the final result of the Museum’s architectural competition, and he also 
expressed his opinions to architect Huang Boa-yu’s about the design of the Museum 
several times. According to Huang, Chiang was very satisfied with the design, 
which coincided with his vision of modern Chinese architecture. After that, Chiang 
invited him to design more buildings for the government and the party, and to be 
consultant in engineering problems in other projects, such as the Chung-shan 
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Building for the National Assembly.
109
 Chiang visited the Museum frequently after 
it was opened to the public. He gave opinions to the curator on improving the 
service, including the condition of exhibition rooms, English guides, the reception 
of foreign guests and uniforms.
110
 In addition, Chiang appointed his people to work 
for the Museum.
111
 From this it is clear that the construction of the Museum was 
very important to Chiang.  
 
To conclude, Taipei’s National Palace Museum is one of the greatest museums 
preserving the most important treasures of Chinese art, rare books and royal 
documents. In the early years, China’s national museums were simply considered to 
be one of many representations of the national past. Not until Beijing’s National 
Palace Museum opened to the public, did the Museum begin to take on a more 
essential symbolic role in defining national identity. After a long retreat to Taiwan 
during the wars, Chiang Kai-shek and the government recognised that the Museum 
and its collections were a very useful tool for political propaganda. Reconstructing a 
grand museum with a splendid Chinese classical architectural style in Taipei was 
one of the most important political missions in the post-war period to demonstrate 
that only Free China had the ability to rebuild and revive Chinese traditional culture. 
Therefore, Taipei’s National Palace Museum is not a neutral space preserving 
national treasures as objective truths of the past, but a cultural shrine creating a 
vision of the past based on certain political needs.  
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In 2000, Tu Cheng-sheng was appointed as the third curator of Taipei’s 
National Palace Museum. Due to his pro-independent political stance, he attempted 
to institute big changes in the museum. He argued that the imperial collections in 
the Museum could not totally represent Chinese national culture. They only 
reflected the aesthetic tastes of China’s nobles and gentry-literati. In addition, the 
Museum leaves no room for folk art or local cultures, with even the concept of 
‘China’ and ‘Chinese culture’ being problematic. It was developed by the KMT and 
had been tied firmly to the image-construction of the Museum.
112
 Therefore, Tu 
attempted to introduce the idea of an ‘Asia Museum’ and ‘Indigenisation’ to the 
Museum, in order to eliminate the influence of the KMT’s nationalist ideology.
113
 
Although Tu’s new policy provoked a series of political debates between 
pro-independent and pro-united camps, he still could not loosen the ideological tie  
knotted by certain political figures who were involved in the construction of the 
Museum and who directed its initial purpose.  
 
Perhaps Benedict Anderson’s suggestion of returning all the imperial 
collections to Beijing is not practical in the near future. But it seems reasonable to 
conclude that in the coming years, different political leaders may try to exert their 
influence upon the Museum in various ways. If this is the case then it is necessary to 
put the museum into a broader historical and theatrical context to gain a better 
insight into identifying the power and knowledge relationship that works in the 
background, dominating the way in which we view the museum and its collections.  
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In 1994 a brawl broke out in Taiwan’s National Assembly (國民大會) when a 
ruling party assemblywoman, Guo Su-chun (郭素春), addressed the main hall of the 
Chungshan Building and was slapped by Su Jhih-yang (蘇治洋), a female colleague 
in the opposition party. This unexpected attack quickly provoked a parliamentary 
riot in the debating room and more representatives were later involved in the riot. 
Although it was not the first legislative violence to occur in Taiwan, the attack still 
shocked the island. The television footage was replayed throughout the day on TV 
news, and the incident also attracted international media, reporting the news as a 




In the post-martial law era, under the leadership of former president Lee 
Teng-hui (李登輝) (1923- ), Taiwan has gradually advanced toward a democracy 
based on bicameralism. However, the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship still 
obstructs the process of full democratization on the island. These brawls that arose 
both in the Legislative Yuan (立法院) and in the National Assembly are a snapshot 
of Taiwan’s political transformation. As a grand parliament building commissioned 
by Chiang Kai-shek, the Chungshan Building, where the National Assembly was 
held, is a constant reminder that reflects both the significant achievements and 
negative facts of political reforms in Taiwan.  
 
From the perspective of China’s parliament building history, the Chungshan 
Building is a unique case. In mainland China, the first group of parliament 
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buildings was erected in the late Qing era. Unlike the Chungshan Building, many 
of them were designed by foreign architects, adopting Western architectural styles 
and semi-circular chambers to host political meetings. During that time, the Qing 
court attempted to make use of these buildings to show its commitment to China’s 
political reforms. In the early Republic period, these buildings also served as 
important sites for policy-making and cabinet meetings. However, the political 
chaos created by President Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凱) and his followers barely allowed 
the parliamentary system in China to function. Not until the Nanjing decade were 
the political assemblies once again restored by the Nationalist government. A 
brand-new parliament building was constructed in the Nanjing city centre in 1936. 
It was also used for cinema and theatre performances, serving as multi-functional 
architecture. In the proposal for the capital plan of Nanjing, a grand assembly hall 
cladded with a Chinese classical style was also planned for the building complex of 
the central government district. However, the whole project was halted due to the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was not until the Nationalist 
government had retreated to Taiwan did Chiang Kai-shek and his regime have the 
opportunity to create a splendid parliament building based on his political vision.  
 
Built in 1966, the Chungshan Building symbolised an attempt by the new 
government to carry out Sun Yat-sen’s political thought on the island. Sun’s 
philosophy was seen as an ideal political blueprint for China. He attempted to 
apply Western political philosophers, modern state bureaucracy and parliamentary 
systems to China without losing its Confucian tradition. In order to show that he 
was Sun’s faithful follower, Chiang paid great attention to the construction of the 
parliament building named after Sun. He intended to erect iconic architecture to 
reflect Sun’s political doctrine. As a result, the Chungshan Building was built to 
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illustrate a strong connection between the Republic’s parliamentary democracy in 
the present with the nation’s past political legitimacy.  
 
The main focus of this chapter is the development of parliament buildings in 
Taiwan. The brief history of China’s assembly halls will also be explored. The 
study period of this chapter starts from China’s the establishment of early National 
and Provincial Assemblies in the late Qing to Taiwan’s Chungshan Building in 
1966. Although China and Taiwan are not countries that created democracy or 
parliament building types, their unique political developments have generated a 
special form of democratic architecture different from its Western origin. Therefore, 
in order to gain a better understanding of the creation of democratic spaces in 
Taiwan, it is necessary to put the Chungshan Building in a broader historical and 
political context.  
 
 
6-1 Early Parliament Buildings in China 
 
Western traditions of democracy, based on the classical ideal of political 
practice, stem from the ancient Greeks and later the Roman Republic. Classical 
democracy not only influenced the formation of later constitutions, but also created 
an architectural legacy which inspired many designers who constructed parliament 
buildings down to the present day. Traditionally, in Ancient Greece every citizen 
was encouraged to directly participate in pubic affairs and debates in a specific 
place designed for political assembly.
2
 The Pynx in Athens was one of the first 
places where political meetings and debates took place. All Athenian citizens had 
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equal opportunity to speak in the assembly on a large flat platform stage 
surrounded by a semi-circular hillside.
3
 Like the Greeks, the Romans also held 
regular assemblies based on citizenry and representation. Senators discussed 
political affairs in the Curia, located on the west side of the Forum. In the 
rectangular shaped chamber, the senators sat in straight and parallel lines on either 
side of the building, ensuring a clear sight of presenters.
4
 Political institutions 
established by the Athenian city-state and later adopted and modified by the 
Roman Republic undoubtedly had a great impact on many European countries. 
These legacies acted as physical reminders and are still reflected in many 
government and parliament buildings, indicating their strong connection to the 




In Medieval Europe, administration and legislative assembly primarily took 
place in the palaces of emperors or kings. In North and Central Italy, however, 
some towns had achieved a measure of independence and built their own 
government buildings and town halls. As a consequence, this new type of 
architecture began to flourish and develop. The oldest of these government 
buildings, called the Palazzo del Broletto, was built in 1215 in Como. The ground 
floor was an open space with arcades serving as an extension of the market held in 
front of the building. The upper floor was the town hall and law court. This design 
quickly became a standard model adopted by many other towns in Italy and some 
other European countries.
6
 Town halls, market halls, law courts and government 
offices were now all placed on the same site as a multi-functional building.
7
 In 
seventeenth century Netherlands, Amsterdam town hall was the grandest of all 
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7
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town halls. A splendid council hall was placed in the middle of a symmetrical plan 
separated by two courtyards and flanked by different rooms and offices.
8
 This 
unique design clearly foresaw the arrival of parliament buildings in the eighteenth 
century.  
 
The Irish Parliament House is among the first specifically designed 
parliament buildings. It was designed for a bicameral congress with a circular 
shape for the House of Commons and a rectangular chamber for the House of 
Lords.
9
 A shallow dome of a Pantheon was added to the top of the House of 
Commons to underline its importance. Classical architectural language was 
adopted on the façade. Two short wings and ornate interior designs conveyed a 
clear message that this new parliament was greatly influenced by ancient Greek 




This influence can also be seen in the design of the US Capitol building. The 
semi-circular shape of a chamber was regarded as an ideal model for political 
congress in the Capitol. Two chambers were separated by a splendid Pantheon 
dome with sumptuous sculptural decorations at the centre of the block.
11
 This 
neoclassical design explored and ultimately echoed Greek and Roman architectural 
and democratic heritage.  
 
Like the US Capitol, the Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom also 
experienced different stages of designs by different architects. Gothic Revival was 
viewed as the best style that could match the preceding architectural details, and 
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represent the aspiration of the British nation.
12
 Both the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords had an oblong chamber. This shape was seen as the most 
suitable form for debates and legislative meetings.
13
 The success of this parliament 
design made it the ‘Mother of Parliaments,’ going on to be adopted elsewhere in 




As shown above, in these parliament designs there are three characters to 
which special attention should be paid. First of all, the assembly hall was the core 
of the parliament. It was designed to provide a forum or a stage set for political 
debates. Secondly, the shape of assembly hall can be divided into three different 
types: the oblong, semi-circular and classroom-like chambers. The oblong chamber 
was mostly adopted by the UK and the Commonwealth nations. The semi-circular 
chamber was popular in European countries and in newly formed democracies. 
Russia and other Eastern European states preferred the classroom-like arrangement 
of chambers where the cabinet was seated behind the podium facing the 
representatives.
15
 Finally, the notion that classical architectural elements 
symbolised the ideal model of democracy had continually influenced early 
parliament designs. Many architects attempted to search for historical legitimacy 
for younger states by constructing their own democratic spaces through traditional 
building forms and style. As Deyan Sudjic argues, culture and architecture have 
been used at the service of political and national ambition in parliament buildings, 
becoming monuments of those nations, reflecting the way these countries see 
themselves and their aspiration of democracy.
16
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Before the Chinese parliament had been built, like most European 
monarchies, Chinese emperors conducted the work of government and meetings 
with courtiers in the royal palace. In the Forbidden City, three front halls, perhaps 
the most splendid building complex in the Outer Court, were used for political and 
ritual purposes. In the Qing dynasty, the Hall of Supreme Harmony (太和殿), the 
largest hall of the City, served as a ceremonial centre of imperial power. Set in the 
middle of the Hall, the emperor presided over royal ceremonies and received 
homage from high-ranking offices and foreign ambassadors.
17
 Located in the 
middle of the Three Front Halls, the Hall of Middle Harmony (中和殿) was used by 
the emperor to prepare announcements to be read in the ceremonies.
18
 The Hall of 
Preserving Harmony (保和殿), the last hall of the Three Front Halls, was where 





In the Inner Court, the Hall of Mental Cultivation (養心殿) originally served 
as a place for the emperor to rest, but was later used as a reading room and a 
residential office. In the late Qing dynasty, the Hall became the most important 
building in the Forbidden City. The emperor spent most of his time here to discuss 
affairs of the empire with the highest officials and closest advisers.
20
 The imperial 
decrees and documentary records were also kept in the Hall for study and 
consultation in the context of policy-making.
21
 In addition, the Emperor 
Qianlong’s favourite study room, the Sanxi Hall (三希堂), was located at the West 
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corner of the Hall.
22
 The Office of Military Intelligence (軍機處), the imperial ‘war 
cabinet’, sat just next to the Hall. A private alley hidden behind the office screen 
connected the Hall with emperor’s residential area.
23
 These features demonstrate 
that the Hall of Mental Cultivation was the hub of imperial power directing the 
work of the empire in the Forbidden City.  
 
However, this symbiosis of power and architecture for the royal family 
obviously could not adapt to the rapid changes of the new international political 
order emerging in the nineteenth century. As discussed earlier, after the Opium 
Wars, many late Qing intellectuals recognised that the traditional perspective of the 
tian-xia system in Imperial China faced an enormous challenge by Western powers. 
It was necessary to establish a new political order in China to save the nation from 
being destroyed by foreign invaders. For example, Wang Tao (王韜) (1842-1922) 
believed that in the modern world, the tian-xia system was no longer a suitable 
ideology to sustain the power of the empire. China had to face a new stage of 
history and share the rest of the world with other countries. A fundamental change 
of its political system was necessary to bring new life to the old nation.
24
 Zheng 
Guan-ying (鄭觀應) (1828-97) also pointed out that if China wanted to avert further 
catastrophes caused by Western powers, an essential change of its traditional form 
of government and political system should be taken into consideration.
25
 Tang 
Zhen (湯震) (1856-1917), a conservative reformer in the Qing court, suggested that 
China should establish a parliament and adopt the Western democratic model, 
forming an open communication between the gentry and the throne.
26
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Adopting the parliamentary system in the Chinese empire was still a radical 
political idea for imperial authority at that time. Therefore, in order to ingratiate 
himself with the conservative officials in the Qing court, Kang You-wei attempted 
to reinterpret the Confucian classics to gain legitimacy from history for his new 
plan of political reforms. With help from Weng Tong-he (翁同龢) (1830-1904), the 
emperor’s closest adviser, the Guangxu read Kang’s reform memorial and 
recognised that his reforms, based on the Western parliamentary model, could 
actually strengthen the throne.
27
 As a consequence, the Hundred Days of Reform 
was launched in 1898 to carry out a series of economic, military and political 
reforms in China. One of the most far reaching changes was to initiate a 
constitutional monarchy and to establish a National Assembly to replace the old 
imperial cabinet.  
 
However, the more conservative officials in the Qing court viewed the 
Reform as a threat to their power and position. They strongly opposed the Reform 
and came to see the Empress Dowager Cixi with a request that she should take 
back the reins of power before it was too late. Cixi changed her attitude and 
immediately launched a coup d’etat to end the Reform.
28
 This short-lived reform 
proved that Cixi and her followers were the true power holders of the empire in the 
late Qing period. It was also these dignitaries that brought the dynasty to its final 
end.  
 
Two years after the coup d’etat, due to the catastrophic result of the Boxer 
Rebellion, Cixi finally recognised that it would be difficult for her to regain foreign 
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esteem and domestic respect unless she showed some sincere intention for real 
political reform.
29
 Therefore, under the endorsement of Cixi, the New System 
Reform (晚清新政) was launched in the last decade of the dynasty. The series of 
institutional and political changes that Cixi attempted to implement to the 
government went even further than Kang You-wei and Emperor Guangxu’s 
proposals.
30
 For Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries, these changes were too 
little and too late. Although the Qing court had held an election for Provincial 
Assemblies (諮議局) in 21 provinces in 1909 and convened the first National 
Assembly ( 資 政 院 ) in Beijing in 1910, most assemblymen and fervent 
constitutionalists were still deeply dissatisfied with the outcome of the Qing court’s 
political reform.
31
 The frustration among intellectuals and the population at an 
incompetent government finally gave the revolutionaries a chance to overturn the 
dynasty in 1911.  
 
The Qing court had left the new Republic with the political and architectural 
legacy of twenty-one provincial assemblies across the empire and an unfinished 
parliament building in Beijing. According to the original plan of the political 
scheme, the Qing court would adopt the model of constitutional monarchy as a new 
foundation for its political reforms. A new constitution was promised to change the 
political and bureaucratic system of the empire. In addition, a National Assembly 
with bicameralism at the apex of the system would plan to convene in Beijing in 
1917.
32
 Therefore, it was necessary to construct a new parliament building outside 
the Forbidden City to accommodate the House of Councillors and the House of 
Representatives.  
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The members of the House of Councillors were selected by the emperor. 
These included members of the royal family, Manchu noblemen and Han senior 
Confucius gentries, a specific term to denote the scholarly class most associated 
with the philosophical tenets of Confucius. The members of the House of 
Representatives were elected from the provincial assemblymen who were picked 
by local elections held by the twenty-one Provincial Assemblies.
33
 However, it 
should be noted that although this new parliamentary system was thought to 
provide a direct channel to the central government with connections to the 
populace, from the dynasty’s point of view, these assemblies were ultimately 






Fig. 6-1 The Perspective of the 
National Assembly.  
Fig. 6-2 The Plan of the National Assembly.  
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Fig. 6-3 The Section of the National Assembly.  Fig. 6-4 The Unfinished Site of the 
National Assembly Building.  
 
 
In 1907, the Qing court began to search for an ideal site for the construction 
of the parliament building in Beijing. As a result, the abandoned Beijing 
examination hall of the Royal Academy (北京貢院) was chosen to be the site for 
this future national democratic space. In 1905, due to the Qing’s New System 
Reform, the traditional imperial examination system for the state’s bureaucracy had 
been abolished. Examination halls across the empire had now suddenly become 
redundant architecture. Re-using these places for new political purposes conveyed 
a significant symbolic meaning: a transformation from former imperial 
examination sites to democratic election spaces with the same aim at selecting 




 German architect Curt Rothkegel (1876-1946) was commissioned to draw 
up a new plan for the first parliament building of the empire. Similar to the US 
Capitol, Rothkegel proposed an ambitious project with a grand dominant cupola 
located in the centre of the building to separate the House of Councillors and the 
House of Representatives. Offices, meeting rooms, archives and many other 
subsidiary spaces were arranged around these two chambers. Both chambers 
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adopted the semi-circular shape and were designed to contain 1550 seats in each, 
1200 seats for assemblymen on the ground floor and 350 seats for auditors on the 
upper floor. Moreover, the building was designed in the style of German 
Renaissance structures, sharing some similarities to the Reichstag in Berlin, 




The project began in 1910. Because the parliament was still under 
construction, the first interim national assembly was held in Beijing’s Law 
College.
37
 Later, the whole building project was forced to be suspended due to the 
outbreak of the Republic Revolution in 1911. After the new Republic took control 
of China, the new government had no intention of continuing this extravagant 
building project. As a result, three years later a new reasonably sized parliament 






Fig. 6-5 The Jilin Provincial Assembly. Fig. 6-6 The Guangdong Provincial 
Assembly.  
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Fig. 6-7 The Chamber of the Fujian 
Provincial Assembly.  
Fig. 6-8 The Chamber of the 
Guangdong Provincial Assembly.  
 
 
According to the Qing’s planned parliamentary system, apart from the 
national assemblymen, twenty-two provinces also needed to elect their own local 
delegates to administer regional affairs and have a voice in the chamber of the 
House of Representatives. The establishment of the Provincial Assemblies was also 
announced by the Qing court when the project of National Assembly was still 
underway. In 1909, apart from Xinjiang province, twenty-one provinces had begun 





The Qing court advised leaders of each province that either re-using existing 
architecture or constructing new ones for the Provincial Assembly were all 
acceptable, but if the local government decided to build a new one, the Western 
parliament building type was the best model to follow.
40
 The Qing court also 
suggested that the semi-circular shaped chamber was the best choice to ensure that 
all assemblymen could be seen and their speeches could be heard in assembly halls 
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 As a result, like the Beijing National Assembly, many provincial 
assembly buildings adopted Western architectural styles to conduct local political 
meetings. In addition, most assembly halls also chose to build on the sites of 






Fig. 6-9 The Hubei Provincial Assembly.  Fig. 6-10 The Plan of the Hubei 
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Fig. 6-11 The Section of the Hubei 
Provincial Assembly.   
Fig. 6-12 The Chamber of the 
Hubei Provincial Assembly.  
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The Hubei Provincial Assembly (湖北諮議會局) is one of the best-preserved 
provincial assemblies in China at present. Designed by the Japanese architect 
Fukui Fusaichi (福井房一) (1869-1937), the whole building was composed of red 
brick and wooden frame cladding with succinct Western classical architectural 
decorations. Like most British colonial architecture in China and in South Asia, 
two superimposed colonnaded verandas were erected around much of the façade. A 
pedimented portico and a tall bell tower were used to emphasise the main entrance. 
Assemblymen’s offices were arranged on both sides of the tower. Behind this, an 
oblong-shaped chamber was placed in the middle, surrounded by other small 
meeting rooms and offices. Unlike other Provincial Assemblies’ chambers in China, 
this chamber was closer to a theatre or classroom than a debating room, and the 








Fig. 6-13 The Façade of the Jiangsu Provincial 
Assembly. 
Fig. 6-14 The Plan of the Jiangsu 
Provincial Assembly.  
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The Jiangsu Provincial Assembly (江蘇省諮議局 ) is another provincial 
assembly which has been well-protected by the local government. This building 
was designed by the famous Chinese architect Sun Zhi-xia (孫支廈) (1882-1975), 
who was viewed one of the first generation of modern Chinese architects. In 1909, 
in order to learn the skills of building an outstanding assembly hall, Sun went to 
Japan for further investigation of the Japanese parliament building.
44
 After the trip, 
Sun decided to build a French Renaissance style of assembly to stress the 
importance of the new democratic space in Jiangsu. The semi-circular shape of 
chamber also illustrated an attempt to reflect the Western tradition of the 
parliamentary debating room. In the layout, Sun placed the chamber in the centre 
of the building surrounded by courtyards with four-directional corridors linked to 
offices and meeting rooms in four wings. Like many other governmental building 
designs, Sun also chose a symmetrical plan to show monumentality with a tall bell 
tower at the front. As a result, this Assembly became one of the most important 
parliament buildings of the early Chinese fledgling democracy.  
  
In short, in the early twentieth century, election systems and parliamentary 
democracy were brand-new ideas introduced to China by the Qing court to 
prolong its dynasty. Although in the concession territories within China, foreign 
powers had built their own consulate buildings and town halls with basic 
governmental and parliamentary functions, the Qing’s National and Provincial 
Assemblies were still the earliest of their kind.  
 
Having briefly reviewed the development of Western parliament architecture 
and the establishment of China’s early parliamentary system, the three following 
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points must be noted. First of all, no matter if they were the National or Provincial 
Assemblies in China, most were designed in a Western classical architectural style. 
Unlike parliament building types in Western democratic countries, the style was 
not used to declare their intention to seek historical legitimacy from Greek and 
Roman traditions. Rather, it was utilised to show aspiration for westernisation and 
modernised political reform. For the Qing court, Chinese classical architectural 
styles could not totally fulfill this political need.  
 
In addition, in the history of Chinese architecture, China did not develop a 
form of assembly hall or parliament building as most European countries did. In 
the late Qing period, most imperial cabinet meetings were conducted in the 
emperor's residential office, but not in the open-mode of an assembly hall. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that adopting the Western design of chambers 
was a rational choice for the fledgling democracy to begin its path towards 
modern political reform, but it should be noted that the British oblong chamber 
did not appear to be a very popular choice for the empire, and the semi-circular 
chamber was the commonest model used in early Chinese parliament design.  
 
Finally, these Qing parliament buildings continued to be used as the political 
debating halls or government offices in the Republican era. The New System 
Reform in the late Qing period was a short-lived social and political reform. 
Although the Qing court had held elections for the provincial assemblies in most 
provinces in 1909, and convened a national assembly in Beijing in 1910, most 
assemblymen and fervent constitutionalists were still deeply dissatisfied with the 
slow processes of the Reform. What disappointed them the most was the fact that 





 Therefore, in 1911, when a strong mood of nationalism had grown in 
China, the revolutionaries seized the opportunity to completely overthrow the 
dynasty and establish a new Republic. But these parliament buildings constructed 
by the Qing court still represented a powerful symbol and played an important 
role in the next stage of China’s modern political history.  
 
 
6-2 New Developments, New Style 
 
Although the National and Provincial Assemblies were mostly constructed 
by the Qing court in the late period, they swiftly moved to an important position 
for the future of the constitutional government. Many local political elites who 
advocated the parliamentary system took advantage of the buildings, cementing 
their own positions from a very visible platform. 
 
In 1911, in response to growing discontent with the New System Reform 
among the population and local elites, the Qing court authorised the National 
Assembly to draft a new constitution and elected Yuan Shi-kai as China’s first 
premier. A form of democratic legitimacy was later conferred on Yuan’s rule.
46
 
However, this earliest cabinet in modern Chinese history did not last very long. 
The outbreak of the anti-Manchu revolution occurred in Wuchang (武昌), the most 
important industrial and commercial town in Hubei province, triggering a chain 
reaction, spreading all over China. At that moment, many Hubei assemblymen 
supported the local military government under the leadership of Li Yuan-hong (黎
元洪) (1864-1928). The Hubei Provincial Assembly Hall was temporarily used to 
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house the military government and became a new centre of political gravity in 
China.
47
 With inspiration from Hubei’s success, the revolution eventually led the 
nation to overthrow the Qing throne. The Emperor eventually agreed to relinquish 
his power to the new Republic. 
 
At the outset, most provinces in the south joined the newly established 
Republic. The revolutionaries and their allies came to Nanjing and convened the 
provisional House of Councillors to elect a new leader who was able to harness the 
new political order at that time. Located in Nanjing city centre, the Jiangsu 
Provincial Assembly Hall was certainly the best place to hold the meetings and the 
election. As a result, in 1912, Sun Yat-sen was elected as China’s provisional 
president, heading the government in Nanjing until the following March.
48
 The 
Nanjing and Jiangsu Provincial Assembly Halls became the heart of China’s 
politics in the early Republican era.  
 
In order to reunite the nation under the same flag, Sun kept his promise of 
ratifying Yuan Shi-kai’s election to the presidency in Beijing. When Yuan made his 
ascent to the top of the regime, a new parliamentary system based on the latest 
draft of a provisional constitution was established. According to this new 
constitution, there were to be two chambers in the parliament. The House of 
Councillors would comprise 274 seats chosen by the provincial assemblies with ten 
members from each province. The House of Representatives would have 594 
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Fig. 6-15 The Layout of the House of Representatives and 





Fig. 6-16 The Ground Floor of 
the         House of the 
Representatives. 
Fig. 6-17 The Current Look of the House 
of the Representatives.  
 
 
This new government, also called Beiyang government, had no intention of 
continuing the construction of the National Assembly Hall that the Qing court had 
planned. The main reason was that the increasing financial difficulties made it 
impossible to afford this highly ambitious building project.
50
 Therefore, the House 
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of Councillors temporarily made use of the Beijing Law College as offices and 
meeting places. The House of Representatives then occupied the Beijing Financial 
College to serve local delegates. Later, a temporary parliament building and the 
presidential office were planned on the open ground at the west side of the 
Financial College.  
 
The German architect Curt Rothkegel, the designer of the Qing’s National 
Assembly Hall, was once again commissioned to design this building. Rothkegel 
re-used the layout of the chamber that he had drawn, reducing the size to contain 
the smaller congress, and topping the design with simple timber trusses. On the 
ground floor, a total of 674 seats reserved for the assemblymen were arranged in a 
semi-circular order. Auditor rooms were placed on the first floor and divided into 
East, South and West sections with 314 seats. The president’s office was situated 
behind the podium of the chamber with pathways linked to the main building and 
other offices surrounding the building. On the façade, a bare pediment was placed 




This simple design revealed that due to a restricted building site, limited time 
and budget, the new government had no choice but to yield to this practical 
arrangement. Unlike the Qing court, the government also had no intention of 
showing its aspiration towards democracy through the construction of a splendid 
parliament building. In addition, the symbolic link between a Chinese classical 
style of architecture and political authority had not yet been created. Provincial 
assemblies still played an important role in connecting local powers to the central 
core as a direct channel to lead the policy-making of the government.  
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However, having an initial development of parliamentary democracy and a 
constitutional government built upon it did not guarantee that the whole political 
system was secure. What China had experienced in the first decade of its 
republican era was tireless strife, scandals, disruption and corruption.
52
 For 
example, the Beiyang government had convened two national assemblies in 1913 
and in 1918 in Beijing. Many political elites tried to maintain a basic form of 
parliamentary democracy in assemblies, but as it turned out neither of the two 
cabinets lasted very long.  
 
Primarily, in northern China, a wide range of land was controlled by warlords, 
a rising power based on local military forces.
53
 These warlords attempted to seize 
more power to sustain their local interests rather than to maintain the authority of 
the new Republic. In southern China, Sun Yat-sen managed to persuade 225 
members of the former parliament to meet in Guangdong and proceed to the 
presidential election. Sun was later elected as an extraordinary President in the 
Guangdong Provincial Assembly Hall and devoted himself to his project for 
national unification.
54
 Even so, Sun’s power base in the south was not stable 
enough to fight against southern warlords. It was not until Chiang Kai-shek 
gathered sufficient forces to launch the Northern Expedition from Guangdong in 
1926 that China was united as a whole. 
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Fig. 6-18 The Hall of Supreme 
Harmony.  
Fig. 6-19 The Plan for the Reconstruction of 
the Hall of Supreme Harmony for the 




In 1923, ten years after the Assembly was first convened, Wu Jing-lian (吳景濂) 
(1873-1944) the head of the House of Councillors, and his counterpart in the 
House of Representatives, Wang Jia-xiang (王家襄) (1872-1928), proposed a new 
plan for the parliament to move into the Three Front Halls of the Forbidden City. 
During that time, the abdicated Qing Emperor Puyi still lived in the Inner Court of 
the City. The main reason for formulating this plan was that Rothkegel’s design 
was thought too crude to be a decent place for national ceremonies. The royal 
palaces, especially the grand Three Front Halls in the City, were an ideal place to 
satisfy political needs. In addition, refitting these Halls for parliament also 





The Swedish architect Albin Stark (1885-1960) was commissioned to redesign 
the Three Front Halls for this new purpose. In his original plan, Stark proposed that 
a new chamber be constructed within the existing Hall of Supreme Harmony with 
two extended rooms built on both flanks as reception halls for visiting dignitaries. 
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This refitting consisted of 1200 seats placed in the middle of the Hall with a 
semi-circular seating arrangement. The other two Halls sited behind the Hall of 





It is reasonable to argue that this redesigned plan conveyed a clear message: 
the symbolic centre of defunct imperial power would be replaced by the centre of 
Republican parliamentary power. Operating on the same site, this new parliament 
would represent the nation’s ruling legitimacy inherited from the old Chinese 
empire by the new-born state. However, Wu Pei-fu (吳佩孚) (1874-1939), a 
powerful northern warlord whose power base was in Beijing, fiercely opposed this 
building project. He argued that if the Three Front Halls were refitted or worse, 
demolished, for the parliament, China would lose its most magnificent ancient 
monument forever. Due to Wu’s strong objection to this project, Stark’s plans had 
no chance of leaving the drawing board. However, this project was the first to 
attempt to transform previous political legitimacy into the new state’s parliament 
building. This attempt also repeatedly appeared in later arguments and shifted the 
direction of parliament design in China.  
 
When Nanjing was selected to be the new capital in 1928 under the leadership 
of Chiang Kai-shek, urban planning was used as an important visual tool to 
represent the glory of the Chinese nation. Erecting impressive governmental 
buildings in the city became the major focus of Nanjing’s reconstruction, although 
this form of city reconstruction had begun in Guangzhou’s city plan. In 1918, Sun 
Yat-sen had mentioned the importance of the state-oriented city and territorial 





planning in his book the International Development of China (實業計畫) (1920).
57
 
Sun Ke, the son of Sun Yat-sen, also published an article in an urban planning 
magazine to support his father’s idea.
58
 Sun Ke showed his early interest in urban 
planning when he was the mayor of Guangzhou. In 1922, he noticed Henry 
Murphy’s designs in the Christian communities and invited him to give advice on 
Guangzhou’s city plan.
59
 That was the first time that Murphy extended his 
influence outside the Christian communities.  
 
In Guangzhou’s city plan, Murphy introduced the Western radial road system 
to reconstruct Guangzhou’s city fabrication. Murphy attempted to echo the 
westernised reforms advocated by the Nationalist government throughout his 
design. He tried to keep the traditional features of the city by decorating public 
buildings with a Chinese classical style. He placed these buildings on the climax of 
new urban axis to highlight the importance of these buildings.
60
 It was the first 
time that Murphy brought his idea of an ‘adaptive Chinese architectural 
renaissance’ to urban design, although the plan faltered due to the subsequent 
military rebellion in Guangzhou.
61
 However, through the relationship with Sun Ke 
and the experience of Guangzhou urban planning, Murphy was hired as chief 
architectural adviser to the Nationalist government for the Nanjing capital plan in 
1928.
62
 It was a great opportunity for Murphy to show his ability to create a new 
vision of a Chinese modern city.   
 
It should be noted that the fact the Nationalist government chose Nanjing as a 
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new capital had multiple symbolic meanings. First of all, Nanjing had been a 
capital in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) from 1368 to 1421. The capital was then 
moved to Beijing until the Qing Dynasty came into existence. Selecting Nanjing to 
replace Beijing as capital had symbolised that it was Ming, but not Qing, who fully 
represented the Confucian orthodoxy of the Han national culture, since it was the 
Manchu empire who had occupied the mainland of Han and who had contaminated 
the pure Han culture for hundreds of years.
63
 Reconstructing Nanjing as a capital 
revealed the aspiration that the government wished to revive Han orthodoxy and 
reconnect the link between a new modern state and the nation’s glorious past. In 
addition, Sun Yat-sen, the most important political master of the KMT, was elected 
as Republic’s first president in Nanjing. Choosing Nanjing as a capital also 
indicated that the party would follow the teaching of Sun and continue his political 
legacy. The practical reason for this decision, however, was that the government 
did not have a stable power base in northern China. For the Nationalist government, 
Nanjing was a better choice than Beijing, in order to keep a capital with a strong 
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Fig. 6-20  Murphy’s Plan for the Reconstruction of Nanjing, 1929.  
 
 
In 1929, Murphy presented his plan for the reconstruction of Nanjing as a 
capital city to the Nationalist government. Inspired by Pierre Charles L’Enfant’s 
urban design for Washington DC, Murphy brought his vision of a modern Chinese 
capital to Nanjing.
65
 Following the suggestion that the committee of capital design 
had made, Murphy placed the district of central government at the foot of Purple 
Mountain. There are two main reasons for this choice. First of all, the distance 
between Purple Mountain and center of Nanjing allowed the city enough land for 
future expansion. Compared to the crowded old town, suburban areas also made it 
easier for designers to initiate new urban development.
66
 In addition, the Sun 
Yat-sen Mausoleum was located on the hillside of the Purple Mountain. 
Establishing the central government district directly under the Mausoleum 
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Fig. 6-21  Murphy’s Drawing of Nanjing’s District of Central Government, 1929.  
 
 
In his proposal, Murphy placed the headquarters of the KMT in the first part 
of the building complex on top of the axis linked to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. 
The headquarters was not only the tallest building in this district, but also 
contained a huge meeting hall comprised of 3000 seats for party members. The 
middle group of buildings contained the president’s offices and residential area, 
including a 1500 seat meeting room and a vast banquet hall. The third part of the 
building complex was a series of governmental houses. Offices and other service 





Following the pattern of Guangzhou’s urban design, Murphy also attempted 
to apply his principles of a modern Chinese city and architecture to Nanjing’s 
reconstruction projects. He created a vivid image of China’s new capital through 
classical form and style to establish an explicit connection with the Imperial past. 
In addition, it is important to note that Murphy arranged these buildings with a 
clear hierarchical system conforming to party ideology. The axis with the Sun 
Yat-sen Mausoleum dominated the whole arrangement of these buildings. The 
headquarters of the KMT was placed under the Mausoleum, and the governmental 
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buildings were placed under the headquarters. This set of relationships conveyed a 
clear message that the KMT and its political doctrine played a decisive role in 
leading the nation towards a promising future. Although Murphy’s plan was 
eventually not accepted by the Nationalist government, his design still enormously 
influenced other proposals presented after him.  
 
  
Fig. 6-22 Huang Yu-yu and Zhu 
Shen-kang’s Design of Nanjing’s 
District of Central Government 
Fig. 6-23  Sun Ke’s Design of Nanjing’s 
District of Central Government 
 
In order to find a better plan, the committee of capital design held a 
competition in 1929. As a result, Huang Yu-yu and Zhu Shen-kang’s designs were 
favoured by the juries. Also influenced by L’Enfant’s capital design, Huang and 
Zhu drew up a plan combining Beaux-Art aesthetics and Chinese classical styles 
for Nanjing’s urban reconstruction. Like Murphy, the headquarters of the KMT 
were still placed on top of the axis dominating the whole plan. A wide avenue 





 This avenue also highlighted the monumentality of the 
capital, with Nanjing being represented as the most important city of the nation.  
 
Under the instruction of Chiang Kai-shek, however, the central government 
district was to move back to the Ming old town.
70
 Several proposals based on this 
new decision were then presented to the government by different designers, 
including Lu Yan-zhi and Sun Ke, and their designs to some extent, still showed 
the influence of Murphy’s original plan.
71
 Due to the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, not all of these plans had the chance to be implemented, 
although many public and party buildings constructed before the War had already 
followed the principle formulated by these plans.
72
 As it turned out, more and 
more architects paid special attention to visualising the nation through their plans. 
Chinese classical styles gradually became more nationally symbolic and were 
widely adopted in many of Nanjing’s party and governmental buildings, reflecting 




Fig. 6-24 The Grand Hall of the National 
Assembly.  
Fig. 6-25 The Meeting Hall.  
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Fig. 6-26 The First National Assembly 
in Nanjing.  
Fig. 6-27 The First National Assembly 
in Nanjing.  
 
 
Among these buildings, the Great Hall of the National Assembly was the one 
which fully represented the new development of architectural design in Nanjing. In 
1935, the Nationalist Government ratified a new constitution and planned to hold a 
new election for the National Assembly. According to the new constitution based 
on Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy, the government still adopted a bicameral 
system, but the role of the National Assembly had been changed. The Legislative 
Yuan was now a general parliament giving delegates an authority to enact bills. 
The National Assembly was a special parliament mainly designed for electing the 




In 1935, in order to house the National Assembly, a design competition was 
held to select the best plan for the new parliament. In the brief for the competition, 
the committee primarily asked every participant to produce a design showing 
explicit Chinese architectural features on the façade. In addition, the building was 
not to be confined only to political usage. Initially planned to be a multiple 
functional architecture, other performances, such as music and theatre were also to 
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The final winner of the competition was the architect Si Fu-quan (奚福泉) 
(1903-83). Si successfully combined the merit of refined Western design methods 
with the features of Chinese architectural traditions to create an impressive 
parliament space. In this symmetrical layout, Si arranged a classroom-like meeting 
hall set behind a small but imposing lobby. The meeting hall consisted of 2500 
seats for the assemblymen on the ground and first floor. Many cutting-edge 
facilities, such as air conditioners, fire-fighting equipment and new election 
counting systems were installed in the building, making it possible to satisfy 




When the building was completed in 1936, it was immediately used for the 
meeting of the new National Assembly. However, during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, Nanjing was under Japanese occupation. The building would not function as a 
parliament again until the nationalist government reclaimed the city.  
 
Undoubtedly, Si Fu-quan’s design was one of the best representative 
examples of the parliament building type in modern Chinese architecture. Although 
the Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan after 1949, Chiang 
Kai-shek continued to seek a suitable building design which could fully reflect his 
aspiration of restoring parliamentary democracy and Chinese nationalism in 
Taiwan under his leadership. In this context, Taiwan’s Chungshan Building was 
expected to surpass the success of Nanjing’s grand hall of national assembly in the 
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post-war era.  
 
 
6-3  The Making of the Chungshan Building 
 
Of China’s parliament building types, the Chungshan Building is one of the 
most important and distinctive cases. This building shows the great potential for 
the adaptation of the Chinese classical style on new building types. With Chiang 
Kai-shek’s instructions and alterations, architect Siou Ze-lan (修澤蘭) (1925- ) 
thoroughly embodied Chiang’s vision of Chinese national imagination through her 
design. Architecture became one of the best tools for certain ambitious politicians 
to visualise their political ideology and will in physical form.  
 
Not long after the retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist government expropriated 
most public buildings constructed by the Japanese colonial regime. Although well 
designed for the needs of administration, numerous financial difficulties meant that 
the government was left with no choice but to re-use these buildings. It was not 
until the Nanhai Academy had been established, the first district specially reserved 
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Fig. 6-28 The full View of the Taiwan 
Provincial Consultative Council 
Hall.  
Fig. 6-29 The Square in Front of the Hall. 
  
Fig. 6-30 The Chamber under the Centre 
Dome. 
Fig. 6-31 The Main Entrance.  
 
 
The earliest assembly hall that built in Taiwan under Chiang regime was the 
Council Hall for the Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council in 1957. The Council 
belonged to the Taiwan Provincial Government, and originally adopts the Taiwan 
Education Association Building as offices and an assembly hall. After the 
Government completely moved to the Zhongxing New Village (中興新村), a new 
planed town in the midst of Taiwan, the new Council Hall was decided to locate in 
Wufeng (霧峰), a small town close to the Village. In the design, the architect Lin 
Bo-nian (林柏年) attempted to create a new form of democratic space placing the 
chamber in the middle of the building under a huge dome. The image of the centre 
dome associate to the classical design of Palladio’s Villa La Rotonda. As Raymond 
Quek has pointed out, during the Neoclassical period Palladianism exists in many 
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countries from Britain, America, Brazil, Finland to Singapore. As a popular form 
usually adopted by the most important civic architecture, Palladianism represents a 




Expect the Palladian dome, the Council Hall was also cladding with the 
Chinese classical style by a simplified manner. On the façade, a row of white 
columns formed a long corridor in the front that made the bright red timber doors 
become the main focus of the entrance. The doors was decorated with Chinese 
traditional patterns which were usually adopted to the traditional main doors. It 
was no doubt that this Council Hall was an early attempt of Taiwan’ parliament 
building design to connect China’s classical traditions with some notable Western 
features for expressing the determination of the government towards parliamentary 
democracy though a visual form.   
 
However, the plan to find the permanent places for central government’s 
bicameral system had encountered some difficulties. Initially, the Legislative Yuan 
occupied Taipei City Hall (中山堂), a meeting place especially designed for Taipei’s 
public assemblies during the colonial era. Later, it moved to the auditorium of the 
Taipei Municipal Girls High School (中山女高) and other buildings near that area, 
to form the new political district in Taipei city centre. Although these spaces were a 
little bit tight, they still could accommodate all members of the Legislative Yuan 
and their assistants. However the other parliament, the National Assembly, did not 
find a permanent place to house the delegates’ offices and regular meetings until 
the issue of constructing a grand hall for nationwide assemblies was raised.  
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In 1957, several generals in the Institute for Defense ( 國防研究院 ) 
commissioned the architect Siou Ze-lan to design a two-storey residence on the 
Yangming Mountain for Chiang Kai-shek, as a gift for his birthday. When Chiang 
saw the design, he summoned Siou and asked her to change it from a presidential 
residence to a grand hall for political assemblies and a reception hall for foreign 
dignitaries.
78
 Chiang believed that what the nation currently needed was an 
impressive hall for political meetings that would exhibit the beauty of Chinese 
traditional culture and architecture for diplomatic purposes.
79
 However, Chiang’s 
idea was not implemented due to financial problems in the early ruling period. Not 
until 1965, eight years after Chiang came up with the idea, did he call on the 




There are two main reasons that explain why Chiang wanted to continue this 
building project at that time. First of all, in order to commemorate Sun Yat-sen’s 
centenary birthday in 1966 and his political achievements for modern China, 
Chiang decided to erect a splendid monumental building named after him.
81
 
Chiang believed that only by following the cultural and political legacy that Sun 
had left to his generation could Confucian orthodoxy and Republican legitimacy be 
maintained. Constructing a building named after Sun showed that Chiang had 
committed himself to the accomplishment of Sun’s political thoughts.
82
 In addition, 
in 1965, Mao Ze-dong (1893-1976), the leader of Communist China, had just 
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launched the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. In Chiang’s view, this 
Revolution was a vicious campaign which would lead the nation to the catastrophic 
end of its own traditional culture and society. Before Chinese national culture was 
completely destroyed, Chiang claimed that it was necessary to fight against the 
Revolution with the aim of reviving Chinese national culture in Free China.
83
 
Erecting a marvellous building as a cultural showcase to display the beauty of 
Chinese national culture became a pivotal task to show Chiang’s promotion of the 




Fig. 6-32  The Full View of the Chung-shan Building.  
 
 
Located on the hillside of the Youngming Mountain, the Chungshan Building 
was built behind the Institute of Revolutionary Practice (革命實踐研究院). Initiated 
as the Party’s think tank with Chiang’s full support, this Institute was a political 
organisation aimed at fostering a new generation of political elites.
84
 Therefore, 
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placing the Institute and the Building on the same slope of the Mountain was an 
ideal choice to form a new political hub in Taipei’s suburban area. However, there 
was a natural environmental problem on this site which needed to be overcome 
before the building project was approved. An active sulfurous vent linked to the 
dead volcano of the Mountain was situated at the heart of the site. This vent 
became an unpredictable engineering challenge for the architect building any 
construction on top of it.   
 
Despite this challenge, Chiang had a strong reason for persisting in 
constructing his ideal parliament building on this site, even though the natural 
conditions were so harsh. According to Di De-yin (狄德蔭), the current curator of 
the Chungshan Building, Chiang was very superstitious about Fung-shui, a 
Chinese traditional system of geomantic beliefs. This site was believed to be an 
auspicious landscape with a high mountain at the back, two hills on both flanks and 
a valley in front to give visitors a bird’s-eye view of Taipei city centre. Di also 
claims that there is an imperial axis connecting the Building itself, the Shilin 
Official Residence and the Grand Hotel on Yuanshan Mountain to the Office of the 
President in Taipei city centre. This important symbolic axis was claimed to bolster 
Chiang’s regime in Taiwan and assure his dream of the re-unification of the 




Therefore, Chiang paid special attention to the construction of the building to 
ensure that this building would be erected exactly in the way that he expected. In 
an interview, the architect Siou Ze-lan confirmed that Chiang not only summoned 
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her many times to the presidential residence to discuss the design concept, but also 
directly altered the design by drawing on the blueprint three times. Chiang used 
different coloured pens to highlight the areas that he thought needed to be altered 
and wrote down his opinions.
86 
Chiang expressly requested that the building 
should have explicit Chinese features. In addition, the grand meeting hall should 
consist of 1200 seats with a vast restaurant serving at least 2000 people. Chiang 
also pointed out that a new staircase needed to be added to the corridor which 
linked the lobby to the main hall, and some unnecessary decorations should be 
reduced in size to save more space for the restaurant.
87
 As well as Chiang, Soong 
May-ling (宋美齡) (1898-2003), Chiang’s wife, offered her advice on the interior 
design. She selected furniture for meeting rooms and the president’s living rooms, 
and spent a great deal of time confirming the final decoration work on the whole 
building.
88
 During the process of architectural design, Siou faithfully altered her 
design to follow Chiang and Soong’s ideas and requirements. In the end, the final 
result revealed that Siou had completed not only an impressive assembly hall, but a 
symbolic statement which combined Chiang’s vision of an ideal parliament 
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Fig. 6-33 The Main Entrance.  Fig. 6-34 The Courtyard.  
 
  
Fig. 6-35 The Round Reception 
Room.  
Fig. 6-36 The Staircase.  
 
 
Graduating from the National Central University, one of the strongholds of 
China’s Beaux-Arts training schools, there is no doubt that Siou Ze-lan was 
familiar with the design skills of using new architectural materials and technology 
to express Chinese classical architectural features in modern building design. In the 
Chungshan Building, Siou fully showed her outstanding ability in constructing a 
totally modern functional building cladded with remarkable Chinese characters. In 
order to gain inspiration, Siou want to the Taipei’s National Palace Museum to 
examine their collection of Chinese antiquities and furniture. Later she applied her 
studies to the building design. For example, the unique Chinese traditional patterns 
of animals that Siou learned from the ancient ritual bronzes made in the Shang 
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Dynasty (1600 B.C.-1046 B.C.) were carved on the bright red wooden main doors 
to welcome the visitors. The other famous furniture was the palace lanterns.
89
 
Designed by Siou, more than 400 handcrafted lanterns hang in the pillars, ceilings 
and walls decorated the whole building in a lavish way. But perhaps the most 
well-known design was the longevity stairway. In order to celebrate Sun Yat-sen’s 
centenary birthday, Siou designed the stairway which had exact one hundred steps 
wound up the hillside to lead visitors going up from the gateway entrance, the 
Chinese style arch to the grand lobby of the Building. Looking down from above, 
the stairway was in an exact shape of Chinese calligraphy of ‘longevity’.  
 
In the layout, Siou divided the whole building complex into two parts and 
linked these with wide corridors and courtyards, which in turn were surrounded by 
small meeting rooms and offices. The main reason for doing this was that the 
building was built on a site with two different geological conditions. The front part 
of the ground was full of sandstone and mudstone; the rear part was based on a 
hard rock stratum. The differential settlement might cause a severe damage to the 
building, if the structural design failed to consider the uneven sinking rate. 
Therefore, dividing construction into two parts was a practical way to erect 
building on this base. As a result, Siou placed a low building volume in the front 
with tall in the rear. Her tactics not only made the building comply with the 
specific geological condition, but also echoed the hillside of the Youngming 
maintain.  
 
On the ground floor of the front part, an anteroom and a meeting room were 
used to receive important guests and foreign dignitaries to the nation. The second 
floor was Chiang’s personal living room and secret office. Only the highest 
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officials and closest advisers were allowed to meet Chiang in this room.
90
 The 
third floor was a reception room emulating the style of the Temple of Heaven in 
Beijing. The façade of this room was a prominent structure with a round layout and 




Fig. 6-37  The Grand Meeting Hall.  Fig. 6-38  The Restaurant.  
 
 
Fig. 6-39  The Layout of the Grand Meeting Hall.  
 
 
The ground floor in the rear part of the building was a vast meeting hall 
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consisting of 1800 seats. The classroom-like layout was adopted for the 
arrangement of the seats in the same direction facing the podium. Above the hall 
was a huge restaurant which could serve 2000 guests dining at the same time. 
Both the meeting hall and the restaurant were lavishly adorned with Chinese royal 
decorations. A massive 14 metre tall roof constructed using a steel frame and 
enveloped by Chinese green tiles was placed on the top dominating the whole 
building complex. The roof was also visually the highest spot which gave an 
unimpeded view from the main gate outwards.  
 
To fight against the sulfurous gas and hot springs coming up from the vent, 
the architect Siou and the other engineers conceived a new method to overcome 
this problem. Because the stage of the grand hall was built directly on the top of 
the vent, the whole building foundation had to have total protection to strengthen 
its structure. First of all, drainpipes were set up on the vent to channel most of the 
gas and hot springs off the building site. The vent was also covered by a huge 
amount of concrete to protect the building base. This method considerably 
reduced the chance that the chemicals would permeate through the base to the 
building in the first place. To this day the sulfurous concentration in the building 
can still be controlled to tolerable levels.
91
 In addition, in order to prevent the 
steel rebars in the foundation from being eroded by sulfur, Siou developed a 
method of wrapping these rebars in different layers of asphalt felt and aluminum 
foil before being anchored into the concrete. This new method proved successful 
in protecting the rebars from being destroyed by the toxic chemical.
92
 As it turned 
out, the Chungshan Building became the only construction in the world built 
directly above a sulfurous vent.  
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Fig. 6-40 Chiang Kai-shek Oversaw 
the Construction Site with 
Architect Siou.  
Fig. 6-41 Chiang Kai-shek Reading the 
Blueprint with Engineer Fu Ji-Kuan. 
 
 
The inauguration date of the building in 1966 was chosen to coincide with the 
commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s centenary birthday. There were only thirteen 
months left for the architect, engineers and builders to carry out the whole building 
project before the date arrived. At least twice a week, Chiang Kai-shek would visit 
the construction site and oversee progress to ensure that this building was 
constructed exactly following his requests.
93
 As a result, the Chungshan Building 
became a renowned parliament building that faithfully conveyed the political 
message that Chiang meant to deliver in visual form during the Cold War period. 
Its distinguishing characteristics and classical interior design also gave the visitors 
a strong sense of ‘Chinese-ness’. 
 
After the inauguration, the Chungshan Building drew lavish praise from the 
public. Most of comments focused on how the architect successfully translated 
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Chinese traditional architectural principles into modern building form without 
conflict and discord. However, Siou’s design also revealed some limitations about 
the application of Chinese classical styles to modern usage. As Fu Chao-ching 
points out, the arrangement of space in the building was largely restricted by the 
colossal roof. The proportion of the roof also diminished the balance of building 
forms that Chinese traditional craftsmen would value.
94
 It is also true that the 
increasing role played by certain political leaders in the work of art left little room 
for artistic creation. However, even though this Building had such defects, it did 
not hinder it from being claimed as one of the most outstanding buildings in 
post-war Taiwan.  
 
It is also important to note that the inauguration date of the Building was also 
the starting date of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. In the 
inauguration address, Chiang announced that the Movement had officially begun. 
A serial of cultural policies implemented in the Nanjing Decade now continued to 
be promoted in Taiwan. As Lin Guo-sian argues, Chiang attempted to censor the 
content of art works, such as literature, music, plays and films, to reflect new 
political needs in the period of national restoration in Taiwan.
95
 Chiang also 
emphasised that the government under his rule was the true inheritor of Chinese 
Confucian orthodoxy. For Chiang, protecting Chinese culture from being destroyed 
by the Chinese Communist Party was one of the most important missions in his 
political career.
96
 It implied that the legitimacy of China’s national culture and 
politics would be tightly held by Chiang and his regime through leadership of the 
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Movement in Taiwan. In this political context, the Chungshan Building became an 
essential metaphor connecting prescribed meanings of culture with a selected 
national past in certain desired ways. After the success of the Chungshan Building, 
a series of new public buildings, such as Taipei’s National Palace Museum, were 
also erected and used to strengthen the image of Taiwan as a liberalised island, one 




Aside from being used as propaganda to support Chiang’s cultural policies, the 
Chungshan Building also served as a reception hall to receive foreign presidents, 
diplomats and politicians. For example, the World League for Freedom and 
Democracy, founded by Chiang in 1966, held regular meetings in the Building.
98
 
The KMT’s National Congress and the plenary session of the central committee 
also routinely took place in the Building.
99
 In 1971, the government decided to 
move the National Assembly from the Taipei city hall to the Chungshan Building 
permanently.
100
 The Chungshan Building became one of the most highly 
politicalised spaces, holding president elections and constitutional amendments, 
and where the presidents of the ROC conducted inauguration ceremonies and state 
dinners.
101
 It was these cultural policies and political events which made the 
Building the most important parliament house in Taiwan at that time. Ironically, 
under the control of martial law and the one-party system established by the KMT, 
real parliamentary democracy in the Western sense did not actually appear in this 
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It is no surprise that in the post-martial law era when Taiwan gradually 
advanced on the road to true democracy, the Chungshan Building was viewed as 
the symbol of Chiang and the KMT’s authoritarian rule. As Charles Musgrove has 
noted, the message of the monuments will experience an enormous change after 
the designers and builders are finished with them. An unintentional result will be to 
shift the original prescribed meanings of the monuments.
103
 In other words, when 
the construction work was finished, the original symbolic meaning of the 
Chungshan Building would inevitably encounter challenges from different 
interpretations. For example, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the biggest 
opposition party in Taiwan, used the Chungshan Building as one of the main stages 
for its political protests against the KMT, and in the first decade of the post martial 
law era, the KMT gradually lost its power to dominate the cultural landscape 
created by its early dictatorial rule.  
 
In 1989, the DDP strongly urged that the Chungshan Building should be 
opened up equally to other parties, to hold their plenary sessions like the KMT did. 
The government and the DDP, however, had disagreements about the arrangement 
of certain political symbols, such as Sun Yat-sen’s and Chiang Kai-shek’s portraits 
and statues, the national flag and emblem. In the end, they came to an acceptable 
compromise that the party flag and the national flag could hang on the stage 
together. Most slogans coined during the totalitarian period which were decorated 
the walls could be covered temporarily. The DDP insisted on omitting the general 
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meeting practices introduced by the KMT, that every person in the meeting hall 
should pay tribute to Sun Yat-sen’s portrait and sing the national anthem.
104
 This 
gesture indicated that the DDP were unwilling to submit themselves to the national 
identity and ideology constructed by Chiang and his party, and occupying the 
Chungshan Building was viewed a radical challenge to the political doctrines 
established by the KMT.  
 
Starting from the late 1970s, Chiang’s cultural policies could hardly serve as a 
panacea for the erosion of national symbols in the new international situation. 
More and more countries recognised the government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China, not Chiang’s regime in Taiwan.
105
 
The rise of Taiwanese consciousness in the island also challenged Chiang’s 
administration, despite attempts to maintain its undemocratic rule by upholding its 
national and political mythology.
106
 The main sticking point was that the 
nationalist government’s weak link with the Chinese nation was maintained by the 
idea of legitimate succession. The constitution adopted in Taiwan at that time was 
enacted in Nanjing in 1946. The representatives who had been elected on the basis 
of this constitution on the mainland continued in office in Taiwan. Under the 
protection of the temporary provisions effected during the period of communist 
rebellion, these veteran members could occupy their seats and enjoy privilege for 
life until the ROC reunited with China in the future and held elections on the 
mainland.
107
 In this regard, it can hardly be said that these assemblymen totally 
represented the population who were born in Taiwan.  
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In 1990, the members of the National Assembly sought to consolidate and 
expand their own powers and privileges. Their actions immediately led to an 
unprecedented chain of public protests. Following the model of the Tiananmen 
Square protests in 1989, these protesters, mainly students, organised sit-ins and 
strikes in the square of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to show their support 
for real constitutional reform.
108
 This wave of protests led to more large-scale 
demonstrations spreading all the way to the Chungshan Building. The main avenue 
that linked the Taipei city centre to the Yangming Mountain was blocked because 
of the demonstration. To show their support for constitutional reform, the DDP 
assemblymen broke the windows and as a means of protest overthrew the tables at 
the state dinner, which was prepared for these delegates who would vote for the 
next president the following month.
109
 Although the presidential election was held 
as scheduled and Lee Teng-hui was appointed as the first Taiwanese president in 
history, the legislative violence had by then become part of Taiwan’s political 
environment. The political status of the Chungshan Building and its relationship to 
the image of nationhood and the political arena was also challenged by these 
parliamentary riots. 
 
Today, the National Assembly has been dissolved. Taiwan currently adopts 
unicameralism, and the Chungshan Building is no longer used as the parliament 
building. In 1999, the Building was listed as one of Taipei’s historical buildings 
and is now open to the public as a tourist attraction. The meeting hall and the vast 
restaurant can be rented for private activities. After Soong May-ling’s death in 
2003, there was a wave of public interest in Chiang Kai-shek and his family’s 
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legend, and the Building became a major nostalgic tourist attraction in Taipei.
110
 
The splendid Chinese classical decorations in the building now serve as a reminder 
of its political and cultural history to a new generation.  
 
To conclude, many dictators, such as Hitler and Stalin, made use of 
architecture to serve political will and ambition, particularly for propaganda 
purposes. For them, architecture was one of the best visual means of creating 
monumental spaces in the name of nation-building. In the history of modern 
Chinese architecture, many governmental buildings were used by politicians who 
attempted to maintain their regimes by producing prescribed political and cultural 
icons. Parliament buildings are a good example to illustrate that the processes and 
practices of political transformation in modern China were gathered and shaped in 
concrete and physical form. From the first parliament building constructed by the 
Qing court to the construction of the Chungshan building in Taiwan, architecture 
had become inseparable from the political arena. 
 
What distinguishes the Chungshan Building was that it not only achieved a 
remarkably clear expression of an inherited relationship with Chinese national 
culture in form and style, but that Chiang Kai-shek was also involved in the design 
process. Even in the Qing dynasty, when the architects who were appointed to 
construct the parliament buildings for central and local governments were asked to 
adopt Western architectural styles, the design process was not directly interfered 
with by politicians. In the grand hall of the National Assembly in Nanjing, the 
architects were asked to follow the design principle that the Nanjing Capital Plan 
had established, but some spaces were still left for them to develop their own 
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concepts. However, in the case of the Chungshan Building, from the outset Chiang 
Kai-shek directed the design process. The styles of the building were to conform to 
artistic principles of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, and the meeting 
hall was to be arranged in the classroom-like chamber preferred by a number of 
Leninist inspired political parties.
111
   
 
It is no surprise that in the post-martial law era, the Chungshan building, 
erected as iconic architecture under Chiang’s totalitarian rule, would symbolically 
become one of the main battlefields in Taiwan’s democratic reform. The ebb of 
Chinese nationalism in Taiwan transformed the Building from its role as an 
important parliament building and a significant cultural landmark to a nostalgic 
tourist spot. Ironically, it was only when the Building stopped being used as a 
parliament that the true parliamentary democracy that Chiang promised to 
implement in a free China arrived. 
 
                                                 
111
 As mentioned earlier, Russia and other Eastern European states preferred the class-room like 
chamber where the cabinet is seated behind the podium facing the delegates. This form of design 
reveals the nature of the KMT as a Leninist party. See Spence, The Search for Modern China, 334-9. 
275 
 
Chapter Seven: In Remembrance of ‘National Saviours’: the 
Mausoleums, Monuments and the Memorial Halls 
 
 
Before the presidential election in 2008 under the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s supervision, the Qu-Jiang-hua (去蔣化) campaign had reached a new 
climax. As discussed earlier, in a forum of the sixtieth anniversary of the 288 
Incident, the previous President, Chen Shui-bian, accused Chiang Kai-shek of 
being the ‘true murderer,’ who should take full responsibility for the bloody 
military crackdown launched on 28 February 1949 in Taiwan. Chen also 
announced a plan to demolish the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, an impressive 
monumental building erected in honour of Chiang in Taipei city centre. He 
claimed that the name of the building should also be changed to the Taiwan 
Democracy Memorial Hall. On 1
st 
March 2007, the former premier of the 
Executive Yuan, Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) (1947- ), announced a project to tear 
down the perimeter wall of the Memorial Hall. In a number of years, the newly 
developed Qu-Jiang-hua campaign had intensified and threatened the survival of 
the Memorial Hall.  
 
The Qu-Jiang-hua roughly translates as ‘de-Chiang-Kai-shek-ification’ in 
English. It was a term used to describe a political campaign aimed at removing 
references to the cult of Chiang Kai-shek in the Taiwanese landscape, and altering 
objects or sites that had been built to commemorate Chiang in the early years of 
his rule in Taiwan.
1
 The earliest action of the campaign could be traced back to 
1996 when Chen Shui-bian was the mayor of Taipei. Chen renamed the most 
notable road, Jie-shou Road (介壽路) which runs between the KMT headquarters 
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to the Office of the President, as Ketagalan Boulevard (凱達格蘭大道).
2
 As the 
new government attempted to tackle this political legacy left by Chiang’s regime 
step by step, the Qu-Jiang-hua campaign would inevitably affect the most 
significant landmark of the cult of Chiang, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. 
 
The Memorial Hall was built in honour of Chiang and his great contributions 
to the nation. He was seen as the national saviour and guardian of Free China. The 
building itself was the last and the most important one that adopted the Chinese 
classical style to serve the particular political ideology promoted by the 
Nationalist government in Taiwan. Like early Western monuments, many Chinese 
monumental buildings stemmed from grand mausoleums of great men or religious 
sacred places. Among the first which have modern architectural concepts is 
Nanjing’s Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, designed by Lu Yan-zhi (呂彥直) (1894-1929) 
in 1925. Lu’s design for Sun’s mausoleum is a good example to illustrate that 
monumentality changed at the time that a new political culture was gradually 
taking shape. This Mausoleum combined Chinese imperial tomb traditions with a 
new emphasis on visual elements. Following the success of the Mausoleum, a 
series of new national ceremonies and cults were established with the aim of 
creating particular cultural and political codes in a Republican China.  
 
In Taiwan, the government first built the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall 
under Chiang Kai-shek’s supervision, and then constructed the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall after his death. Lu Yan-zhi’s modern Chinese monumentality was 
first challenged by Wong Da-hong (王大閎) (1918-) who designed the Dr Sun 
Yat-sen Memorial Hall, and was later succeeded by Yang Jhuo-cheng (楊卓成) 
(1914-2006) who designed the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. In the 1980s, 
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economic and social transformations helped to form a new force to undermine the 
unquestionable authority of the government and its representations in architecture. 
Chinese nationalism was no longer a dominant political ideology supporting the 
regime. Challenged by Taiwanese nationalism and growing political forces, the 
role of monumental buildings as part of the political struggles in Taiwan had 
experienced considerable change.  
 
A series of questions has arisen as to how new perceptions of monumentality 
have emerged in Taiwan? How are these cultural and political codes produced? 
How to maintain them? What is their relationship to Chinese nationalism and 
modern Chinese monumentality? Why has their role changed, and which factors 
caused these changes?  
 
In order to answer these questions, the establishment of Nanjing’s Sun 
Yat-sen Memorial Hall, Taipei’s Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall will be examined in this chapter. The issues of 
monumentality, the image-making of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and 
national heroes will also be explored. The study period of this chapter starts from 
Sun’s death in 1925 to the completion of Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall 
in the 1980s. Through the study, this thesis believes a close relationship between 
the construction of national saviours and its expressions in visual forms in 
postwar Taiwan will be fully presented.  
 
 
7-1 Constructing a Grand Mausoleum for the National Saviour  
 
Sun Yat-sen died shortly after arriving in Beijing on 12 March 1925. Sun 
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returned to Beijing with the purpose of unifying, pacifying and rebuilding the 
divided nation.
3
 Unfortunately, before he fulfilled this task, he was diagnosed 
with terminal cancer of the liver and later died in hospital.
4
 The public response 
to Sun’s death was enormous. When his coffin was moved from the hospital to 
Beijing’s Central Park for the funeral ceremony, there were around 700,000 
individuals and representatives from over 1,000 organisations to pay homage to 
him.
5
 Small-scale polls conducted by Beijing’s two universities revealed that of 
all Chinese contemporary politicians Sun Yat-sen was the most popular leader.
6
 
People most admired Sun for raising and managing vast funds for the revolution, 
but he died with no personal fortune at all. Compared to his rivals and other 
warlords, Sun’s honesty at a time of corruption made him an object of worship as 




Sun’s followers also witnessed this degree of popular emotion at his funeral. 
It is no surprise that many politicians at that time appealed to the closeness of their 
political relationship with Sun to strengthen their power. Many KMT leaders tried 
to make use of his image and aura to claim that they were the true political heirs 
of Sun. Ironically, before his death, Sun was a symbolic figure for only a segment 
of the population, though the large procession that followed his funeral made him 




As Sun was a Christian, his family insisted on holding a Christian service in 
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 For the KMT, this form of ceremony was not enough to illustrate 
Sun’s contributions to the nation. His funeral had to conform to his political status 
as the founder of the new Republic. Therefore Sun’s second funeral ceremony was 
held in Beijing Central Park. His coffin was placed in the centre of a provisional 
sacrificial hall for the public to honour him.
10
 During the ceremony, the crowd 
shouted slogans: ‘Down with the warlords!’ ‘Down with imperialism!’ A 
recording of Sun’s previous speeches was played from loudspeakers, and movie 




During and after the funeral service, the KMT, with keen foresight, 
encouraged a mass national mourning phase so that people could ‘receive tutelage 
from the dead.’ This form of ceremony quickly spread all over the country. Other 
major cities in China copied Beijing’s model to run their own ceremonies in 
remembrance of Sun, all under the KMT’s supervision.
12
 For three weeks the 
public filed past the body in homage as it lay in state, and then Sun’s remains were 




On his deathbed, Sun instructed the Party to place his remains on display 
like Lenin’s and locate his tomb at Purple Mountain in Nanjing.
14
 The reason that 
Sun chose to be buried at the Purple Mountain was that the Mountain and the city 
had deep metaphorical meanings. First of all, Sun’s tomb was to lie within the vast 
area of the first Ming Emperor’s tomb. Zhu Yuan-zhang (朱元璋) (1328-98) was 
the founder of the Ming dynasty who had reclaimed the homeland of Han from the 
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rule of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). In 1912, when the new 
Republic was established in Nanjing, Sun came to pay his respects at Zhu’s tomb 
for his great achievement in the restoration of the Han race. Sun’s worship 
symbolised that the Han race had finally reclaimed lost territory from a foreign 
dynasty once again. Sun attempted to make use of the historical and geographical 
link with the founder of the Ming to arouse the sentiments of Han nationalism.  
 
Nanjing was also the capital that Sun had chosen for the new Republic. 
Nanjing was the capital of the Ming Empire from 1368 to 1421. During the rule of 
the Qing dynasty, the city had been a symbol of ethnic resistance. The Qing court 
forbade commoners from venturing near Zhu’s tomb in order to prevent it from 
becoming a symbolic centre of revolt. But for Sun, Beijing was a Manchu city. 
When the new Republic was established, Sun was elected as the first president of 
the Republic, and Nanjing should replace the status of Beijing as China’s new 
capital. Therefore, Nanjing was the ideal city to immortalise Sun’s role as a 
founding father of the nation.  
 
As Kees Terlouw argues, in order to legitimatise their rule, a new or 
established regime tends to build a link with particular heritage sites where 
important national events took place in the past.
15
 For that reason, choosing to be 
buried at Purple Mountain in Nanjing was the last and wisest decision made by 
Sun, who had always been expert at managing his public image.
16
 As a result of 
this, the KMT came to mobilise the symbolic power of the whole Mountain site, 
including Zhu’s tomb and Sun’s future mausoleum, to glorify Sun and to place 
him as the central figure of the nation.  
                                                 
15
  Kees Terlouw, ‘Charisma and Space,’ Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 10, no. 3 (December 
2010): 339-40.  
16




One month after Sun’s death, a committee composed mainly of KMT’s 
leaders organised the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum at Purple 
Mountain. An international architectural competition was launched to search for 
the best design for entombing Sun.
17
 The committee decided to build a larger and 
taller mausoleum than the Ming imperial tomb to express Sun’s great 
achievements. It was believed that his achievements for the newborn nation had 
largely surpassed previous dynasties.
18
 No longer serving Chinese emperors, the 
mausoleum was now intended to be the ceremonial site of the nation.  
 
According to competition guidelines, the design of the Sun Yat-sen 
Mausoleum should keep Chinese classical styles with distinctive monumental 
features. Some basic spatial principles of the Chinese traditional Imperial tomb, 
such as the sacrificial hall, the tomb and a long north-south axis, were to be 
followed, to highlight its traditional Chinese monumentality. The main structure 
was to use solid stone and reinforced concrete instead of traditional fragile brick 
and wood that were commonly used in imperial tombs. In front of the sacrificial 
hall, there was to be an open space large enough to hold a ceremonial service for 
50,000 people.
19
 This request intended to make the Mausoleum a vast 
monumental space open to public access, not another imperial tomb only serving 
royal family members and high officials. The KMT attempted to extend the 
boundary of traditional ceremony to a countrywide mass audience who were 
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Fig. 7-1  Lu Yan-zhi,’s Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. 
   
  As a result, the winning entry designed by the Chinese architect Lu Yan-zhi  
met the competition jury’s expectation. A graduate of Cornell University, an American 
Beaux-Arts training school at that time, Lu worked at Henry Murphy’s office as a 
draftsman for two years. It is almost certain that Lu acquired his knowledge of 
Chinese traditional architecture, and learned the approach to adaptive architecture 
from his years with Murphy.
21
 This experience was crucial to his career when he later 
became the most influential Chinese architect in the 1920s. When most Western 
competitors resorted to the concept of the pagoda, Lu shifted his focus to the 
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Fig. 7-2 The Worship Hall of the 
Mausoleum.  







Fig. 7-4  The Plan of Worship 
Hall and Sun’s Tomb.  
Fig. 7-5  The Section of Worship Hall and 
Sun’s Tomb.  
 
 
Lu Yan-zhi successfully created a grand mausoleum on top of a peak on the 
southern slope of the Mountain. An impressive sacrificial hall was placed on a 
massive staircase leading visitors from the gateway arch at the foot of the 
Mountain to the hall with an unimpeded view. Looking down from above, the vast 
staircase is in an exact bell shape. Lu intended the bell to remind visitors that it 
284 
 





The worship hall had an enormous blue Chinese roof on top and white walls 
enveloped around it. These features made the hall a salient landmark on Purple 
Mountain. Lu adopted classical Chinese architectural elements, including the 
archway, the pillars, the hall and the long stairway, that could also be found in the 
Ming and Qing’s imperial tombs, to give Sun’s Mausoleum a more consecrated 
aura. However, the design of the worship hall also reflected the deep influence of 
the Beaux-Arts aesthetics that he learned from the American university and 
Murphy’s architectural firm. In order to express Sun’s contributions to the nation, 
Lu imitated the space of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Sun’s 
testament and important writings were inscribed on the surrounding walls of the 
hall. A seated statue of him was placed in the middle of the hall. The visitors could 
actually see the statue through three arch entrances inscribed with the characters 
of nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people, taken from Sun’s 
famous piece Three Principles of the People.
24
 A series of scenes inspired by 
Sun’s life were also carved on the base of the statue.  
 
Sun’s tomb, a sarcophagus enclosed by a round burial mound, was at the 
back of the worship hall. Sun’s remains were permanently preserved here. Lu 
followed the model of Napoleon’s Tomb in Paris and Grant’s Tomb in New York 
to form a round sunken crypt which allowed the visitors to view Sun’s 
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From the gateway arch, along the vast staircase to the worship hall and to the 
tomb, Lu created a sequence of solemn spaces along the hillside to provide a vast 
public space to hold national ceremonies for Sun. It should be noted that the 
Mausoleum also included in its elaborate construction, building material gathered 
from different provinces of China. The entrance was built of Fujian granite. The 
steps were made by Suzhou stone. Hong Kong provided its stone for the walls of 
the worship hall. Yunnan offered its marble to pave the floor. The columns of 
black granite were hewn from Qingdao.
 26 
Thus, as the collective contributions of 
Chinese people were symbolically shown on the building, the Mausoleum could 
claim to be the shrine of the nation.  
 
The great new Chungshan road (中山路), named after Sun’s courtesy name, 
was designed to connect the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum to Nanjing city centre. 
Almost all the major buildings of the city, including the Jiangsu Provincial 
Assembly, the Gingling University, the Ming City Gate, the new central 
government district, the Ming Imperial Tombs and the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum 
lay along it.
27
 That is to say, through the Chungshan road, Sun Yat-sen and his 
story and political legacy are closely interwoven with the fabric of the city.  
 
Indeed, in his design, Lu Yan-zhi successfully combined traditional Chinese 
architectural features with new emphases on the visual representation of power. 
He used solid, physical symbolic elements to make abstract feelings of nationhood 
feel more real.
28
 After the mid-1920s, an increasing number of Chinese architects 
shared the same vision as Lu in a quest for a more modern Chinese architecture by 
fusing Western and Chinese building traditions. A new trend of architectural 
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design began to form in Nanjing and was later widely adopted in many other civil 




In 1929, the first phase of construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum had 
finished in time for Sun’s burial ceremony in Nanjing. The KMT had already 
developed a new set of regular ceremonies to honour Sun. Parts of the ceremonies 
borrowed from the imperial rituals, but skipped some undesirable customs, such 
as kowtow, to make it closer to modern life. However, the key differences between 
these new ceremonies and the ancestral rituals were the people who performed 
them and who comprised the audience. When the KMT performed the new 
ceremonies in remembrance of Sun, the audience was the nation. Through the 
power of mass media, the ceremonies would spread all over the country and 




In 1929, a specially designed train preceded Sun’s hearse on its journey to 
Nanjing. The train would stop temporarily in every major city and town for local 
ceremonies, which attracted large crowds to pay homage to Sun.
31
 In the KMT’s 
Nanjing headquarters, Sun’s remains, dressed in the new national costume, were 
covered by the party flag. Over ten thousand people took part in the long 
procession following the hearse on the way to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. Those 
participants who came from groups controlled by the party were arranged in a 
particular order to show that the party’s legitimate descent derived from different 
sections of society.
32
 The most important politicians of the Republic and Sun’s 
friends and relatives took their places in the worship hall and Chiang Kai-shek 
acted as the chief sacrificant to conduct the final burial ceremony. It was this 
                                                 
29
 Fu, 中國古典建築新式樣(New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style), 113-38.  
30
 Musgrove, ‘Monumentality in Nanjing’s Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,’ 11-12. 
31
 Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen, 215-7. 
32
 Ibid., 220-9.  
287 
 
ceremony that made Chiang symbolically the political heir of Sun Yat-sen and the 




What the KMT needed at that time was a great revolutionary leader and a 
founding father of the Republic to secure the historical legitimacy of the party, 
and Sun was exactly the person that the party wanted. Although Sun did conduct 
early anti-Manchu revolutions, his relationship with the 1911 Wuchang 
revolution was not as close as the KMT’s depiction.
 34
 However, after his death, 
it was important to construct a political myth to re-affirm Sun’s legitimacy and 
authority.
35
 In KMT propaganda, Sun was described as a leader and national 
saviour who conducted a coherent revolutionary group to overthrow the Qing 
throne.
36
 This new national narrative later constantly appeared in school 
textbooks, party propaganda and national ceremonies.
37
 It was also used as a 
powerful tool to consolidate the Nationalist government and to strengthen 
monumentality of his mausoleum. 
 
 
7-2 The New Memorial Hall in Taiwan  
 
In the 1920s, Celebrations and commemorations of Sun’s life at that time 
took on an almost religious fervour. Sun’s courtesy name Chungshan soon became 
very popular in China. Many roads, parks, buildings and even numerous 
commercial goods were named after him.
38
 The government designated the 
anniversary of his birth and death were as national holidays. His words and 
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writings, were widely circulated among the people and treated as sacred texts. 
Behind these phenomena, to a great degree, it was the Nationalist propaganda 
writers who created and promoted the cult of Sun Yat-sen to society.
39
 As 
Henrietta Harrison argues, rituals and ceremonies are an important part of the 
process through which a sense of national identity is constructed. When the new 
political culture was arising during the early twentieth century in China, rituals 
and ceremonies relating to the feeling of nationhood gradually became a dominant 
force in everyday lives.
40
 The cult of Sun Yat-sen, through the KMT, led the new 
political culture and began to generate a number of national symbols which were 
gradually taking their root in different social spectrums in China.
41
When the KMT 
had taken control of Taiwan in 1945, this set of ceremonies and symbols was also 
introduced to the island, forming the basis for political legitimacy and authority.  
 
Although Chiang Kai-shek had lost the mainland, he still continued to make 
use of the national ceremonies and symbols to consolidate and strengthen his 
position in Taiwan. In order to clean the ‘toxins’ of Japan’s ‘enslavement 
education’, the portrait of Japanese emperor was replaced with that of Sun Yat-sen 
and Chiang Kai-shek. The new regime also forced every Taiwanese person to 
participate in the weekly mass meetings of their work places, schools and 
communities. The standard model of ceremonies that had been set up in the 
mainland was then continuously performed in Taiwan.
42
 Constantly studying 
Sun’s writings, Chiang’s instructions and Chinese history were viewed as the most 
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1965 was the year of Sun Yat-sen’s centennial birthday. Chiang Kai-shek 
grasped the opportunity to glorify Sun and align himself with Sun in order to 
reinforce the legitimate base of his rule in Taiwan. In 1963, preparations for Sun 
Yat-sen’s centennial birthday were established to organise celebration activities 
and cultural events, which included music concerts, play performances, 
film-making, and academic conferences, to honour Sun during the entire year.
44
 
The Chinese Renaissance Movement was the biggest and the most influential 
cultural campaigns. The construction of the memorial hall for Sun Yat-sen was the 
most important events in the campaign. This memorial hall was to form a new 
ritual centre for Sun in Taiwan, to show the government’s continued commitment 
towards Sun’s political and national ideals.   
 
In 1964, the committee announced the architectural competition for the Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. Twelve of the more famous of Taiwan’s architects 
were invited to take part in the competition.
45
 The Memorial hall was expected to 
be a solemn and sublime building representing Sun’s devotion to the modern 
Chinese nation. Furthermore, the competition guidelines requested all participants 
to formulate a building proposal that could combine Chinese traditional building 
elements with merits of Western architecture and construction technology.
46
 A 
huge assembly hall comprising 3,000 seats was requested to provide sufficient 
space for political meetings, speeches, national music and opera and other cultural 
activities. In addition, the exhibition spaces were required to display Sun’s 
writings, manuscripts, documents and items that he had used. A special library 
was needed to store the collections of literature and publications relating to Sun’s 
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life and political thoughts. Several small meeting rooms were necessary to offer 




Among these competition entries, Wang Da-hong’s design for the Memorial 
Hall was one of the best in matching the committee’s demands.
48
 Wang Da-hong 
was famous for his modernist approach to architecture. His later reputation, 
however, was built on his unique modernist interpretation of Chinese classical 
architectural principles in his work. The turning point was the closed competition 
for Taipei’s National Palace Museum that he joined in 1961. After the museum 
competition, Wang Da-hong began to make a minor change to his design strategy 
in order to win the next competition for public works.
49
 The Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
Memorial Hall became one of the well known cases in Wang’s career that showed 
his compromise between his modernist ideal and Chinese revival style. What 
Wang Da-hong presented to the committee was a memorial hall with clearer 
characteristics of Chinese architectural styles. Wang still insisted on his modernist 
position, but emphasised Chinese features in the building appearance. Unlike 
many other Beaux-Arts trained architects, in his student life Wang did not do any 
systematic research on Chinese traditional architecture. In fact, what he knew 
about Chinese buildings were the images that came from his childhood in Suzhou 
and in Shanghai. Wang argued that if Chinese architects did more than just try to 
imitate Western architecture in their work, then their design to some degree would 
naturally contain Chinese spirit.
50
 The inspiration of Wangs’ designs of modern 
Chinese buildings came from the simple, austere principles of Chinese 
architecture hidden behind its ornate appearance. He never directly applied the 
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Chinese building elements to his designs, but rather translated them into modernist 
forms and then adopted them in the building.
51
 He deeply opposed the Chinese 
revival style created by those architects who blindly imitated ancient Chinese 






Fig. 7-6 The Original Design of the Sun 
Yat-sen Memorial Hall.  
Fig. 7-7 The Ground Floor.  
 
 
Wang Da-hong admits that the most difficult part of designing a monumental 
building like the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall is how to use architectural form to 
express the greatness of the person. According to Wang’s understanding, Sun 
Yat-sen was a relatively simple, amiable and honest man. Therefore, in his design, 
Wang chose simple forms and materials to represent Sun’s personality traits.
53
 
This form, without a doubt, was also close to the modernist form. The whole 
Memorial Hall was built in an exact square to symbolise Sun’s image. In China, 
the square is normally used to represent an upright person. It also indicates the 
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Chinese world view: ‘the celestial circle and the terrestrial square’ (天圓地方).
54
 
The huge, tall assembly hall was placed in the middle of the building with a 
worship hall in front. Sun’s seated statue would be located in the worship hall for 
visitors to pay their respects. The lower spaces, such as meeting rooms, exhibition 
rooms and the library, were arranged to surround the central assembly hall. The 
periphery of the building was enveloped by open corridors designed for public 
activities. This spatial arrangement would not only highlight the monumentality of 
the central tall structure, but also be kept at human scale in the peripheral spaces. 
Wang covered the different height of spaces between the tall assembly hall and the 
lower spaces surrounding it with two smooth, graceful curved roofs. With a little 
flavour of the Chinese traditional curved roof, they were enveloped by modern 
ceramic, not traditional, roof tiles. Moreover, no additional decoration was used in 
the building structure. The columns and beams were not painted with ornate 
traditional polychrome with added fake bracket sets beneath them as many other 
revival buildings had.
 55




Fig. 7-8  The Sun Yat-sen Memorial 
Hall. 
Fig. 7-9  The Main Entrance.  
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Fig. 7-10  Details of the Curved 
Roof. 
Fig. 7-11  The Worship Hall. 
 
 
Wang Da-hong successfully created an alternative modernist approach to the 
Chinese classical style. However, for Chiang Kai-shek and some members of the 
committee, Wang’s design was still not ‘Chinese enough’. After the committee 
had announced the winner of the competition, Wang presented his design to 
Chiang in the Office of the President. At that moment, Chiang nodded his 
approval of the building proposal, but viewed it as pure modernist architecture.
56
 
Two days after the presentation, Wang received a phone call from Chiang’s 
secretary asking for design alterations. Chiang asked him to add more Chinese 
building elements to his design to make it become a more ‘Chinese-looking’ 
building.
57
 In Chiang’s opinion, the building that could most represent China was 
the Hall of Supreme Harmony in the Forbidden City.
58
 However, this time Wang 
insisted that he did not want to alter the Memorial Hall into another Qing style 
building. He argued that Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary who overthrew the Qing 
throne, that it was wrong to commemorate him and his great achievements by 
constructing a Qing style memorial hall. Wang further stated that for a great man 
like Sun such a conservative style definitely did not match his pioneering image.
59
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Wang’s arguments drew a great deal of support from Sun Ke, son of Sun 
Yat-sen, and the other committee members.
60
 At this point, Chiang finally gave 
his agreement to Wang’s proposal.
61
 As a result, based on the original plan, Wang 
slightly altered the roof design to accede to Chiang’s request for a more 
‘Chinese-looking’ building. He covered the building with four pieces of roof 
stretching from the centre, where the tall assembly hall was located, down in four 
directions. Wang also lifted a part of the roof at the front side of the building to 
highlight the main entrance. Through this alteration, visitors could actually see 
Sun’s seated statue in the middle of the sacrificant hall through the main door 
outside the building.  
 
After one year and eight months of struggling between Chiang’s ideal and 
seven years in construction, the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall was finally 
completed, becoming one of Wang’s masterpieces. In political circles, Wang’s 
approach to modern Chinese architecture was gradually accepted by the 
government. After the completion of the Memorial Hall, he won more public 
building design cases, and his designs also earned him a great reputation in 
architectural circles. Fu Chao-ching, a famous historian of Taiwanese architecture, 
praised the design of the Memorial Hall as a successful exploration for modernist 
re-interpretation of Chinese classical styles. Han Pao-teh (漢寶德) (1934-), also a 
famous architectural historian in Taiwan, claims that Wang certainly created new 
possibilities for the formation of a modern Chinese style.
62
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Although the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall was the result of a compromise 
in design between Chiang Kai-shek and the architect, it did not change the fact 
that Chiang attempted to make use of this building as the centre of the cult of Sun 
Yat-sen. In post-war Taiwan, Sun’s figure was already engraved in many official 
buildings, such as the National Palace Museum and the Chungshan Building, but 
the Memorial Hall was certainly the most important one dedicated to him. Every 
year in the Memorial Hall a magnificent ceremony would be held to 
commemorate Sun. For most Nationalists, although they lost the opportunity to 
pay their homage to Sun in his Nanjing Mausoleum, the construction of the 
Memorial Hall in Taiwan to some degree assuaged their deep regret.  
 
On 5 April 1975, three years after the memorial hall was completed, Chiang 
Kai-shek suffered a major heart attack and died in Taipei.
63
 In his will, he still 
encouraged his comrades and countrymen to fulfill the ideal of the Three 
Principles of the People and recover the mainland under Sun Yat-sen’s political 
blueprint.
64
 Therefore, it is no surprise that the Nationalist government would 
choose the Memorial Hall to hold a solemn, peaceful public funeral for Chiang 
Chiang’s remains were moved to the assembly hall of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
Memorial Hall for the public ceremony. During the whole week around two and a 
half million visitors reportedly came to see Chiang’s body lying in state and to pay 
their last respects.
65
 The Nationalist government attempted to make use of 
Chiang’s funeral rituals to consolidate the strength of the nation. Choosing the Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall as a site to conduct the service illustrated that the 
current ruler would continuously uphold the political legitimacy that Sun had left 
                                                 
63
  Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 584-5. 
64
 Ibid., 585.  
65
 Ibid., 586. Also see Anonymous, ‘全民無盡的哀思(Endless Grief of the Nation),’ 中央月刊
Central Monthly, May 1975, 169-84.  
296 
 




Fig. 7-12 Chiang’s Hearse in Front 
of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial 
Hall.  
Fig. 7-13 Yang Jhuo-cheng’s Design 
of the Cihu Residence.  
 
  




The last stage of Chiang’s national funeral began on the 18
th
 of April, when 
his hearse took its journey toward a temporary burial site in a small town called 
Daxi (大溪), sixty miles from Taipei. The hearse was covered with yellow 
chrysanthemums, with the Party emblem and the Christian cross in the front. A 
motorcade escorted the hearse with a crowd of people forming a long procession 
on the way to Daxi.
66
 Most of them wore mourning dress and held banners with 
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slogans to commemorate the great leader of the nation.
67
 The final destination 
was Cihu residence (慈湖官邸), one of Chiang’s favourite retreats located near 
Daxi and a lake also called Cihu. Cihu literally means ‘benevolent lake’ in 
English. Chiang gave the lake and the residence the name because the scenery 
here reminded him of his benevolent mother and his home town.
68
 The residence 
was built in 1959 by the architect Yang Jhuo-cheng (楊卓成) (1914-2006), and 
Chiang used the place every year as a summer resort. Yang Jhuo-cheng used the 
model of a siheyuan, the Chinese quadrangle with a courtyard in the middle 
surrounded by four attached houses, to construct the residence in order to 
console Chiang’s nostalgia for home. In the end, it was also Yang who was 
commissioned to design a grand memorial hall dedicated to Chiang.  
 
 
7-3 The Last Paradigm 
 
For a long time, monumental buildings designed for conducting special 
ceremonies and rituals were the ideal places for certain political and religious 
needs. These buildings were normally built with solid, durable materials in order 
to emphasise their immortality and monumentality. Even if the great men had 
been dead for centuries, the buildings dedicated to them still stood firmly and 
were more permanent than the houses for the living. This is the reason why the 
oldest buildings in the world often have a close relationship to the death of 
particular great men in history.
69
 In the process, a link between the buildings and 
their audiences is established that energises the buildings and prevents them from 
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being forgotten by the men that worship in the buildings. Thus, monumental 
buildings must have a clear architectural style connected to a particular history to 
generate an emotional impact in the populace. In the cases of Nanjing’s Sun 
Yat-sen Mausoleum and Taipei’s Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, from the outset 
the construction committees established explicit goals for the architectural 
competitions. What they were looking for was a permanent building cladded with 
a classical Chinese style to commemorate Sun and to hold special ceremonies that 
could help to unify the nation and direct its people towards particular aims of 
national development. After the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the Memorial Hall 
built for him was to be utilised in the same way. 
 
After Chiang’s national funeral, the construction committee of the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall announced an architectural competition similar to the 
others mentioned earlier. A park located in the heart of Taipei city centre in the 
political district was chosen to be the building site, with the Office of the 
President just a few blocks away. The Memorial Hall included a worship hall with 
Chiang’s seated statue in the middle for regular ceremonies. Again a music 
concert hall and theatre were required to provide plenty space for entertainment 
and cultural activities. However, the whole architectural complex occupied only a 





Like the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and the Memorial Hall, the design of the 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was to express the spirit of traditional Chinese 
culture in form and style. New building technology and materials were also 
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necessary to construct an enduring building which could satisfy the needs of 
modern usage.
71
 As a result, Yang Jhuo-cheng’s design won first place and the 
commission of the Memorial Hall from the government.  
 
During the competition and construction process, an idealised image of 
Chiang Kai-shek reached a new climax as the government had begun to promote 
his mythology. In Chiang’s early rule, he also started to align himself with Sun in 
order to consolidate his power in Taiwan. Portraits of Chiang and Sun were 
required to hang in every classroom and government office. The Taiwanese were 
instructed to express their loyalty to the Chinese nation and its great leaders. 
Chinese history and geography were the core lessons taught in schools with the 
aim of giving children more knowledge about their motherland.
72
 Chiang’s image 
and speeches appeared repeatedly on television broadcasts, newspapers, 
magazines and different media. His portrait was also printed on notes, stamps and 
many other objects which had been infused into Taiwanese’s daily life.
73
After 
Chiang’s death, his birthday officially became a national holiday.
74
 The traditional 
Qingming Festival, an annual festival to remember and honour ancestors at grave 
sites, was moved to the anniversary of Chiang’s death. On that day, the present 
President and important officers would come to the Cihu residence and pay 
homage to Chiang.
75
 Many other memorial ceremonies and activities which 
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New instances of commemoration of Chiang Kai-shek began to slow down 
after 1980. The turning point was President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang 
Kai-shek, who started to adopt the American economic model and undertake a 
series of economic reforms in the 1970s. Those reforms helped Taiwan change its 
original mode of economy from an agricultural to an export-oriented economy. 
Taiwan later became the world’s sixteenth largest export country.
77
 Following 
economic growth, architectural design and industry continued its path towards 
Modernism. From the 1970s onwards, the Chinese classical style of building and 




However, the older political elites did not completely transfer their powers to 
the Taiwanese.
79
 After Chiang’s death, the authority of the government was still 
held by members of Chiang’s family and political elites who originally came from 
the mainland. It was also those people who continuously upheld the national 
ideology established by Chiang Kai-shek. The result of the competition of the 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall illustrated that Chiang’s family still had control 
over the style of the Memorial Hall. According to interviews with Chen Mai (陳邁) 
(1930-), one of the competition participants, and Wang Ji-kun (王紀鯤), a famous 
architect who was invited to offer his advice on the competition, it was Soong 
May-ling, Chiang’s wife, who exercised her power in changing the final result of 
the competition. In the first phase of the competition, only Yang Jhuo-cheng had 
adopted the Chinese classical style in his proposal. All the other architects showed 
their interest in exploring possibilities of developing a modernist style to express 
modern Chinese monumental architecture. Yang’s design provoked a debate on 
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whether or not the classical style was the only one that could fully represent 
modern Chinese monumental architecture. When Soong came to view the five 







Fig. 7-16  Yang Jhuo-cheng’s Entry.  
 
  
Fig. 7-17 The Original Design of the 
Worship Hall.  




In Yang Jhuo-cheng’s design, he stuck firmly to the modern Chinese 
monumentality that had been explored by Lu Yan-zhi in creating his vision of a 
memorial hall for Chiang. A tall worship hall was built in a square, topped with a 
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steep pointed roof, with the hall placed on three levels of base layers, and with a 
long stairway starting from the ground level. The end of the stairs was the 
entrance to the worship hall, and the huge statue of Chiang Kai-shek was situated 
in the middle of the hall for people to pay homage to him. The ceiling was 
composed of a vast dome painted with the national emblem and decorated by 
bracket sets. The square layout of the hall and the round dome on top symbolised 
the traditional concept of ‘the celestial circle and the terrestrial square.’ The square 
also signified Chiang’s courtesy name of Jhong-jheng (中正). Three levels of base 
layers implied that Sun’s Three Principles of the People was the foundation of 
Chiang’s political philosophy. Beneath the worship hall, several exhibition rooms 
were designed to display Chiang’s stories, manuscripts, documents, photographs, 
the clothes that he wore and objects that he used. The whole worship hall was 
built in white marble, topped with blue roof tiles to indicate the blue sky and white 
sun in the national emblem. Although the main structure was steel-framed, the 










Fig. 7-21 The Ceiling on the Worship 
Hall.  
Fig. 7-22 The Exhibition Room under 
the Worship Hall.  
 
 
The worship hall was located at the end of an axis. The axis started from a 
huge archway entrance and a vast square which was planned to accommodate 
large gatherings of about 50,000 people. Four big Chinese characters 
Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng ( 大 中 至 正 ) were hung on the archway entrance. 
Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng means ‘great centrality and perfect uprightness’ in English. 
These characters were believed to be the ideal phrase to symbolise Chiang’s life 
and thoughts.
81
 The concert hall and the theatre were placed on both flanks of the 
square, where the most important performances of the nation would be presented. 
Although the concert hall and the theatre were built in the Qing style, interior 
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Fig. 7-23  The Archway Entrance.  Fig. 7-24  The National Theatre.  
 
  
Fig. 7-25  The National Concert Hall.  Fig. 7-26  Details of the Roofs.  
 
When the committee announced that Yang Jhuo-cheng’s entry had won first 
place, it immediately provoked serious disputes in Taiwan’s architectural and art 
circles. Many architects and scholars criticised Yang’s design, viewing it as a sign 
of regression in Taiwanese architectural design. Han Pao-the stated that Yang’s 
design was a crude imitation of the Chinese classical style with no innovation.
82
 
The architect Jhong Ze-hai (仲澤還) claimed that the rigid form of the Chinese big 
roof heavily restricted the development of interior spaces and stifled the creativity 
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Fig. 7-27  The Caricature in the Louver Window Magazine.  
 
 
In fact, Taiwan’s early debates on revivalism and modernism began in the 
1960s. When the first group of government buildings, such as the Nan-hai 
Academy, was cladded with classical Chinese styles, some modernist architects 
and architectural scholars expressed their discontent.
84
 In the drawing, the 
architect Lu Yu-jun was described as a shallow designer who believed that adding 
a Chinese big roof and traditional decorative elements to a modern construction 
made the building become more Chinese. This caricature questions the revivalist 
architect who not only misunderstood the principles of Chinese traditions, but also 
misused the form of modernism in his work. As the architectural scholar Hua 
Yi-chang (華宜昌) has pointed out, the revivalist approach would limit the 
development of Taiwan’s architecture and lead it down a narrow path in the future. 
In the end, Taiwan’s architecture would gradually lose its ability to adapt to the 
changing world.
85
 However, these criticisms by modernists did not fundamentally 
change the fact that the Chinese classical style was still thriving under the early 
rule of the KMT.   
 
Constructing a monument as a political symbol was much easier than 
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controlling its use and meanings, especially when the building was designed to 
worship a controversial historical figure like Chiang. In 1980, the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall was completed and opened to the public. During that 
time, Taiwan had gradually paved its way towards social and political liberation. 
Although the Memorial Hall was not intended to become a place for questioning 
authority, it had gained a status as an iconic building, and unexpected events 
began taking place.  
 
Firstly, diversified civic activities started to occupy the square and the open 
spaces of the Memorial Hall. The beautiful park and nostalgic scenery of the hall 
made it an ideal spot for taking wedding pictures.
86
 The wide exterior corridors of 
the concert hall and the theatre attracted growing numbers of young people to 
hang out and take part in hip-hop dance.
87
 The Memorial Hall was slowly and 
quietly transforming into an ideal site for public recreation, and only a few tourists 




Secondly, anti-KMT and anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaigns began to flourish 
in the late Chiang Ching-kuo ruling period.
89
 The authority of the Memorial Hall 
and the Chinese national ideology was challenged by democratisation. After the 
abolition of martial law in 1987, it was very difficult for the KMT to maintain the 
mythologised cult of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. Moreover, the square in front of 
the Memorial Hall became the biggest open space in the political district of the 
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Taipei city centre, and since the 1990s, the Memorial Hall was the ideal place for 
political demonstrations.  
 
In 1994, the Democratic Progressive Party won the Taipei mayoral election. 
When Chen Shui-bian took office as the mayor in Taipei, the city was full of sites 
associated with Chiang Kai-shek, monuments which commemorated him and 
institutions, roads and places named in his honour. Chen began to carry out a 
series of projects to purge the cult of Chiang Kai-shek.
 90
 In 2000, the KMT lost 
the presidential election. It was a great opportunity for the DDP, a new ruling party, 
to tackle the political legacy left by the KMT during the totalitarian period. 
Numerous Chiang Kai-shek statues were torn down as soon as the Qu-Jiang-hua 
campaign was launched. The Chiang Kai-shek International Airport was renamed 
the Taoyuan International Airport. Two of Chiang’s former residences, the Shihlin 
Residence and the Grass Mountain Chateau were now opened to the public, 






Fig. 7-28 The ‘Kites of Freedom’ 
Hung on the Worship Hall.  
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Chen Shui-bian finally shifted the focus to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial 
Hall. He renamed the Memorial Hall as the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall on 
May 2007.
92
 The four big characters Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng that hung on the 
archway entrance were later replaced by Zih-You-Guang-Chang (自由廣場).
93
 
Artists were allowed to hang their designs and their ‘Kites of Freedom’ in the 
worship hall to symbolise liberation of the secret spaces.
94
 This action 
immediately led to serious political friction between KMT’s and DPP’s supporters, 
but Chen still viewed it as a symbol of success for the Qu-Jiang-hua campaign.  
 
Arguably, three decades after his death, Chiang Kai-shek was simply not as 
prominent on the island as he had been. The campaign of removal of Chiang’s cult 
from the streets continued relatively smoothly because it had already lost the 
presence it once had in people’s daily life.
95
 Today, the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall was no longer a sacred, solemn place. It has been transformed into 
one of Taipei’s most popular places for music concerts, exhibitions and civic 
activities. Due to the transformation of Taiwan’s politics and society, the meaning 
of monumentality has also experienced considerable change. No party, including 
the KMT and the DPP, now has the ability to monopolise collective memory and 
the interpretation of history to serve political ideology through monumental 
buildings. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is a primary example illustrating 
that the public spaces in Taiwan will no longer be dominated by single, dictatorial 
rule from above. It can now only be activated by multiple voices from below. The 
Taiwanese may no longer be forced to commemorate Chiang at the Memorial Hall, 
but the purge of Chiang, even the threat to demolish the Memorial Hall, had 
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When Premier Su Tseng-chang announced a plan to demolish the perimeter 
wall of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall on 1
st
 of March 2007, the Taipei city 
government immediately had a meeting about putting the Memorial Hall on the 
list of Taipei’s historical buildings.
1
 During that time, Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌) 
(1952-), the rising political star in the KMT, was the mayor of Taipei with 
sufficient political strength to question the policy made by the central government. 
In this controversial demolition issue, Hau strongly opposed the plan, viewing it 
as a threat to the most important site of the cult of Chiang Kai-shek. In order to 
protect the building from being destroyed, Hau’s strategy was to designate the 
Memorial Hall and its surrounding walls a Taipei city historical building. In doing 
so, according to city ordinances, no authority, including the DPP central 
government, could carry out any alterations to the structure. However, Hau’s 
response to the issue also provoked a series of debates: did the 27-year-old 
monument qualify to be a historical building? Should politics be involved in the 
process of architectural conservation decision-making?  
 
In order to compete with the Taipei city government on the issue of building 
conservation, the central government began to speed up the process for 
designating the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a national heritage site.
2
 The 
DPP government later announced that the Memorial Hall, its surrounding park and 
buildings were the new premier national heritage sites of Taiwan. The central 
government took full control of the Memorial Hall and began to make alterations 
                                                 
1
 ‘The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and its surrounding walls are now designated a temporary 
historical site,’ United Daily News, 06 March 2007. 
2
 ‘The DPP Took control of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,’ China Times, 07 November 2007. 
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to the building’s name and the plaque Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng (大中至正) that hung 
on the archway entrance. According to the ordinances, the administrative power of 
national heritage sites belonged to the central government and the Taipei city 
council did not have the legal power to stop the plan. Under such circumstances, 
the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall became the main focus of political struggles 
between the two parties in the presidential election year.  
 
It is no surprise that after the KMT regained political power in 2008, the new 
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九 ) (1950-) immediately announced that any 
alteration made by the DPP to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall would be 
restored under his administration.
3
 The name of the monument and the old 
inscription on the archway entrance would revert to its original state. Ma’s action 
after the presidential election revealed that political forces in Taiwan have never 
stopped attempting to make use of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a clear 
political statement for their party supporters, even though Chiang Kai-shek had 
been dead for more than three decades.  
 
The fight over the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in contemporary Taiwan 
is a good example to show that nationalism and certain types of buildings do have 
a close, metaphorical relationship. In the age of nation-building, nationalists not 
only created a new set of national narratives to re-construct and re-interpret their 
national past, but also resorted to visual forms of emotive symbols to embody 
basic concepts of nationalism. Aided by certain architects, a new form of 
architecture was being developed to express their idea of a nation, and these 
buildings usually clearly connected national history and culture.  
                                                 
3




Architecture, in this context, was used as a powerful political tool to create a 
sense of community and national identity in a visual way. However, when social, 
political and cultural circumstances changed, these buildings became controversial 
icons attracting different polarised groups to come to the sites and fight for what 
they believed. When the cult of Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese nationalism could 
no longer maintain its power, this is exactly what happened to the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall.  
 
The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is the last of the nationalistic 
architecture in Taiwan. Although nowadays the authority of the building has been 
challenged, it is still the most important landmark in Taipei city centre. It is also 
important to notice that the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is not a building ex 
nihilo. Its form and style date back to the 1920s when pioneer architects began to 
explore a Chinese national style in mainland China. Foreign missionaries were the 
earliest group of people who recognised the importance of reflecting some 
deference to Chinese contexts in building styles to help promote church 
businesses in China. Henry Murphy was one of the earliest architects who 
systemically examined Chinese building traditions and applied this research to his 
church building designs. Although these designs were initially encouraged in 
China’s Christian community, due to limited investigations into real Chinese 
traditional architecture and the language difficulty in fully understanding ancient 
texts about Chinese building craftsmanship, the results of their designs were not 
quite convincing. It was not until Chinese successors began exploring building 
traditions in the 1930s that the development of nationalistic architecture in China 




The reason that Chinese native architects attained such achievements in 
creating their own nationalistic architecture was that scholars had carried out 
extensive and detailed research on Chinese traditional buildings. The Society for 
Research in Chinese Architecture had established a new set of research methods 
for examining traditional architecture based on a thorough understanding of the 
ancient Chinese construction manuals and extensive field studies. One of these 
scholars, Liang Si-cheng, not only set up a new standard for the research of 
Chinese architectural history through his precise and detailed examination of the 
buildings and ancient texts that he surveyed, but also mapped out a contour of 
Chinese architectural history, which was clearly influenced by the linear 
progressive concept of historiography. Graduating from the University of 
Pennsylvania, Liang applied what he learned from America to his research on 
Chinese traditional architecture. His publications, such as a Pictorial Reference 
Book for Chinese Architectural Design, later became well-known reference books 
circulating among Chinese native architects who were creating nationalistic 
architecture.  
 
Aside from Liang Si-cheng, many American Beaux-Arts trained Chinese 
architects began to exert their influence in their homeland. Through the similarity 
between Beaux-Arts design principles and Chinese building traditions, these 
architects finally found a new path for the course of modern Chinese architecture. 
In the 1930s, the Nanjing Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek and the 
KMT was looking for a new form to consolidate its political legitimacy from a 
wider social basis, and these native architects came to help them to establish a 
legitimate image of China’s new regime through the creation of a national style of 
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architecture. The development of nationalistic architecture reached its climax in 
Nanjing, the new capital of the nation. At that time, leaders of the KMT viewed 
these buildings as a visual form of propaganda that could fully serve their political 
ideology. Among these buildings, Lu Yan-zhi’s design for Sun Yat-sen’s 
Mausoleum and Henry Murphy’s proposal for Nanjing capital plan were the most 
influential projects. Without their devotion to the search for a national style, these 
nationalistic buildings would not have been built.  
 
When the KMT lost power in China in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his 
regime were forced to retreat to Taiwan. Chinese architects also moved with the 
government and settled on the island, introducing Chinese nationalistic 
architecture to Taiwan for the first time and continuing new developments. In 
order to reconstruct cultural, historical and ethnic relationships between Taiwan 
and China, the new rulers began to wipe out all traces of Japanese colonial 
heritage and re-direct social identification toward the KMT’s version of Chinese 
traditions. Chinese culture was now used to create a sense of national 
consciousness linking the mainland before 1949 to Taiwan thereafter. Architecture 
was seen as one of the main tools manifesting Chinese national culture, and in the 
early period of the KMT’s rule, many governmental buildings were clad with the 
Chinese classical big roofs and other traditional building elements that had been 
used in Nanjing.  
 
In order to awaken the national consciousness of the Taiwanese and convert 
them into ‘true Chinese’, the new rulers had set up a goal of re-sinicisation 
policies intended to clean the ‘toxins’ of Japan’s colonial enslavement education. 
Based on State Shinto, Japanese colonial shrines in Taiwan were viewed as the 
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centre of the Kominka Movement and the symbol of Imperial Japan that definitely 
needed to be purged after the new regime was established. Therefore most of the 
official Shinto shrines were temporarily used as national holy spaces for 
revolutionary fallen soldiers and the common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor, and 
later torn down for use as official Martyr shrines. These Martyr shrines not only 
served as sacred halls where the cultural and genealogical boundaries were 
identified through distinctive myths, symbols and cults of the nation, they were 
also used as important political institutions to evoke a deep sense of national 
consciousness in the population. The Taiwanese who were qualified to be 
enshrined in the Martyr shrines were also seen as converts who had finally been 
recognised as representatives of the ‘true Chinese’. Clad with the Chinese 
classical style, Taipei’s Martyr shrines were the most splendid buildings which 
reflected Chiang Kai-shek’s desire for the construction of a national holy space in 
the capital. These shrines also revealed that political leaders exercised their 
influence on shaping national identity by creating a new religious space for the 
nation and its population.  
 
During the Cold War period, the US supported Chiang Kai-shek’s 
totalitarian regime and viewed Taiwan as the most important ally and security 
cordon of the West Pacific Ocean. The position of Taiwan became a complex 
balance of power created by the antagonism of the Communist and Western camps. 
At the time, the tensions between Communist China and Free China also offered 
an opportunity for Chiang’s regime to promote an image that it was Taiwan not 
the mainland that was the true stronghold of Chinese culture. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that Chiang would launch the Culture Renaissance Movement in 1966 to 
strengthen his superior status as the heir of orthodox Chinese culture in Taiwan. In 
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the movement, Chiang attempted to promote numerous social and cultural 
activities to reflect current political needs, and convey a clear political message 
through visual forms.  
 
Taipei’s National Palace Museum was one of these buildings erected to 
symbolise the glory of Chinese national history and culture. During the design 
process, the architect Huang Boa-yu was asked to use explicit, straightforward 
revivalist styles to demonstrate that the National Palace Museum was a cultural 
shrine of the Chinese nation. Huang’s design conformed completely to the 
authority’s vision of an impressive museum housing the most important national 
treasures of the nation. Huang also carefully arranged the iconography programme 
that totally dominated the visitor experience. Object lessons were carefully 
organised by museum professionals and nationalists with the aim of turning the 
Taiwanese into new citizens of the Chinese nation. For Chiang Kai-shek, the 
museum was a useful political tool which could help boost national morale to 
strengthen his regime’s cultural authority and political legitimacy during wartime. 
This is why Chiang insisted that these national treasures move from Beijing to 
Taipei and a new national museum be built for displaying the more important art 
collections. These collections were no longer the property of the royal family, but 
state-owned art works exhibited in the museum for the public. The government 
also utilised the museum to acclaim themselves as the true protectors and heirs of 
Chinese national culture.  
 
The Chung-shan building was another governmental building constructed 
for the Chinese cultural renaissance movement. The building was a famous 
parliament building that conveyed the political message that Chiang Kai-shek 
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meant to deliver in visual form during the Cold War. Like most European 
monarchies, China did not have a parliament building, but used the emperor’s 
office where the work of government and meetings with courtiers were conducted. 
When the Qing court decided to implement modern political reform, the central 
and local governments began to construct different parliament buildings, such as 
the National Assembly and twenty-one other Provincial Assemblies. These 
buildings directly adopted a Western style to show the aspiration of the Qing court 
toward Westernisation and modernisation in political reforms. It was not until the 
Nationalist government took control of China and established the new capital in 
Nanjing, did the Chinese classical style begin to become a symbol of the nation, 
widely adopted in many party and governmental buildings, including the Great 
Hall of the National Assembly. But Chiang’s ideal of a splendid parliament 
building based on his political schemes was not fully achieved until the whole 
nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. In order to fulfill Sun Yat-sen's 
political ideology in Taiwan and to express a strong determination to protect 
Chinese culture in Free China, Chiang grasped the opportunity to erect a 
remarkable iconic architecture clad with Chinese classical styles on the 
Youngming Mountain. This building is the best example to illustrate that the 
processes and practices of political transformation in modern China under 
Chiang’s leadership were gathered and shaped into concrete and physical form to 
satisfy certain political needs.  
 
It should be noted that the image of Sun Yat-sen was very important to 
Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. After Sun died in 1925, a new political order was 
needed. Sun’s political thoughts were viewed as the modern version of the 
Confucian orthodoxy that should be revived in Chinese society. When Sun 
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Yat-senism was established, Chiang Kai-shek constantly reminded his people of 
his close personal and political relationship to Sun to legitimise his regime. The 
Confucian orthodoxy was re-introduced and seen as a core value of ‘Chineseness’ 
inherited from ancient sage emperors, philosophers, great thinkers and national 
heroes. After the 1920s, a new political culture that placed the cult of Sun 
Yat-senism in the centre of nationalist reinvention began taking shape. The KMT 
not only re-made Sun’s image and aura, but also developed a new set of regular 
ceremonies to honour Sun and to strengthen the relationship between the nation 
and its population. Among these ceremonies, Sun’s national funeral was the most 
important ritual, performed by the highest authority. It is clear that Chiang’s 
regime attempted to make use of Sun’s funeral and Nanjing capital’s historical and 
geographical links to arouse the sentiment of Chinese nationalism. By opening the 
central funeral rituals to public view through different media, the government 
intended to extend the ethnic boundary to a countrywide mass audience who were 
now included in the family of the nation.  
 
The construction of the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum on Nanjing's Purple 
Mountain was a turning point in the development of a Chinese classical style. 
Designed by Lu Yan-zhi (1894-1929), this Mausoleum successfully combined 
traditional Chinese architectural features with a new modern interpretation of 
monumentality. It also led to a new trend of architectural design, first in Nanjing’s 
official buildings and later spreading across the country. When the Nationalist 
government retreated to Taiwan, these national rituals and the modern Chinese 
monumentality created by Lu were also introduced to the island. The architect 
Wong Da-hong (1917- ) attempted to challenge this monumentality when he was 
commissioned to design the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei, and later 
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Yang Jhuo-cheng (1914-2006) gained inspiration from Lu’s work for his design of 
the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Built in late-1970s, the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall was the last nationalistic architecture erected to honour Chiang, the 
great leader of the nation. Although a great deal of criticism from modernist 
advocates targeted Chinese classical styles, it did not change the fact that it was 
the most popular style adopted in most governmental buildings in Taiwan. 
However, after the 1980s, the style had almost been forgotten due to enormous 
economic and social change. The anti-KMT and anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaigns 
began to flourish during the 1980s, challenging the political status of the 
Memorial Hall and Chinese nationalism in general. The square in front of the 
Memorial Hall became an ideal space for political demonstrations, and the whole 
area was also slowly and quietly transforming into a site for public recreation. 
Only a few tourists and the older generation came to the Memorial Hall to worship 
Chiang.  
 
It is clear that in all of the martyr shrines, museums, parliament buildings 
and memorial halls built at this time, Chiang Kai-shek had taken part in the design 
process. For example, the style of the Taipei Martyr shrines totally reflected 
Chiang’s favour for the Qing imperial building form. From the establishment of an 
official organisation, the movement of national treasures to the construction of a 
new national museum in Taipei, Chiang also intervened in the policy-making of 
the National Palace Museum. The Chung-shan building is probably the best 
known case to illustrate how Chiang altered the original design to conform to his 
ideal of a Chinese modern parliament building. The competition result of the 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was also decided by Soong May-ling, Chiang’s 
wife. Clearly, behind the construction of the nationalistic architecture in Taiwan, 
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the elite of the day played an important role in shaping the visible forms of the 
Chinese nation. 
 
Through analysis of reinvented Chinese nationalistic architecture, this 
current study proves that these buildings could not have been produced without a 
foundation formed by particular political, social and cultural circumstances in 
China and in Taiwan. During the period of nation-building, nationalists 
accompanied by architects tended to adopt cultural and traditional symbols from 
the past to create a sense of community and national identity in a visual way. The 
unique developments of modern Chinese politics led to a narrative of Chinese 
nationalism emphasising humiliation in war and national salvation. Influenced by 
Social Darwinism, these nationalists firmly believed that only when the Chinese 
empire successfully transformed its old system into a modern form of a 
nation-state, would the nation prevent itself from being eliminated by foreign 
powers. Many traditional myths and ethnic symbols were reconstructed and 
reinterpreted in order to fit into modern national myth-making, helping to 
consolidate the nation as a whole to fight against foreign influence. In addition, 
Confucianism, represented as a core value of China’s traditional cultural and 
political order, was used as a source to legitimise the nation’s current regime. 
Architecture, in this regard, was also an important part of national symbolism, 
demonstrating visually the idea of a Chinese nation by borrowing traditional 
elements from history.  
 
As Anthony D. Smith has pointed out, it is impossible to grasp the idea of 
nationalism without exploring its cultural matrix based on pre-existing ethnicity. 
Compared to modernism and prehistory, ethno-symbolism emphasises that the 
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influences of historical and cultural factors can indeed provide a better framework 
to explain Chinese nationalism. In Smith’s theory, a nation stems from its 
pre-existing ethnic roots and requires memories, myths and traditions. These 
symbols help the nation to create a cultural boundary and homeland identity in 
modern circumstances. In the early formation of the Chinese nation, in order to 
develop Chinese identity, many political elites searched for national symbols from 
the past to reconnect the old ethnicity with the new nation. Architecture as a 
powerful contributor of national symbolism, therefore, is created by those who are 
eager to forge the nation and fulfill their political blueprint through image-making 
and particular visual languages.  
 
Thus, this thesis argues that Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach 
does provide a convincing explanation in the close relationship between 
nationalism and architecture during the nation-formation. In recent years the 
modernist account of nationalism has been one of the most dominant approaches 
to nationalism study. However, modernism tends to pay much attention to the 
transformation of social structure, but little to the cultural and symbolic factors 
that may play a more important role in shaping nations and nationalism. 
Ethno-symbolism, on the other hand, re-connects ethnicity with nationality to seek 
for a better account of nations and nationalism. Based on this approach, the 
current study claims that only when a broader cultural and historical circumstance 
have been carefully examined, could nationalistic architecture and its relations be 
fully understood. In his new book The Nation Made Real: Art and National 
Identity in Western Europe 1600-1850, Smith conducts a research placing the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Western European visual culture into a 
wider social and historical context to deal with the subject of creating a national 
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image by means of art form in the era of nation-building. His works shed light on 
a great potential for a cross-disciplinary research in connecting nationalism studies 
to the subject of art and its relevance. 
 
From this perspective, this thesis is an attempt to respond to Smith’s 
ethno-symbolism in architectural discipline. As mentioned before, the studies on 
nationalistic architecture in the past have given too much weight to stylistic 
analysis to cataloguing these buildings. They tend to view the style as a priori 
evolved from time immemorial, but overlook a further discussion on a wider 
social, cultural and historical perspective of architecture related to nationalism. 
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce ethno-symbolism as an interdisciplinary 
method the explanation on the development of nationalistic architecture in 
post-war Taiwan.  
 
However, Smith’s perspective may encounter some theoretical problems. For 
example, in order to carry out a broader analysis of the historical background and 
cultural setting, Smith fails to pay enough attention to the political factors that 
may also play an important part in formation and shape of national ideology. John 
Hutchinson, also an active ethno-symbolist, on the other hnad, is aware of the 
problem and argues that, in the study of nationalism, politics takes a special place 
distributing and controlling culture as a necessary resource frequently conceiving 
conflicts in a territory of a nation.
4
 Therefore, this thesis suggests that the 
discussions of nationalism cannot by-pass the question of political power. It is 
inadequate to define nation and nationalism primarily in terms of cultural and 
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historical symbolic systems. It needs to place them into a network of power in 
order to quest for a better understanding.  
 
Built on this perspective, this thesis argues that nationalism is a particular 
use of cultural artifacts produced by a group of people tends to sustain their 
distinctive identity and ethnic continuity through a series of symbols in a country. 
Culture in nationalism is a matter of consensus determined by some leading elites 
who attempt to use it as an essential conceptual tool for carrying out certain 
political programmes during nationhood building. Architecture is one of the best 
examples to show that national cultural can be embodied by distinct visual 
languages to serve the need of power. Especially in the era of nation-formation, 
nationalists accompanied by architects, as myth-makers, are apt to adopt national 
identity in a visual way. The current study believes that through the close 
examinations on Taiwan’s nationalistic architecture, suffice it to say at this point 
that it can provide a satisfactory account for the topic of the metaphorical 
relationship between nationalism and architecture. It is also the major contribution 
of this thesis to the nationalism studies and architectural discipline.  
 
In recent years, the issue of nationalism related to architecture draws a 
special attention from scholarship. For example, a new edited book nationalism 
and architecture collects many article wrote by different scholars from 
architectural historians to theorists. Numerous cases presented in the book show a 
common phenomenon occurred in many countries that nationalists accompanied 
by architects use architecture as a political tool to reinforce identity during the 
nation-building. Here, a foundational and interdisciplinary theory is needed to link 
the recent nationalism studies in decades to the discussions on nationalistic 
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architecture. The purpose of this thesis is attempt to span the theatrical gap 
between nationalism and architecture.  
 
This thesis divides Taiwan’s nationalistic architecture into four different 
building types: the martyr shrine, the museum, the parliament building and the 
memorial hall. Although these buildings are the most representative examples to 
sufficiently explain the close relationship between the idea of nationalism and its 
visual representations, the current thesis was limited by the number of cases 
supporting the main argument. Only are the major official buildings which 
manipulated by national elites with aim to transform their political ideology into 
architectural forms in Taiwan presented in this thesis. This is not to deny the 
importance of other subordinate building types, such as educational institutes, 
religious architecture and commercial buildings. But these non-official buildings 
to some extent have little different architectural expressions in responds to the 
Chinese classical style. For example, although the main buildings in the campus of 
the Chinese Culture University are cladding with the Chinese palace style, the 
main references to the style and special arrangement are largely derived from I 
Ching philosopy (Book of Changes) and Bagua (eight symbols). Tainan’s China 
Town is another example showing that the architect attempt to give the 
commercial space a sense of great Chinese national nostalgia. Similar expressions 
also appear to other cases like hotels, hospitals, community centres, etc. These 
buildings apparently influence by Chinese nationalism, but not completely follow 
the rigid rules of Chinse traditional architecture.
5
 During the 80s, the idea of 
post-modernism also introduced to Taiwan and created a trend to enlarge, 
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 More details about the buildings please see Fu, 中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese 
Classical Style), . 
325 
 
exaggerate or distort Chinese architecture elements on the building façades. Here, 
the architects tend to pay more attention on relaxation of the Chinese classical 
building principle, but less on its political and national meanings.  
 
These buildings require another theoretical framework to seek for a better 
explanation. That is to say, the current study mainly emphasises the analysis of the 
top-down approach to the rise of Chinese nationalism and its effects on 
architecture. It may overlook people’s responses and reactions to these buildings 
from below. Although Anthony D. Smith has correctly pointed out that such 
micro-analysis indeed pays as little or no regard to historical background as the 
top-down approach did in their accounts, these bottom-up approaches still can 
offer partial explanations in people’s perspectives on established national ideology 
and these nationalistic buildings.
6
 Therefore, everyday aspects of nationhood and 
its effects on nationalistic architecture in Taiwan are other topics requiring further 
exploration in the future.  
 
Most importantly, Taiwanese nationalism is a rising political agenda which 
has challenged the idea of Chinese nationalism in the post-martial law era. This 
current thesis focuses only on the developments of Chinese nationalism and 
nationalistic architecture in Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalism and certain visual 
forms that are closely associated with the concept have not been examined. This 
may also be worth further exploration in the future.  
 
By singling out the significance of symbolic and visual elements in the 
formation and development of nations and nationalism, the current study offers an 
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 Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism, 134.  
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approach that bridges the theoretical gulf between nationalism studies and 
architecture. The rise of Chinese nationalism did stimulate a number of architects 
who were eager to search for a national style to fully represent the nation and 
national identity constructed by certain elites. Through the study of nationalistic 
architecture, this thesis argues that a more complete and nuanced account of the 
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